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SUMMARY 
 
 
The first paper (joint with François Degeorge and Roni Michaely) examines the role of brokers in 
the performance of securities analysts, after taking into account the inherent abilities of the 
employed analysts. Brokers can be divided into two groups. The first one includes the prestigious 
Wall Street firms, the second all the other lesser brokerages. Big Wall Street firms have the 
resources to hire the best talent and to provide their analysts with the necessary infrastructure. On 
the other hand, conflicts of interest put limits to how much analysts can reveal and how accurate 
their forecasts are. The conflicts of interest arise because of the business model of the big Wall 
Street firms. Most Wall Street firms are not only stock brokers, but also investment banks and want 
to secure as much lucrative  investing business as possible, even by hurting their brokerage business. 
A way to secure investment banking business is to put pressure upon  their employed analysts to 
issue favorable forecasts. At the same time, minor brokerages are less influenced by  conflicts of 
interest, but on the other hand they don't have the resources to employ the best analysts or to build 
the necessary infrastructure to support the employed analysts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) provide good description of the conflicts of interest phenomenon. 
So, working at a big Wall Street firm comes with advantages and disadvantages. Thus, it is 
interesting to ask if working at a large and resourceful Wall Street firm has overall advantages to 
the analyst, after controlling for an analyst's inherent ability. To this end, we have analyzed the 
analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts, long term recommendations value and short term reactions to 
recommendations release of analysts working both at top Wall Street brokers and lesser brokers. 
From the analysis of forecasts after controlling for an analyst's inherent ability, we have concluded 
that the effect of working for a large Wall Street firm is weak and in many cases the top firms are 
detrimental to their analysts' forecast accuracy relative to the performance of analysts employed by 
lesser brokers. The evidence from the long term recommendations evaluation is weak with no 
significant differences in performance; there is only weak evidence that the top firms have a 
negative effect on the sell recommendations. Finally, from the short term reactions, we find that the 
top brokers have a positive effect on the buy recommendations, but only for analysts who moved 
from lesser brokerages. Overall, the top Wall Street firm effect seems to be weak, it is not extended 
to all aspects of analysts’ performance and, assuming it is present, it cannot be exploited by all 
analysts at all phases of their career. In all cases (forecasts, long term recommendations value and 
short term reactions), we have found evidence that the top brokers are good at finding and 
employing non-top broker analysts who are good match for their business and discontinue the 
employment of analysts who are not. 
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The second paper uses analysts' quarterly forecasts to investigate the role of dividends. Signaling 
models, agency models and tax considerations have been put forth to provide explanations for the 
existence of dividends. Most studies examining the information content of dividends focus on 
whether dividends signal profitability. The reached consensus perceives dividends as having very 
limited, if any, signaling content for future earnings. Instead, dividends seem to be related to past 
profitability; as Miller put it, dividends lag earnings. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) 
see dividends as signaling the maturity of the firm, which leads to lower discount rates because of 
the reduction in risk. In the second paper I provide evidence that dividends have an information role, 
but a different one than the one assumed by signaling studies: I find that paying firms exhibit more 
information dissemination than their non-paying counterparts. The main challenge is to provide a 
measure for the information available to investors for each firm. I opt for an indirect way and I use 
the analysts’ forecasts as a way to proxy for this information. More specifically, I use the errors and 
the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a proxy to measure the information available to investors. If 
the forecasts for dividend-paying firms are more accurate than the forecasts produced for non-
paying firms, it means that the information for the dividend-paying firms available to analysts was 
more abundant or of higher quality than the information available for non-paying firms. The same 
logic applies to forecast dispersion. Higher dispersion means higher disagreement among analysts. 
So, lower dispersion for a firm means lower disagreement for this firm and lower disagreement may 
suggest a better information flow than the flow of higher dispersion firm. The results confirm both 
hypotheses: dividend-paying firms exhibit lower forecast errors and lower forecast dispersion. I also 
explore three factors which may cause the above results. First, there is more information available 
for dividend paying firms. A second factor that may contribute to higher information efficiency is 
the higher accrual quality of the dividend paying firms. Third, the forecasts for dividend paying 
firms are more evenly distributed across the quarter, implying less reliance on publicly available 
information and more dependence on private sources. Moreover, the market seems to react more 
mildly to news regarding dividend paying stocks. Dividend paying stocks exhibit lower return 
reactions with respect to favorable forecasts and hold/sell recommendations. Furthermore, both in 
favorable and unfavorable forecasts and buy and sell recommendations, they exhibit lower volume 
reactions. The reduced forecast errors are more pronounced for the cases of large firms and growth 
firms, which are the firms that have more discretion at reporting their quarterly earnings. The above 
results seem to point to an agency explanation of dividends, as described in Easterbrook (1984). 
 
The third paper makes use of the long term forecasts issued by financial analysts to examine the 
extrapolation hypothesis. The extrapolation hypothesis states that investors are too optimistic about 
vii 
 
growth and big firms and too pessimistic about value and small firms, extrapolating the firms’ 
recent performance. The extrapolation hypothesis (Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny, 1994) tries to 
explain why value strategies, buying cheap stocks using book-to-market and price to earnings ratios 
as measures, earn superior returns over adequately long periods. Long term forecasts forecast mean 
growth (in percent) of operating earnings over a period of three to five years. I find that the errors of 
the forecasted growth are greater for the low book-to-market firms and large firms. Also, for most 
cases during the sample period, the forecasting errors are positive for all categories of book-to-
market and size firms. In other words, the analysts overestimate the growth prospects of all firms, 
but they are particularly more optimistic about the outlook of growth and large firms, confirming in 
this way the extrapolation hypothesis. Then, I proceed to examine which are the factors that 
influence the analysts and lead them to issue optimistic long term forecasts for the growth firms, 
and at the same time cause the long term forecasts of all kind of firms to rise and decline together. I 
find that analysts seem to base their long term forecasts on the current GDP growth and the age of 
the firm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Resources or Ability? The Influence of top Brokers 
on Analysts’ Performance 
(joint with Prof. François Degeorge and Prof. Roni Michaely) 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the role of brokers in the performance of the securities analysts. Specifically, we 
divide the brokers in two groups, where the first group includes the most prestigious Wall Street 
brokers and the second all the other lesser brokers. The question we ask is if working for a top broker 
improves the forecast accuracy and the recommendation picks of the employed analysts, after 
controlling for each analyst’s inherent ability. 
 
I. Introduction 
Securities analysis is a multi-million dollar business and almost all the big Wall Street firms are 
involved, spending big amounts to employ analysts, their staff and the required infrastructure to 
produce reports which include earnings forecasts, recommendations and target prices. Beyond these big 
players a galaxy of smaller independent brokers produce earnings forecasts and recommend stocks. 
Most of these smaller brokerages cannot spend the required amounts to employ the star analysts and 
maintain the costly infrastructure which is necessary. The question is then if working for a big broker 
can make a difference for the individual analyst. Is the forecasting performance of the analyst improved 
if he can take advantage of the resources of a big broker, given his own ability? Is it beneficial for an 
analyst to work for a big broker, with respect to the analyst’s accuracy and investment picks? 
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Stickel (JF, 1992) provides evidence that All American (AA) analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than 
the forecasts by the non-AA analysts. Sinha, Brown and Das (Contemporary Accounting Research, 
1997) also report differences in forecasting among analysts. Mikhail, Walther and Willis (Journal of 
Accounting Research, 1997) attribute part of the forecasting discrepancies among analysts to 
experience. Clement (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999) examines the determinants of 
analysts’ forecasting performance and he argues that working for a resourceful broker is indeed 
beneficial for the analyst: analysts working for top brokers do seem to issue more accurate forecasts. 
However, he doesn’t examine if the better performance comes because the top brokers provide their 
analysts with more means to perform their tasks, or it is that top brokers can hire the best analysts. In 
the same spirit, Jacob, Lys and Neale (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999) also investigate the 
effects of experience, learning and brokerage houses on the accuracy of forecasts. 
Analysts do not just merely process financial information and then just report their best forecasts. The 
company’s executives have strong interest to manipulate the data they provide to analysts (Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser, JB 1999). Many times the analysts tend to cooperate with the management (Lim, 
JF 2001). There are also cases where the analysts are under pressure from their employer to produce 
favorable output, as described in Michaely and Womack (RFS, 1999) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 
(Contemporary Accounting, 2000). Larger brokers, which draw most of their income from the 
underwriting and investment banking activities in general, are maybe more inclined to put pressure on 
their analysts to report favorable estimates. 
There seem to exist differences in the performance of top and non-top brokers' recommendations value. 
Barber, Lehavy and Trueman examine the performance of the recommendations of top and non-top 
brokers before the Global Settlement agreement and they report differential performance between top 
(mainly investment banks) and non-top brokers. 
Hong and Kubic (JF, 2001) analyze the employment changes of analysts and find that the better 
forecasters have improved probabilities to move to higher status brokers. Also, after controlling for 
accuracy, they present evidence that the more optimistic analysts have also improved probabilities to 
move to higher status brokers. 
Previous research provides some evidence that there are analysts who consistently seem to perform 
better. Mikhail, Walther and Willis (JFE, 2004) report that there are analysts who exhibit a relative 
persistence in their stock picking ability. Groysber, Lee and Nanda (Management Science, 2008) also 
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analyze the moves of AA analysts between brokers. They find that analysts who move lose their 
competitive advantage when they move to broker with less resources. They deduce that analysts' 
performance is tied to the broker the analyst works for. 
Kim, Morse and Zingales (JFE, 2009) examine a question similar to the one in this paper but in a 
different setting. They focus on the output of economics and finance professors in top and non-top US 
universities. They do find that a top university helps its professors to increase output, however the gap 
with the non-top universities is shrinking, presumably because of advances in Internet and 
communication technology. 
We investigate the analysts’ performance with respect to forecast accuracy and recommendations’ 
returns. The contribution of this work is to identify if the resources of top brokers have an impact on 
the output of the analysts they employ, after controlling for the analysts’ inherent ability. In other 
words, can an analyst working for a top Wall Street firm improve his performance, because his 
employer is the Wall Street giant which allows the analyst access to unlimited resources? Previous 
research has investigated the question if forecasts and recommendations issued by the top brokers are 
better or worse, without investigating if the forecasts and recommendations are superior because of the 
broker per se, or because the top broker is able to attract analysts with higher abilities. The assumption 
is that, as in the case of Kim, Morse and Zingales (JFE, 2009) working for a top broker does make a 
difference. However, our results do not support such conclusion. The securities analysis landscape 
seems to be more complicated than academic paper publishing because of the agency problems 
between brokers, analysts and firms. 
We investigate both earnings forecasts and recommendations. For the earnings, we use panel 
regressions with analysts fixed effects and we regress the forecast accuracy on a set of control variables 
and a top broker dummy. We use panel regressions for the whole of our sample and we also focus on 
analysts moving from top to non-top brokers, and controlling for analysts' ability (through analysts 
fixed effects), we estimate the coefficient of the top broker dummy. Finally, we repeat the analysis for 
pre and post Global Settlement periods. The conclusion we reach is that the top brokers do not 
contribute positively to the overall performance of an analyst. In other words, after controlling for the 
analysts' inherent ability, top brokers cannot offer an improvement on the forecasts' accuracy, despite 
the resources devoted to the analysis business. 
As a next step we examine both the long term performance of the recommendations and the short term 
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price and volume reaction. For the long term performance we form separate long and sell portfolios and 
we estimate the alphas using the Carhart model. We fail again to establish any reliable positive 
connection between top brokers and performance.  
Finally, we investigate the market’s reaction to the recommendations release. The evidence provided 
points to a higher reaction to buy recommendations issued by analysts moving from top brokers from 
non-top ones. However, we find no effect on the reactions to sell recommendations.  
Section II describes the data used, section III analyzes the hypotheses and the obtained results and 
section IV concludes. 
 
II. Data 
The data comes from IBES and CRSP. We use the IBES Details (earnings forecasts) file from 1990 to 
2009, the IBES Recommendations file from 1993 to 2009 and CRSP monthly and daily file from 1990 
to 2009. For the investigation of earnings forecasts accuracy we use the intersection firms between 
CRSP daily file and IBES Details file. For the investigation of the recommendations performance we 
keep the intersection of firms between IBES Recommendations file and daily CRSP.  
Since we are interested not only in the forecasts/recommendations of an analyst, but also in the broker 
for whom the analyst worked at the time he issued the forecast/recommendation, it is crucial to be able 
to positively identify the broker who employed the analyst. However, there are cases in the IBES 
Details file with the same analyst appearing to change employment too often and in most cases between 
the same two brokers. For example, he may issue a forecast at March 1 for broker X, then at March 10 
for broker Y, then at April 1 for broker X, then at April 15 for Y again, and so on for a period which can 
extend from a few weeks to more than a year. The phenomenon includes both top and non-top brokers, 
and it is widespread in the whole 1990-2009 period, with a higher density of cases in the early sample. 
In order to resolve the problem, we require that each analyst has at least one year of continuous 
presence with the same broker. The one year cutoff was chosen as the minimum meaningful time that a 
broker would keep an analyst, i.e. it doesn’t make sense to hire an analyst and then fire him in less than 
a year. From the earnings sample we excluded analysts covering less than 4 or more than 40 firms per 
quarter. No such restrictions were used for the recommendations file: recommendations are far more 
sparse than quarterly earnings forecasts. We consider as top the following brokers: Bank of 
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America/Montgomery Securities, Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse/DLJ, First Boston, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, UBS/Warburg, Alex Brown, 
Salomon, and Sanford Bernstein. We create the intersection between the IBES Details file and CRSP 
monthly and IBES Recommendations file and CRSP daily file using the connection Table provided by 
WRDS. Summary statistics (after requiring each analyst to stay at a broker for at least a year) on 
analysts per year and firms covered per year are presented at Table [1]. There are 11903 firms, 8102 
analysts and 492 brokers in the earnings file, for a total of 1777745 observations/ forecasts for quarterly 
earnings. The mean number of firms covered by each analyst in a top broker is 11.14 (median 10) and 
10.95 (median 10) for analyst working at a non-top broker, as shown at Table [2]. In the 
recommendations file there are 12148 firms and 11784 analysts, with each analyst working at a top 
broker having issued 6.57 recommendations on average (median 5) and 7.32 (median 6) if he works at 
non-top broker, as reported at Table [3]. CRSP monthly dataset includes 21120 firms, from three 
exchanges ( NYSE, AmEx and NASDAQ ). At Table [4] we report number of firms at each size decile 
in the CRSP data. Deciles used are NYSE deciles, and were based on the market equity value at the end 
of the previous year. At Table [5] we present the number of forecasts per size deciles and number of 
covered firms per size decile. We see that analysts' coverage is tilted towards big firms with respect to 
forecasts number, but the number of companies covered in the lower size deciles is greater than the 
number of companies covered in the top deciles: There are more forecasts for the large firms. Table [6] 
presents the same information but separately for top and non-top brokers. We see that the analysts in 
the top brokers are focused on bigger firms, while their colleagues at smaller brokers cover more 
smaller firms. Table [7] reports the number of recommendations per size decile and number of firms 
per size decile. 
 
III. Hypothesis formulation and empirical evidence 
III. A. Forecasts 
III. A. 1. Whole Sample 
We create five variables to examine the accuracy of earnings forecast. The first is the absolute error 
standardized by the price of the stock at the month before the end of the financial quarter of the firm 
(SAE): 
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ܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ห௙௢௥௘௖௔௦௧೔,ೕ,೟ି௔௖௧௨௔௟ೕ,೟ห௉௥௜௖௘ೕ,೟                (1) 
where forecasti,j,t is the earnings forecast issued by analyst i, for the firm j at quarter t, while actualj,t is 
the actual earnings announced by the firm j for the quarter t. Since the earnings and earnings forecasts 
in IBES are already diluted, we divide the forecast error with diluted prices, Pricej,t.  
The other four are come from Bae, Stulz and Tan (JFE, 2008): 
ܲܯܣܨܧ௜,௝,௧ ൌ െ ௔௕௦௘௥௥௢௥೔,ೕ,೟ି௔௕௦௘௥௥௢௥ണ,೟തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௔௕௦௘௥௥௢௥ണ,೟തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത    (2) 
ܲܯܣܨܧ ௜ܲ,௝,௧ ൌ െ ௌ஺ா೔,ೕ,೟ିௌ஺ாണ,೟തതതതതതതതതௌ஺ாണ,೟തതതതതതതതത     (3) 
ܦܣܨܧ ௜ܲ,௝,௧ ൌ െሺܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ െ ܵܣܧఫ,௧തതതതതതതതሻ   (4) 
 
ܴܽ݊݃݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ெ௔௫ௌ஺ாೕ,೟ିௌ஺ா೔,ೕ,೟௥௔௡௚௘ௌ஺ாೕ,೟    (5) 
 
with ܧݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑܽ ௝݈,௧  
and ܾܽݏ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ห݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑܽ ௝݈,௧ห.    
 
The absolute error standardized by price (SAE) is a measure of absolute accuracy, while the other four 
are measures of relative accuracy, in the sense that the performance of the other analysts covering the 
firm is taken into consideration through the mean forecast error. Notice that the lower the SAE, the 
better the forecast. On the other hand, for pmafe, pmafep, dafep and range, the higher their value, the 
better the forecast. Table [8], panel A gives a description of the above performance measures. Table [9] 
reports basic statistics for the Error, absolute error and the 5 performance metrics. 
Since we want to find out if working for a top broker is beneficial for an analyst, we run the following 
regression for each of the 5 forecast performance measures: 
ܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ܿ݋݊ݏݐ ൅ ܽଵܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ܽଶܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௝,௧ ൅ ܽଷܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௝,௧ ൅
ܽସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ܽହܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௝,௧ ൅ ܽ଺ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௝,௧ ൅ ܽ଻ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ଼ܽܶ݋݌ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎ௜,௧ 
        (6) 
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 Forecast maturity is the difference in days between the announcement of the actual earnings and the 
forecast. The earlier the forecast, the higher the forecast error. Both dates are taken from the IBES 
details file. The experience of an analyst i is defined as the difference in years between his first forecast 
and his current forecast j,t. The higher the experience of the analyst, the more accurate his forecasts 
should be in general. The firm specific experience is defined as the difference in days between the 
analyst's first forecast for the given firm and his current forecast for the same firm. We postulate that 
the higher the firm specific experience, the more accurate the forecasts of the analyst for the given firm. 
The number of firms covered is the number of firms for which the analyst has issued forecasts in the 
given calendar quarter. We expect that the more firms an analyst covers, the worst his overall 
forecasting performance. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the 
month before the end of the financial quarter of the given firm. The rationale of the inclusion of size is 
that bigger firms maybe have different patterns of earnings (e.g. more stable), and this could introduce 
bias in the results. Also, we see at Table [6] that analysts in top brokers tend to cover bigger firms, 
while their colleagues in non-top brokers focus more on smaller firms. By including size to the set of 
regressors, we can control for this heterogeneity. Finally, it may be that there is more information for 
bigger firms, so forecasting may be easier. On the other hand, bigger firms have multiple lines of 
business, and this could make forecasting more difficult. Coverage measures the number of analysts 
covering the same firm at the given financial quarter. We postulate that the more extensive the 
coverage, the lower the forecasting errors of analysts, because of the higher diffusion of information 
about the given firm. The difficulty is defined as the average number of firms followed by the firm's 
analysts (Barth, Kasznik and McNichols, Journal of Accounting Research, 1999) and is designed to 
capture the difficulty of estimating the EPS of the given firm. The notion is that if the coverage of a 
firm is intrinsically more difficult, then the firm's analysts will cover less firms. The top broker dummy 
is a dummy which is one when the forecast was issued on behalf of a top broker and zero otherwise. A 
short description of the regressors is presented at Table [8]. 
As mentioned above, we take out analysts who cover less than 4 and more than 40 companies. We also 
windsorize absolute error and SAE at their 99th centile and pmafe and pmafep at their first centile. 
We present first the results at Table [10] from the pooled regression without size included in the 
regressors in order to confirm that the forecasts from top brokers are more accurate than forecasts from 
non-top brokers: top broker dummy is negative at the SAE regression and positive for the other four 
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metrics, indicating increased accuracy. It is also significant except from the case of dafep. So we can 
confirm previous research (e.g. Clement 1999) that forecasts from more resourceful brokers (a good 
proxy for top brokers) are more accurate. 
Next, we proceed to the examination of our main hypothesis. The results are presented at Table [11]. 
We perform both pooled regression estimation, as well as panel data estimation. We estimate both cases 
with and without quarter fixed effects. In the panel data regressions, we use the analyst and quarter as 
the panel dimensions. At each quarter we take the average of the analyst's accuracy measure (SAE, 
pmafe etc), the average experience during the quarter, the mean firm experience of the firms he covered 
in the quarter, the mean maturity of his forecasts, the mean size of the firms he covered and the mean 
difficulty of the firms he covered. For the panel estimation we require that the analyst didn't move from 
a top to a non-top broker (or vice versa) during the quarter, so the TopBroker dummy can take the 
values 0 or 1, and not fractional values. For the panel data we use analysts fixed effects. In the pooled 
regression cases we use clustered standard errors. The observations are clustered by firm and quarter.   
From the results of Table [11], Panel A we see that the SAE is the measure with the highest R2, while 
the dafep measure explains almost nothing of the variation of the model. In the pooled regressions we 
see that in all cases except dafep maturity increases the forecast error and it is strongly significant. 
Analyst experience improves SAE and causes the other four measures to deteriorate in both pooled 
regressions (Panel A and B) and it is significant in both cases, except for dafep. The number of 
companies seems to actually improve performance in the SAE metric, while being insignificant in the 
other cases. Size seems to strongly improve accuracy with respect to the first metric, but it actually 
decreases accuracy with respect to the other four measures. 
We also see that after controlling for size, the top broker dummy in the pooled regressions has turned 
positive for the SAE (Panel A, Tables [10] and [11]), while it has been reinforced for the other four 
metrics. This is an indication that size is beneficial for forecasting. Also the R2 of the SAE regression 
has improved substantially, while the R2 of the other four metrics has remained the same. 
Coverage exhibits the opposite behavior, it decreases accuracy for SAE and Dafep, but it improves 
accuracy for the other metrics. Difficulty has the opposite than the expected sign, except from the 
Dafep case. The higher “difficulty” means that many  firms are covered by the firm’s analysts, which 
means that the firm’s EPS results are relative easy to forecast. Easiness of forecasts means low SAE 
and high pmafe and pmafep. So, high “difficulty” implies low SAE, i.e. a negative coefficient, and high 
CHAPTER 1
8
pmafe etc., i.e. a positive coefficient. Forecasts issued for a top broker seem to be worse if we use SAE, 
but they seem better if we use the other four metrics. The forecasts coming from top brokers seem to do 
better than the forecasts of non-top brokers in relative terms. 
As mentioned above, the panel estimation is run over averages for each analyst at every quarter using 
analyst fixed effects. The underlying assumption is that an analyst's inherent ability remains the same; 
what changes is the ability of the broker to help him to make the most out of his limited and constant 
ability. The results are presented at Table[11], Panels C and D. The most important result is of course 
the coefficient of the TopBroker dummy. Since we have controlled for the analyst's ability, the dummy 
coefficient measures the marginal effect of the broker on the accuracy of the forecast. We see that in 
both cases, with and without controlling for time, the coefficient is insignificant for all measures at the 
5% level (pmafe and pmafep are marginally significant). Also, all metrics agree that working for a top 
broker actually deteriorates performance (positive coefficient for SAE, negative for the other cases). 
So, there is evidence, albeit weak, that working for a top broker is detrimental to the analyst forecast's 
accuracy. The benefits of more resources and better staff seem to be offset by possible conflicts of 
interest [Michaely and Womack, RFS 1999]. Maturity again is significant for most cases and again with 
the predicted sign. Experience seems to contaminate analysts' performance when we use SAE, while it 
is beneficial when we use pmafe, pmafep and range. Firm experience seems to degrade performance no 
matter which metric we use (“starts as an analyst, ends as an ambassador”). Size improves forecasts for 
SAE case, is detrimental for range and irrelevant for the other three metrics. Difficulty has a negative 
sign in the case without the quarter fixed effects for pmafe, pmafe and range, and it is statistically 
insignificant for the other two cases. In the quarter fixed effects, it seems to be beneficial based on the 
SAE metric and statistical insignificant for the other four cases. 
In order to shed more light on the effect of top brokers, we isolate the analysts who moved from non-
top brokers to top brokers and vice versa. We have 359 cases of analysts who moved from non-top to 
top brokers and 341 cases of analysts who moved from top to non-top brokers. We see that the number 
of people who moved to and from top brokers is approximately the same. 
The results for the analysts moving from non-top brokers to top brokers are shown at Table [12]. We 
estimate the same equation [6]. We estimate the model with pooled data (without quarter dummies) and 
panel data (analyst and quarter as dimensions), with and without quarter dummies. We focus on the top 
broker dummy. In the pooled case, the coefficient is positive and highly significant for the SAE, 
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indicating deteriorating performance. For the other four cases the results are statistically insignificant, 
with positive effect for pmafe, pmafep and range, and negative for dafep. Notice that again the version 
with the SAE has the highest R2. In the panel data cases, in the case without time dummies, the top 
broker dummy is positive and significant for the SAE case, indicating decreased accuracy. Pmafe, 
pmafep and range suggest improved accuracy, while dafep agrees with SAE. When we include the time 
dummies in the panel regressions, we see that in all cases the coefficient for the top broker dummy is 
insignificant and with exception of range they agree that the working for a top broker is detrimental for 
the accuracy of earnings forecast. 
The results for the analysts who moved from top brokers to non-top ones are shown at Table [13]. In 
the pooled regressions, we see that according to SAE, the forecasts issued on behalf of top brokers are 
better than the one of non-top brokers, the opposite for pmafe and pmafep, and no difference for dafep 
and range. Again, we move to the panel regressions to evaluate the marginal significance of the broker. 
At the panel estimation without quarter dummies (Panel B), we see that the topbroker dummy is 
negative (improved performance in top brokers) and significant for the SAE case, positive (improved 
performance in top brokers) and insignificant for dafep, while it is negative (improved performance in 
the non-top brokers) and significant for pmafe, pmafep and range. So, in this case we get mixed 
signals, the top brokers are either detrimental to performance or have insignificant effect. At the case 
with quarter dummies (Table [13], Panel C), only Pmafe, Pmafep and Range are significant and 
negative, indicating negative top broker effect. 
Finally we put analysts moving from non-top to top and top to non-top together. The results are 
presented at Table [14]. In the panel estimation without year dummies we see that no coefficient is 
significant, but again SAE and dafep point to positive effects of top brokers, while pmafe, pmafe and 
range point to negative effects. When we include time dummies, we get significance for pmafe and 
pmafep. So, by focusing on the analysts who move between top and non-top brokers, we see that the 
effect of top brokers is insignificant or even negative. 
 
III. A. 2. Global Settlement 
Global settlement brought changes in the way the securities business was conducted. In this section we 
repeat the analysis of the previous section for each period before (1990-2002) and after (2003-2009) 
the Global settlement, in order to check if the findings of previous section still hold for both periods, or 
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the results are driven by the results of one sub-period.  
The results for the pre-Global Settlement period are presented at Tables [15] through [18]. We focus on 
the panel regressions (with time dummies) and the top broker dummy. For the whole sample (Table 
[15], panel D), we see that the top broker dummy indicates improved marginal performance after 
controlling for analysts' intrinsic ability, but the effect is insignificant. For analysts moving from non-
top to top (Table [16], panel C), the t-statistics are very small, so the evidence is very weak, implying 
no benefit or loss of accuracy. For analysts moving from top to non-top brokers (Table [17], panel C), 
we see that the sign of all metrics agree that there is a deterioration in performance, but again the 
coefficients are not statistically significant, pointing to only weak deterioration. Putting both categories 
together (Table [18], panel C) we get the same evidence, that there is no effect of the top brokers on the 
accuracy of forecasts. 
The results for the post Global Settlement period appear at Tables [19] through [22]. We examine again 
to the estimates of the top broker dummy at the panel regressions. For the case with the whole sample 
(Table [19], panel D), the results point to deteriorating performance of the analysts: SAE, pmafe, 
pmafep and range point to negative top broker effect and are all significant, while dafep has a t-statistic 
of only 0.1. For the analysts who move from non-top to top (Table [20], panel C), we get again the 
same effect, deterioration of performance, but with no significance. The effect is more pronounced in 
the case of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers (Table [21], panel C). All coefficients point to 
the same effect (deterioration of performance) and are all significant with the exception of dafep. 
Adding the two categories of movers together (Table [22], panel C), gives the same picture of 
performance deterioration, with all but the dafep coefficients significant. 
 
III. A. 3. Focusing on the same firms 
When analysts change brokers, they don't keep covering the same firms they covered in their previous 
employer. Different brokers serve different clienteles and the analyst should change the firms he 
covers. Dropping some of the firms he covers and starting the coverage of new ones may decrease his 
overall performance because of bad forecasts about the earnings of the newly covered firms. This 
conjecture, coupled with the fact that he has to adapt to his new environment with more or less 
resources may introduce bias to the previous results. For this reason we expand the analysis to the 
analysts who move between top and non-top brokers examining only the firms for which there was a 
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continuation of coverage, despite the analyst's job change. We do it in two ways: In the first, we use the 
whole employment history in the two brokers, and in the second we focus on the two last quarters at his 
old job and at the third and fourth at his second. In the second approach we choose to focus on a limited 
period for the following reasons: we focus on the last two quarters at the old employer because the 
analyst would be well established in the broker and most probably able to make the most out of his 
employer, and also suffering because of all the drawbacks of his broker. We focus on the third and 
fourth quarter because the first two may be a transition period for the analyst, plus we want to avoid his 
performance to be contaminated by any other effects, e.g. later shocks to the broker, later problems 
with his new employer, increased pressure by the broker for favorable forecasts, changes in the firms 
covered (e.g. change of management) etc. In the first approach we keep a firm in the dataset if there is a 
forecast for it at least once in both the first and the second broker, i.e. the analyst covers the firm but 
not necessarily on a frequent basis. In order a firm to be included in the dataset of the second approach, 
there should be coverage of it in all the four quarters examined in the second approach, i.e. the analyst 
covers the firms on a regular basis.  
The results for the first approach are presented at Tables [23] and [24]. For analysts moving from non-
top to top brokers, the panel regressions with quarter dummies (Table [23], panel C) which measure the 
incremental benefits of the broker show improved but insignificant performance using SAE, and 
deteriorating but again insignificant performance for the other metrics. For the analysts moving from 
top to non-top brokers, the panel regressions with quarter dummies (Table [24], panel C) show 
deteriorating performance , insignificant for the case of SAE and Dafep and significant effect (pmafe, 
pmafep, and range). The results show that there is a positive effect for the analysts who leave the top 
brokers (i.e. negative top broker effect), both in absolute and relative accuracy.   
The results for the second approach (two quarters per broker) are presented at Tables [25] and [26]. 
Notice that because of the small amount of observations used, the tests fall short of statistical power. 
For the analysts moving from non-top to top brokers, the panel regressions (Table [25], panel C) show 
an improvement in both absolute accuracy (SAE, insignificant) and the relative one (Pmafe, 
significant). For the case on analysts moving from top to non-top brokers, focusing on the panel 
regression results (Table [26], panel C), we see that the top broker effect is detrimental but insignificant 
for SAE, but significant for the relative accuracy (Pmafe and Pmafep). 
The results of the two approaches point to an asymmetric behavior: analysts who move to top brokers 
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form non-top ones, improve their forecasts, even marginally, and analysts who leave their top brokers, 
again improve their forecasts. This points to the hypothesis that the top brokers know which analyst to 
hire and which one to let go or fire. 
 
III. A. 4. Discussion on the forecasts results 
We see from the above analysis of the forecasts issued by analysts working at top and non-top brokers, 
that overall there is some evidence that top brokers are detrimental for their analysts. This is especially 
the case also for the sub-sample after the Global Settlement agreement, i.e. negative top broker effect. 
However, the situation is different before the Global Settlement, with no clear evidence of any top 
broker effect. If we focus on the firms that analysts covered before their move and continued to covered 
after the move, there is some evidence that there is a positive top broker effect for the analysts who 
move to top brokers and negative for the ones who leave the top brokers. As mentioned above, this 
points to the hypothesis that the top brokers know which analyst to hire and which one to let go or fire. 
Indirectly, this is also evidence contrary to the existence of a positive top broker effect. We have seen 
that in general the analysts who move from non-top to top brokers do not exhibit any increase on their 
performance (after controlling for their own abilities). Given that there is a somewhat improved 
performance on the forecasts of the continuously covered firms, it follows that for the new firms which 
are assigned to the analyst there is no positive (actually slightly negative) effect, indicating that the top 
broker effect does not apply to all firms an analyst covers. Also, the top broker effect is not 
continuously active on an analyst; analysts leaving the top brokers improve their performance, an 
evidence of a negative top broker effect. In any case, there is not enough strong evidence to conclude 
that there is a positive top broker effect. If anything, there is evidence of a negative top broker effect. 
We also note that the top broker dummy for SAE is in general lower for the analysts moving to top 
brokers from non-top brokers than for the analysts who leave the top brokers, with the exception the 
comparison between the values of the dummy at Panel C of Tables [12] and [13]: 0.00008 for the 
analysts moving to top brokers and -0.00011 for analysts leaving the top brokers. For the other cases 
( Panel C at Tables [16] and [17], Panel C at Tables [20] and [21], Panel C at Tables [23] and [24], 
Panel C at Tables [25] and [26]), the value of the dummy for the analysts moving to top brokers is 
lower than the value of the dummy for the ones who leave. For the case of Pmafe, the value of the 
dummy is always higher for the analysts who move to the top brokers than the value of the dummy for 
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the ones who leave the top brokers (again, Panel C at Tables [12] and [13], Panel C at Tables [16] and 
[17], Panel C at Tables [20] and [21], Panel C at Tables [23] and [24], Panel C at Tables [25] and [26]). 
So, the analysts who move to top brokers seem to make more out of their employer than the analysts 
who left the top brokers. This is evidence that the top brokers are good at hiring analysts who are a 
good match for their business. 
 
III. B. Long term recommendations value 
III. B. 1. Whole Sample 
Recommendations are maybe the most visible output of the analysts research. In order to analyze the 
recommendations performance, we will use the framework proposed by Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 
[JFE, 2007]. We estimate the investment value of the of the recommendations of analysts working at 
top and non-top brokers, analysts who move from non-top to top brokers and vice versa and we also 
repeat the analysis for ex and post global settlement periods. Long term evaluations have the advantage 
of non being influenced by short term market reactions. The drawback is that we have to introduce a 
model to account for the risk of the recommendations portfolio. 
For the long term evaluation of the recommendations the basic methodology is the following: We form 
buy and sell portfolios and then we evaluate the performance of each portfolio by the alpha generating 
after adjusting for risk using the Fama and French factors plus momentum (Carhart model). We use buy 
and short portfolios instead of one portfolio (long-short), so we can compare the analysts performance 
for buy and sell recommendations separately. Given that the problem with the analysts changing 
employers too fast (as described in the Data section) is also present in the Recommendations file, we 
cleaned the IBES Recommendations dataset in the same way we cleaned the IBES Details file. The top 
brokers are the same as the ones used to analyze the Details file. After cleaning the recommendations 
data, we have identified 307 moves from non-top brokers to top ones and 301 moves from top to non-
top brokers. 
We create two daily rebalancing portfolios (one buy, one sell) for each analyst category of interest. We 
group buys and strong buys together (“buy” recommendations), and holds, sells and strong sells 
together (“sell” recommendations). We explain the formation of each portfolio with the following 
example. Assume we want to evaluate the performance of buy recommendations of analysts working at 
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top brokers. For each buy recommendation we buy $1.00 of the recommended stock at the close of the 
trading day the recommendations was issued. If the recommendation was issued after trading hours or 
during weekend, the recommendation enters the portfolio at the beginning of the next trading day at a 
price equal to the closing price of the previous trading day. By waiting until the end of the trading 
hours, we try to take into account the fact that small investors will not be aware of the 
recommendations immediately just after the release of the recommendation. The recommendation will 
remain in the portfolio for a year, except if it is reiterated, in which case the one year counting starts 
anew, or if it is removed by the analyst earlier than the one year limit by issuing a sell recommendation 
for the stock. There is a limit of two years that a recommendation can stay continuously in the 
portfolio. If the stock is recommended by more than one analyst, the stock enters the portfolio as many 
times as recommended. Since the portfolio is updated daily, we take the recommendation out of the 
portfolio at the end of the drop day (or the one year limit). In the case an analyst changes broker before 
a recommendation in the portfolio expires, the recommendation stays in the portfolio until its 
expiration, i.e. a position is not liquidated if the analyst leaves his broker. The above approach will 
produce a time series of daily returns which are calculated the following way: 
ݎ௜,௧௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢ ൌ
∑ ௫೔,೟∗௥೔,೟ೝ೐೎೙೟೔సభ
∑ ௫೔,೟೙೟೔సభ
   (7) 
 
where ݎ௜,௧௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢  is the daily return of the recommendations portfolio, ݎ௜,௧௥௘௖ is the gross return on 
recommendation i at date t, nt is the number of recommendations in the portfolio, and xi,t is the 
compounded daily return of recommended stock i from the close of trading on the day the 
recommendation was issued through day t-1. 
 
These daily returns will be used to estimate the alpha of the portfolio using the three Fama-French 
factors plus the momentum factor (Carhart model): 
ݎ௜,௧௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢ െ ݎ௙,௧ ൌ ߙ െ ߚ൫ݎ௠,௧ െ ݎ௙,௧൯ ൅ ݏሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݄ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߤሺܹܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௧  (8) 
 
ݎ௜,௧௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢ is the date t return of portfolio j, rf,t is the date t risk-free rate, rm,t is the date t 
return on the value-weighted market index, SMBt is the date t return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of small-cap stocks minus the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of 
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large-cap stocks, HMLt is the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 
minus the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, and WMLt is the 
date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of stocks with high recent returns minus the date t return on 
a value-weighted portfolio of stocks with low recent returns. The four factors come from the website of 
Kenneth French. 
 
In order a daily return to be included in the regression to estimate alpha, at least 50 active 
recommendations are required to be active that day. The reason is to have a well-diversified portfolio in 
order to avoid the results being driven by a few really good or bad recommendations. We use the above 
methodology to evaluate the buy and sells portfolios of top and non-top brokers, analysts who moved 
from non-top to top and vice versa and we also repeat the analysis of the movers case for ex and post 
Global Settlement. Finally, we perform the movers analysis by putting each recommendation one day 
earlier in the portfolio. The idea is to replicate the benefits of a big institutional investor with privileged 
access to information. 
Table [27] presents the daily alphas of the buy and sell recommendations of top and non-top brokers. 
Only the alpha for the case of buy recommendations of the top brokers is significant, while the 
differences between the alphas of non-top and top brokerages are not significant. Figure [1] 
demonstrates the evolution of the portfolio value and the number of active recommendations for each 
portfolio. 
We present the results of the moving analysts at Table [28]and at Figure [2]. We focus initially on the 
analysts who move from non-top brokers to top ones. The results are presented at Table [28], Panel A. 
We see that the non-top buy recommendations are significant at the 5% for the analysts moving from a 
non-top to a top broker, their top brokers recommendations are significant at the 10%, but the 
difference in performance is not significant. The performance of the sell recommendations also is better 
when the analyst was at the non-top broker, but again the difference is not significant. For the analysts 
moving from top to non-top brokers, the performance of the buy recommendations Is better at the top 
broker, but for the sell recommendations it is better at the non-top broker. In either case, the difference 
in performance is not significant. We see that there is weak evidence that there is a detrimental effect 
on the sell recommendations, and no clear effect on the buy recommendations. 
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III. B. 2. Global Settlement 
We delve deeper, we break the sample into before and after Global Settlement periods, and we repeat 
the analysis of the recommendations of analysts who move between the two broker groups. The results 
are presented at Tables [29] and [30] and Figures [3] and [4]. We focus initially on the performance 
before the Global Settlement, Table [29] and Figure [3]. An analyst who moves from a non-top to a top 
broker exhibits deteriorating performance after he leaves his old broker. However, the differences are 
very small and none is significant. An analyst who moves from a top to a non-top broker issues worse 
buy and sell recommendations at his new non-top broker. Again, no difference in performance is 
significant. The negative top broker effect (non-top to top case) and the positive effect (top to non-top 
case) are not statistically significant and the overall it seems that no top broker effect is present, or the 
top broker effect doesn’t apply to all analysts in a uniform fashion. 
 For the case of the moves after the Global Settlement (Table [30] and Figure [4]), there is weak 
evidence that the buy recommendations perform better at the top brokers, since in both movers 
categories the buy recommendations perform better, but the difference in performance is statistically 
insignificant. The opposite is true for the sell recommendations: in both categories the sell 
recommendations issued when the analyst was at the non-top broker perform better. Again however, no 
difference in performance is significant. 
Next we try to see if an institution with earlier access to analysts’ recommendations can achieve 
abnormal returns. To this end, we move the inclusion of each recommendation to the corresponding 
portfolio the day before the recommendation was issued. The results are presented at Table [31] and 
Figure [5]. Most results are now significant. For the non-top to top analysts, the top brokers have no 
effect on the buy recommendations and to deteriorate the sell ones. The differences in performance are 
again insignificant. The difference in performance between the sell recommendations issued by 
analysts who moved from non-top to top, even if it is not significant statistically, it is a 3% annual 
return, which economically is significant and it is possible to point to the fact that initially (at the non-
top broker) the analysts were mostly following the drop of a stock, while in their top broker are making 
more original calls. For analysts moving from top to non-top brokers, the buy recommendations 
perform the same, but the sell ones are slightly better at the non-top broker, but the difference is not 
significant. 
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III. B. 3. Discussion on the recommendations value 
The evidence from the long term recommendations value is that working for a top broker has only 
limited effect on the profitability of the recommendations picks of a given analyst. There is only limited 
evidence that there is a detrimental effect in the sell calls, coming mainly from the period after the 
Global Settlement agreement and the use of the sell recommendations one day before their public 
release. If we compare the alphas generated by the two categories of analysts, we see that the analysts 
moving to top brokers from non-top ones, usually perform better in the top brokers than the analysts 
who leave the top brokers to move to non-top ones. This is also valid for the performance of the two 
groups at the non-top brokers. This provides some weak evidence that the top brokers are good at 
hiring competent analysts and replace with them analysts with inferior performance, who then move to 
non-top brokers. 
 
III. C. Return and volume reaction 
III. C. 1. Methodology and results 
Next, we investigate the short term effect of the recommendations. We focus on the return and volume 
reactions during a short reaction of three days centered on the day the recommendation was issued. We 
take into consideration the Hansen critique that the analysts simply react to publicly available 
information by using the First Call Preannouncement dataset and remove from our sample the 
recommendations which are close to events recorded in the Preannouncement database. We also require 
that each recommendation is six trading days away from another recommendation and announcement 
of quarterly results. Following the above methodology, we can isolate each recommendation from a 
number of confounding effects that might actually cause the return and volume reaction. The quarter 
results announcement dates are taken from Compustat. Because of the nature of the metrics used, we 
require that each recommendation has 61 valid trading days before and after the recommendation 
release. 
In order to measure the volume reaction, we use the following ratio: 
௜ܸ,௧௥௘௔௖௧௜௢௡ ൌ ௏೟
೔
൫∑ ௏೟೔షలభ೟సషమ ା∑ ௏೟೔లభ೟సమ ൯∗ଵ ଵଶ଴ൗ
                (9) 
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with ௧ܸ௜ the volume of the stock i at date t.  
In order to measure the return reaction, we use the following metrics: 
ݎ௜,௧௥௘௔௖௧௜௢௡ ൌ |௥|೟
೔
൫∑ |௥|೟೔షలభ೟సషమ ା∑ |௥|೟೔లభ೟సమ ൯∗ଵ ଵଶ଴ൗ
                                                    (10) 
 
ݎ௜,௧௘,௦௜௭௘ ൌ ൣ∏ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧௜ାଵ௧ୀିଵ ሻ െ ∏ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧௦௜௭௘ሻାଵ௧ୀିଵ ൧	                                (11)                 
ݎ௜,௧௘ ൌ ଵ௡೟ ∑ ሺݎ௜,௧ െ ݎ௠,௧ሻ
௡೟௜ୀଵ                                                                     (12)                  
with ݎ௧௜ the return at day t for the stock i, ݎ௧௦௜௭௘ is the size decile return at day t and ݎ௠,௧ the market 
return at day t. 
The idea of the first metric is to compare the volume of the day of recommendation release and the 
adjacent days to the medium term average trading volume of the stock. The second metric does the 
same thing but for returns, using absolute returns since returns can be negative and the average return 
goes close to zero. The third measures the size adjusted return for a window of one before and one day 
after the release of the recommendation. The fourth one is just the market adjusted daily return. 
First, we present results for top and non-top brokers. The results are presented at Tables [32] through 
[35]. We see that for all cases, the reactions are statistically significant. The difference between the size 
adjusted return of non-top and top brokers is significant for the case of buy recommendations 
(t=3.728), but not for the case of sell recommendations. For the buy recommendations the volume 
reaction at the day of the release and the same day return reaction of the recommendations of the top 
brokers are higher than the ones from the non-top ones. For the sell recommendations, the volume 
reaction to non-top brokers is larger than the one to top brokers. The opposite is true for the return 
reactions, the sell recommendations of the top brokers cause higher return reactions and have more 
negative cumulative size-adjusted returns . 
In order to evaluate the top broker effect, we focus again on the analysts who move from non-top to top 
brokers and from top to non-top brokers. The results are presented at Tables [36] through [43] and also 
at Figures [6] through [17]. In all cases, the reactions at the day of release are significant for all metrics. 
The same applies for the reactions at the days previous and after the release of the recommendation. 
The size-adjusted return for the buy recommendations appears to be higher than the size adjusted return 
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for the sell recommendations for most cases. Notice that for volume reactions and return reactions, we 
test significance against one, since we are using volume reaction standardized by the average 
volume/return of the stock. For the size adjusted returns, we test significance against zero. 
In order to evaluate the influence of the brokers, we compare the size-adjusted returns when the 
analysts were at the non-top and top brokers. For the case of analysts moving from non-top to top 
brokers we find that the difference for the buy recommendations is (non-top: 0.01207, top: 0.0205) is 
significant at the 5% level. The difference in returns for the sell case is not significant. For the case of 
analysts moving from top to non-top brokers, the differences in the size adjusted returns are not 
statistically significant, even if in both cases the returns related to recommendations which come from 
the top brokers are larger both for the buy and the sell recommendations. 
 
III. C. 2. Discussion on the short term reactions 
The tables presented above present evidence of weak top broker effect, focused on buy 
recommendations: buy recommendations in both cases of moving analysts have higher return reactions 
and higher size-adjusted returns, with the size-adjusted returns of the analysts moving from non-top to 
top to be significant. However, since top brokers recommendations in general cause larger reactions, it 
is not clear if the increased reactions of “promoted” analysts is because the top broker enhanced their 
abilities (or, more precisely the marker thinks that the top broker enhanced their abilities) or it is that 
the increase in the reaction comes because of the weight the investors put on recommendations coming 
from top brokers. In order to resolve the issue, we test the response of the “promoted” analysts’ buy 
recommendations size adjusted return (0.0205) to the one of the top brokers in general (0.015). The t-
test yields t=1.647, which is marginally significant at the 10% level, providing some evidence that the 
top broker improves the analysts' abilities. We get no clear evidence from the sell recommendations, 
since for one group (non-top to top) the reactions are higher for the non-top brokers, for the other group 
higher for the top broker recommendations. Notice also that for the analysts moving from top to non-
top, their buy recommendations' reaction are very close to the ones for all buy recommendations issued 
by top brokers. Moreover, even if the size adjusted return reactions of the recommendations issued by 
non-top broker analysts who were to move to top brokers are about the same with the average size-
adjusted reactions to non-top brokers, after moving to top brokers, the size adjusted return reactions 
their recommendations cause are above the average of a top broker issued buy recommendation. 
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Overall, the evidence points to the case that there is a limited top broker effect for the buy 
recommendations and also that the top brokers are able to hire analysts that may perform better than the 
average top broker analyst. 
The overall analysis from the reactions to recommendations shows that top brokers might help their 
analysts to increase the responsiveness of the market to their buy recommendations, but have no effect 
on the sell recommendations. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
We have tried to evaluate the effect of top brokers on analysts’ performance. To this end, we have 
analyzed the analysts’ forecasts, long term recommendations value and short term reactions to 
recommendations release. From the analysis of forecasts we have concluded that the top broker effect 
is weak and in many cases the top brokers are detrimental to their analysts forecast accuracy. The 
evidence from the long term recommendations evaluation is weak with no significant differences in 
performance; there is only weak evidence that the top brokers have a negative effect on the sell 
recommendations. Finally, from the short term reactions, we see that the top brokers have a positive 
effect on the buy recommendations, but only for analysts who moved from non-top brokers. Overall, 
the top broker effect seems to be weak, it is not extended to all aspects of analysts performance and, 
assuming it is present, it cannot be exploited by all analysts at all phases of their careers.  
In all cases (forecasts, long term recommendations value and short term reactions), we have found 
evidence that the top brokers are good at finding and employing non-top broker analysts who are good 
match for their business and discontinue the employment of analysts who are not. 
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Table 1   . Basic Summary Statistics for earnings file
Panel A: Number of firms in the IBES details file
                    
 20.   2009   3825  
 19.   2008   4220  
 18.   2007   4536  
 17.   2006   4427  
 16.   2005   4383  
                    
 15.   2004   4237  
 14.   2003   3897  
 13.   2002   3946  
 12.   2001   4182  
 11.   2000   4752  
                    
 10.   1999   5167  
  9.   1998   5311  
  8.   1997   5388  
  7.   1996   5105  
  6.   1995   4496  
                    
  5.   1994   4182  
  4.   1993   3577  
  3.   1992   3211  
  2.   1991   2808  
  1.   1990   2594  
                    
        yyy    num  
                    
Unique firms present for all years: 11903
Panel B: Number of analysts in the IBES details file
                    
 20.   2009   2297  
 19.   2008   2872  
 18.   2007   3005  
 17.   2006   3042  
 16.   2005   2995  
                    
 15.   2004   2891  
 14.   2003   2777  
 13.   2002   2786  
 12.   2001   2904  
 11.   2000   2841  
                    
 10.   1999   2878  
  9.   1998   2736  
  8.   1997   2491  
  7.   1996   2137  
  6.   1995   1976  
                    
  5.   1994   1799  
  4.   1993   1558  
  3.   1992   1340  
  2.   1991   1296  
  1.   1990   1129  
                    
        yyy    num  
                    
Unique analysts present for all years: 8102
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Panel C: Number of brokers in the IBES details file
                   
 20.   2009   208  
 19.   2008   225  
 18.   2007   251  
 17.   2006   260  
 16.   2005   271  
                   
 15.   2004   253  
 14.   2003   235  
 13.   2002   196  
 12.   2001   197  
 11.   2000   197  
                   
 10.   1999   206  
  9.   1998   211  
  8.   1997   199  
  7.   1996   180  
  6.   1995   169  
                   
  5.   1994   163  
  4.   1993   145  
  3.   1992   119  
  2.   1991   115  
  1.   1990   115  
                   
        yyy   num  
                   
Unique brokerss present for all years: 492
Table 1: The table reports descriptive statistics of the data included in the earnings forecasts sample. 
The data come from the intersection of  IBES earnings file and CRSP monthly file, after requiring each 
analyst to stay with his broker for at least one year.
Table 2  :  Number of firms covered according to the broker category
Panel A: Number of firms covered: top brokers
                                                          
     2009         11.66721              11        8.894514
     2008         11.53795              11        8.574792
     2007         11.48592              11        8.300396
     2006           10.869              10        7.808252
     2005         10.44661              10        7.468655
     2004         10.18143              10        7.314246
     2003         9.776358               9        7.015596
     2002         10.06616               9        7.112914
     2001         10.08875              10        6.794093
     2000         10.35628              10         7.29088
     1999         11.37146              11        8.453212
     1998          11.5051              11        8.235364
     1997          11.6456              11        8.489722
     1996          12.4472              12         8.79559
     1995         12.39916              12        9.462796
     1994         12.58998              11        9.667235
     1993         12.98519              12        9.657193
     1992         12.81915              12        9.222392
     1991          10.8026              10        8.478238
     1990          10.5514              10        8.493263
                                                          
      yyy   mean(meanNu~s)   med(meanNu~s)    sd(meanNu~s)
                                                          
All years: mean: 11.14, median: 10, std: 8.2
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Panel B: Number of firms covered: non-top brokers
                                                          
     2009         12.24778              13        7.058325
     2008         11.63876              12        6.979713
     2007         11.64892              12        7.332205
     2006         11.42829              11        7.145503
     2005         11.14216              11        7.012056
     2004         10.90928              11        6.579288
     2003         10.20824              10        6.812195
     2002         9.918005              10        6.863027
     2001         9.763517               9        7.212565
     2000         10.15718               9        7.283477
     1999         10.50422               9        7.674718
     1998         10.40313               9        7.794388
     1997         10.78319              10        8.244837
     1996         11.43307              10        9.204965
     1995          11.7465              11        9.490662
     1994         12.23669              11        9.637233
     1993          11.6324              10        9.646353
     1992         11.46498              10        9.407547
     1991          10.3242               9        8.751531
     1990          9.52849               8        8.376392
                                                          
      yyy   mean(meanNu~s)   med(meanNu~s)    sd(meanNu~s)
                                                          
All years: mean: 10.95, median: 10, std: 7.78
Table  2:  The  table  reports  number  of  firms  covered  by year  and broker  category in  the  earnings 
forecasts sample. The data come from the intersection of  IBES earnings file and CRSP monthly file, 
after requiring each analyst to stay with his broker for at least one year. Top brokers are defined at 
Table 8.
Table 3  .  Basic summary statistics for Recommendations file
Panel A: Number of firms
                    
 18.   2009   3760  
 17.   2008   4189  
 16.   2007   4460  
                    
 15.   2006   4425  
 14.   2005   4345  
 13.   2004   4226  
 12.   2003   4196  
 11.   2002   4317  
                    
 10.   2001   4248  
  9.   2000   4860  
  8.   1999   5312  
  7.   1998   5508  
  6.   1997   5409  
                    
  5.   1996   5193  
  4.   1995   4593  
  3.   1994   4407  
  2.   1993   3420  
  1.   1992      1  
Unique firms present at all years: 12148
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Panel B: Number of analysts
                    
 18.   2009   3242  
 17.   2008   3450  
 16.   2007   3520  
                    
 15.   2006   3485  
 14.   2005   3485  
 13.   2004   3407  
 12.   2003   3300  
 11.   2002   3535  
                    
 10.   2001   3270  
  9.   2000   3418  
  8.   1999   3529  
  7.   1998   3349  
  6.   1997   2866  
                    
  5.   1996   2521  
  4.   1995   2197  
  3.   1994   2000  
  2.   1993   1296  
  1.   1992      1  
                    
        yyy    num  
                    
Unique analysts present at all years: 11784
Panel C: Recommendations issued by analysts: top brokers
All years: mean: 6.57, median: 5, std: 6.1
                                                          
     2009         6.084243               4        5.616028
     2008         6.523279               4        6.083884
     2007          6.02336               5        5.736369
     2006         5.788618               4        5.544864
     2005         5.325367               4        4.604987
     2004         5.598478               4         4.81432
     2003         6.488605               4        6.354212
     2002         7.790997               6        6.970785
     2001         5.421728               4        4.507517
     2000         5.632688               5        4.897762
     1999         6.429173               5        5.822737
     1998         6.696479               5        6.243486
     1997         7.129762               6        6.273357
     1996         7.456724               6        6.001594
     1995         8.021834               7        6.800218
     1994         10.55596               9        9.725133
     1993         9.911043               8        7.729747
                                                          
      yyy   mean(meanNu~s)   med(meanNu~s)    sd(meanNu~s)
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Panel D: Recommendations issued by analysts: non-top brokers
All years: mean: 7.32, median: 6, std: 6.75
Panel E: Buy and sell recommendations for the top brokers
                                                          
     2009         7.117683               6        5.352582
     2008         7.184401               6        5.511893
     2007         6.726257               6        5.157846
     2006         6.770264               6        6.004221
     2005         6.516016               6        5.922339
     2004         7.256266               6        12.63269
     2003         7.548919               7         5.39711
     2002         8.165094               7        5.880309
     2001         6.568452               6        4.919975
     2000         6.629484               6          5.3609
     1999         6.964625               6        5.823819
     1998          7.28748               6        6.562487
     1997         7.221441               6        5.666084
     1996         8.054886               7        6.952403
     1995         8.645236               7        7.177566
     1994         9.049652               7        8.140511
     1993          10.1448               8        9.355524
                                                          
      yyy   mean(meanNu~s)   med(meanNu~s)    sd(meanNu~s)
                                                          
                        
     2009   2,023  3,659
     2008   3,461  6,494
     2007   3,876  5,882
     2006   3,239  5,820
     2005   2,985  4,923
     2004   2,803  5,257
     2003   3,846  6,840
     2002   7,130  8,906
     2001   5,417  3,073
     2000   5,834  2,738
     1999   6,749  2,980
     1998   6,066  3,064
     1997   5,343  2,661
     1996   5,060  2,709
     1995   4,275  3,351
     1994   4,614  3,371
     1993   1,984  1,367
                        
      yyy     Buy   Sell
              RecCode   
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Panel F: Buy and sell recommendations for the non-top brokers
Table 3: The table reports descriptive statistics of the data included in our recommendations sample, 
after  requiring each analyst  to stay with his  broker for  at  least  one year.  “Buy” recommendations 
include “Buy” and “Strong Buy”, while “Sell” recommendations include “Hold”, “Sell” and “Strong 
Sell”. Top brokers are defined at Table [8].
Table 4. Number of firms per size decile in the monthy CRSP file 1990-2009.
      Total      163,739      100.00
                                                
         10        5,753        3.51      100.00
          9        6,532        3.99       96.49
          8        7,292        4.45       92.50
          7        8,209        5.01       88.04
          6        9,394        5.74       83.03
          5       11,268        6.88       77.29
          4       13,550        8.28       70.41
          3       16,685       10.19       62.14
          2       21,338       13.03       51.95
          1       63,718       38.91       38.91
                                                
     decile        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
Table 4: The table reports the number of firms per size decile in the CRSP monthly file 1990-2009. 
Deciles used are NYSE deciles, and were based on the market equity value at the end of the previous 
year. 
                          
     2009    7,160   9,087
     2008    9,322  11,532
     2007    9,162   9,814
     2006    8,924   9,896
     2005    8,764   9,173
     2004    9,585  10,190
     2003    8,837  10,656
     2002   12,156  10,709
     2001   10,190   6,143
     2000   11,889   4,685
     1999   12,781   5,512
     1998   13,026   6,489
     1997   11,339   5,581
     1996   10,929   6,332
     1995   10,483   7,040
     1994    8,195   5,765
     1993    3,972   3,019
                          
      yyy      Buy    Sell
               RecCode    
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Table 5. Number of forecasts and firms per size decile
Panel A: Number of forecasts for each decile
                                                                                          
     2009    4,444   4,793   7,027   9,635  10,999  12,480  14,145  14,306  17,068  22,799
     2008    5,348   7,257  10,019  12,321  13,371  15,263  14,143  16,371  20,482  27,446
     2007    3,968   6,916  10,627  11,949  11,700  12,230  12,760  13,808  19,154  24,134
     2006    3,401   6,475   9,180  10,978  11,477  12,720  11,348  14,450  19,648  24,744
     2005    2,366   5,575   8,222  10,934  10,619  10,641  12,601  14,482  18,616  24,352
     2004    1,784   3,947   7,792   8,798  10,993  10,368  11,610  13,910  18,625  24,317
     2003    2,139   3,916   5,288   7,170   7,627   9,229  10,595  11,464  16,535  21,525
     2002    1,614   2,854   4,075   5,506   7,829   9,029  11,658  12,107  15,726  21,981
     2001    2,151   3,074   3,970   5,243   7,491   8,491  10,566  13,411  16,581  25,211
     2000    1,734   2,434   3,302   4,600   5,361   6,614   8,756  10,985  14,156  20,472
     1999    3,377   4,504   5,334   5,800   6,969   7,704   9,715  12,313  14,215  19,424
     1998    4,446   6,065   6,137   6,492   7,031   8,058   8,223  10,275  13,412  19,032
     1997    4,370   5,271   5,577   5,689   6,361   6,302   7,125   9,257  12,877  16,310
     1996    4,245   4,287   5,298   5,659   5,466   5,789   7,619   9,490  12,639  15,806
     1995    4,265   3,882   4,792   4,360   5,667   5,855   7,812   9,457  12,308  16,177
     1994    4,365   4,645   4,237   4,739   4,906   6,117   7,524   8,555  11,241  14,808
     1993    2,232   2,828   3,669   3,639   4,032   4,552   5,642   6,445   8,667  11,699
     1992    1,838   2,944   3,572   4,154   4,274   5,497   5,617   6,897   9,193  11,650
     1991    1,678   2,358   3,038   3,414   3,810   4,467   4,643   5,754   6,839   9,528
     1990    1,831   2,043   2,277   2,803   3,207   3,551   3,554   4,700   5,501   7,521
                                                                                          
      yyy        1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9      10
                                                decile                                    
                                                                                          
Panel B: Number of firms for each decile
                                                                                
     2009     644    400    395    424    390    378    332    288    286    268
     2008     722    510    499    459    431    375    307    311    285    279
     2007     638    600    636    517    432    387    347    304    323    292
     2006     608    574    576    506    447    397    327    315    323    295
     2005     521    606    584    547    436    362    343    321    312    292
     2004     420    527    648    485    475    362    347    306    298    291
     2003     483    526    459    437    392    373    333    288    295    272
     2002     419    461    425    429    455    410    395    319    302    298
     2001     565    493    429    430    462    403    373    358    331    319
     2000     579    478    477    513    506    451    493    443    428    371
     1999     862    666    580    554    461    455    443    421    369    326
     1998   1,048    824    646    528    454    443    340    355    325    312
     1997   1,079    795    685    553    508    386    379    354    335    288
     1996   1,006    703    627    583    458    380    373    343    331    270
     1995     906    587    558    421    410    350    346    330    300    261
     1994     897    646    459    396    349    321    301    297    270    230
     1993     595    483    468    394    347    292    274    266    231    212
     1992     452    446    422    410    310    288    243    230    208    187
     1991     424    370    362    321    281    263    211    214    187    168
     1990     457    333    275    285    250    229    213    204    175    164
                                                                                
      yyy       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10
                                           decile                               
                                                                                
Table 5: The table reports the number of forecasts and firms per decile in the intersection of IBES and 
monthly CRSP files for the 1990-2009 period. deciles used are NYSE deciles, and were based on the 
market equity value at the end of the previous year. 
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Table 6. Number of forecasts and firms per size decile and broker category
Panel A: Number of forecasts for each decile for top broker analysts
                                                                                          
     2009      417     494     896   1,768   2,096   2,736   3,641   4,716   6,231   9,178
     2008      362     827   1,546   2,511   3,156   4,609   5,152   6,628   9,131  12,985
     2007      269     772   1,690   2,617   3,301   3,929   4,963   5,855   9,286  12,072
     2006      262     589   1,359   2,545   2,990   4,045   4,201   6,096   8,961  11,536
     2005      170     470   1,003   2,134   2,975   3,143   4,509   6,043   8,609  11,222
     2004      134     259     824   1,653   2,681   3,203   4,130   5,625   8,272  10,999
     2003      229     384     673   1,422   1,974   3,042   3,842   4,705   7,217   9,638
     2002      241     441     836   1,309   2,285   3,319   4,714   5,400   7,346  10,510
     2001      383     705     998   1,590   2,658   3,471   4,686   6,265   8,148  12,009
     2000      196     300     779   1,291   2,024   2,602   3,711   4,921   6,759   9,855
     1999      472     811   1,493   1,735   2,567   3,003   4,149   5,763   7,236   9,774
     1998      528   1,237   1,685   2,024   2,558   3,181   3,658   4,992   6,583   9,355
     1997      504   1,044   1,386   1,765   2,330   2,609   3,071   4,276   6,249   7,754
     1996      467     869   1,357   1,764   1,895   2,195   3,007   4,210   5,798   7,036
     1995      452     693   1,246   1,465   2,000   2,383   3,125   4,100   5,465   7,103
     1994      438   1,003   1,099   1,543   1,834   2,408   2,976   3,626   4,955   6,079
     1993      262     554   1,021   1,174   1,389   1,755   2,342   2,743   3,819   4,904
     1992      231     654   1,022   1,405   1,517   2,223   2,178   2,948   4,212   5,038
     1991      238     611     971   1,092   1,419   1,680   1,945   2,299   2,993   4,056
     1990      296     627     888     978   1,310   1,442   1,408   2,078   2,391   3,223
                                                                                          
      yyy        1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9      10
                                                decile                                    
                                                                                          
Panel B: Number of firms for each decile for top broker analysts
                                                                      
     2009     75    90   138   228   225   257   278   253   270   263
     2008     83   151   227   271   312   316   278   284   278   276
     2007     72   160   282   332   331   316   318   286   311   290
     2006     65   129   240   312   307   324   282   296   308   287
     2005     44   109   201   314   296   266   303   295   303   284
     2004     35    77   180   247   305   272   305   284   289   282
     2003     62   101   140   224   230   278   287   262   283   271
     2002     68   104   177   221   304   321   361   301   292   295
     2001    115   163   191   254   332   332   341   341   325   317
     2000     64   106   178   277   329   354   427   406   413   367
     1999    142   209   296   300   328   358   381   400   354   323
     1998    188   324   350   351   343   357   298   336   321   306
     1997    170   313   340   355   363   319   333   332   328   285
     1996    158   276   316   365   326   312   322   326   323   268
     1995    150   189   286   269   300   290   297   313   292   257
     1994    138   260   240   252   254   270   266   282   262   229
     1993     85   168   240   256   250   245   250   244   228   212
     1992     67   163   213   249   228   233   213   219   204   186
     1991     85   138   197   194   204   214   183   198   184   168
     1990     99   151   172   183   179   182   181   191   173   162
                                                                      
      yyy      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10
                                      decile                          
                                                                      
Panel C: Number of forecasts for each decile for non-top broker analysts
                                                                                          
     2009    4,027   4,299   6,131   7,867   8,903   9,744  10,504   9,590  10,837  13,621
     2008    4,986   6,430   8,473   9,810  10,215  10,654   8,991   9,743  11,351  14,461
     2007    3,699   6,144   8,937   9,332   8,399   8,301   7,797   7,953   9,868  12,062
     2006    3,139   5,886   7,821   8,433   8,487   8,675   7,147   8,354  10,687  13,208
     2005    2,196   5,105   7,219   8,800   7,644   7,498   8,092   8,439  10,007  13,130
     2004    1,650   3,688   6,968   7,145   8,312   7,165   7,480   8,285  10,353  13,318
     2003    1,910   3,532   4,615   5,748   5,653   6,187   6,753   6,759   9,318  11,887
     2002    1,373   2,413   3,239   4,197   5,544   5,710   6,944   6,707   8,380  11,471
     2001    1,768   2,369   2,972   3,653   4,833   5,020   5,880   7,146   8,433  13,202
     2000    1,538   2,134   2,523   3,309   3,337   4,012   5,045   6,064   7,397  10,617
     1999    2,905   3,693   3,841   4,065   4,402   4,701   5,566   6,550   6,979   9,650
     1998    3,918   4,828   4,452   4,468   4,473   4,877   4,565   5,283   6,829   9,677
     1997    3,866   4,227   4,191   3,924   4,031   3,693   4,054   4,981   6,628   8,556
     1996    3,778   3,418   3,941   3,895   3,571   3,594   4,612   5,280   6,841   8,770
     1995    3,813   3,189   3,546   2,895   3,667   3,472   4,687   5,357   6,843   9,074
     1994    3,927   3,642   3,138   3,196   3,072   3,709   4,548   4,929   6,286   8,729
     1993    1,970   2,274   2,648   2,465   2,643   2,797   3,300   3,702   4,848   6,795
     1992    1,607   2,290   2,550   2,749   2,757   3,274   3,439   3,949   4,981   6,612
     1991    1,440   1,747   2,067   2,322   2,391   2,787   2,698   3,455   3,846   5,472
     1990    1,535   1,416   1,389   1,825   1,897   2,109   2,146   2,622   3,110   4,298
                                                                                          
      yyy        1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9      10
                                                decile                                    
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Panel D: Number of firms for each decile for non-top broker analysts
                                                                                
     2009     630    393    391    416    385    369    327    286    280    267
     2008     712    500    491    447    417    362    305    307    280    276
     2007     619    592    614    502    419    372    337    298    318    285
     2006     592    567    556    487    430    387    317    310    316    289
     2005     510    588    564    531    421    348    337    316    305    291
     2004     404    515    631    464    458    344    336    296    292    289
     2003     458    507    445    424    377    358    318    283    290    271
     2002     380    430    408    406    434    393    377    305    298    294
     2001     514    453    402    404    427    372    355    343    317    318
     2000     547    458    454    478    461    422    459    427    416    367
     1999     806    639    543    519    429    419    406    399    364    323
     1998     988    777    595    488    417    409    317    334    318    308
     1997   1,022    745    631    502    464    350    364    342    326    288
     1996     955    626    578    515    420    346    354    329    323    270
     1995     863    535    513    360    382    323    328    317    294    258
     1994     846    582    424    361    320    303    285    289    268    227
     1993     563    440    425    350    321    274    255    259    228    211
     1992     420    398    372    366    275    262    227    220    207    186
     1991     383    332    319    291    254    240    196    205    185    168
     1990     400    286    226    243    227    201    196    195    170    162
                                                                                
      yyy       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10
                                           decile                               
                                                                                
Table 6: The table reports the number of forecasts and firms per decile in the intersection of IBES and 
monthly CRSP files for the 1990-2009 period both for top and non-top brokers. deciles used are NYSE 
deciles, and were based on the market equity value at the end of the previous year. Top brokers are  
defined at Table [8].
Table 7. Number of recommendations and firms per size decile
Panel A: Number of recommendations for each decile
                                                                                
     2009   1,208  1,236  1,804  2,583  3,049  3,342  4,102  3,656  4,248  4,983
     2008   1,462  1,858  2,618  3,205  3,380  3,900  3,475  3,950  4,521  5,611
     2007   1,375  2,080  3,141  3,466  3,168  3,073  3,225  3,203  4,097  4,386
     2006   1,408  2,085  3,068  3,262  3,147  3,131  2,918  3,202  3,827  4,408
     2005   1,101  1,998  2,699  3,213  2,953  2,690  2,823  3,156  3,690  4,166
     2004     980  1,616  2,757  2,840  3,469  2,901  3,062  3,612  4,259  4,989
     2003   1,322  1,773  2,252  2,884  2,890  3,301  3,757  3,843  5,097  6,227
     2002   1,167  1,721  2,113  2,963  3,835  4,531  5,692  5,470  6,894  9,706
     2001     949  1,339  1,586  1,892  2,617  2,780  3,116  3,958  4,928  6,837
     2000     939  1,137  1,472  2,019  2,345  2,850  3,504  3,987  4,914  6,556
     1999   1,926  2,043  2,222  2,662  2,956  3,290  3,646  4,378  4,544  5,825
     1998   2,488  2,845  2,828  2,857  2,807  3,090  2,863  3,421  4,118  5,311
     1997   2,253  2,371  2,541  2,516  2,724  2,434  2,715  2,875  3,491  4,257
     1996   2,233  2,093  2,537  2,666  2,443  2,405  2,681  3,116  3,685  4,316
     1995   2,069  1,859  2,182  1,984  2,452  2,331  2,823  3,302  4,123  5,583
     1994   2,245  2,166  2,027  2,041  2,011  2,467  2,853  3,276  4,158  5,445
     1993     825    924  1,064  1,034  1,098  1,204  1,427  1,608  2,090  2,769
     1992                                                               1       
                                                                                
      yyy       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10
                                           decile                               
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Panel B: Number of firms for each decile
                                                                                
     2009     517    361    387    430    415    383    350    300    295    278
     2008     612    482    503    468    429    388    317    334    298    284
     2007     563    570    611    526    434    399    359    317    331    295
     2006     566    550    582    515    459    403    334    329    329    298
     2005     500    575    572    538    442    368    350    326    313    293
     2004     442    497    622    482    471    374    351    316    307    292
     2003     533    508    461    440    406    386    350    306    300    275
     2002     491    519    452    464    489    442    420    341    311    302
     2001     513    458    435    421    481    436    397    373    348    328
     2000     531    434    477    522    528    492    514    485    451    380
     1999     857    641    558    567    481    490    472    440    388    332
     1998   1,075    834    661    554    473    467    363    368    338    313
     1997   1,025    761    672    568    534    413    400    365    337    289
     1996     992    678    654    602    476    402    393    342    332    269
     1995     905    564    550    445    435    372    356    339    300    262
     1994     956    668    497    416    363    335    313    295    272    233
     1993     524    447    449    372    331    287    274    254    231    213
     1992                                                               1       
                                                                                
      yyy       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10
                                           decile                               
                                                                                
Table 7: The table reports the number of recommendations and firms per decile in the intersection of 
IBES and daily CRSP files for the 1992-2009 period. deciles used are NYSE deciles, and were based 
on the market equity value at the end of the previous year. 
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Table 8. Accuracy metrics and regressors used in equation [6] 
Panel A: Forecast Metrics 
Accuracy Metric Definition 
Forecast error for analyst i, company j, quarter t ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑܽ ௝݈,௧
 
Absolute Forecast error for analyst i, company j, 
quarter t 
ܾܽݏ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ห݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑܽ ௝݈,௧ห 
 
Standardized Absolute Error for analyst i, company 
j, quarter t. The absolute forecast error is 
standardized by the stock price of the second month 
of the firm’s financial quarter. 
 
ܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ห
݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑܽ ௝݈,௧ห
ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁,௧  
 
Proportional Mean Absolute Forecast Error is 
defined as the ratio of the difference between the 
absolute forecast error (abserrori,j,t) by analyst i for 
firm j at time t and the mean absolute forecast error 
avg(abserror)j,t of all of the forecasts for firm j for 
fiscal quarter t, to the mean absolute forecast error 
avg(abserror)j,t. A positive pmafei,j,t indicates that the 
absolute forecast error abserrori,j,t by analyst i for 
firm j at time t is larger than the average absolute 
forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm j for the 
same fiscal fiscal quarter t. To facilitate 
interpretation, it is multiplied by minus one. 
 
ܲܯܣܨܧ௜,௝,௧ ൌ െܾܽݏ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ െ ܾܽݏ݁ݎݎ݋ݎఫ,௧
തതതതതതതതതതതതതത
ܾܽݏ݁ݎݎ݋ݎఫ,௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതത  
 
Proportional Mean Price-scaled Absolute Forecast 
Error is similar to pmafe except that abserrori,j,t is 
standardized by the stock price of the second month 
of the firm’s financial quarter, i.e,. pmafepi,j,t 
=(SAEi,j,t –avgSAEj,t)/avgSAEj,t. To facilitate 
interpretation, it is multiplied by minus one.  
 
ܲܯܣܨܧ ௜ܲ,௝,௧ ൌ െܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ െ ܵܣܧఫ,௧
തതതതതതതത
ܵܣܧఫ,௧തതതതതതതത  
 
De-meaned Absolute Forecast Error standardized by 
the stock price of the second month of the firm’s 
financial quarter. The price scaled absolute forecast 
error SAEi,j,t of analyst i for firm j at quarter t is 
computed as the price-scaled absolute difference 
between an earnings forecast and the actual 
disclosed earnings. To facilitate interpretation, it is 
multiplied by minus one. 
 
ܦܣܨܧ ௜ܲ,௝,௧ ൌ െሺܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ െ ܵܣܧఫ,௧തതതതതതതതሻ 
 
Rangei,j,t is the ratio of the difference between the 
maximum SAEi,j,t for firm j, fiscal quarter t and 
analyst’s SAEi,j,t to the range of SAEi,j,t for firm j and 
fiscal quarter t. 
ܴܽ݊݃݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ܯܽݔܵܣܧ௝,௧ െ ܵܣܧ௜,௝,௧ݎܽ݊݃݁ܵܣܧ௝,௧  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1
32
Panel B: Regressors 
Regressors  Description 
Maturity difference in days between the announcement of the 
actual earnings and the forecast 
Experience defined in years as the difference between analyst’s 
first forecast and his current forecast 
FirmExperience defined as the difference in days  between the 
analyst's  first forecast for the given firm and his 
current forecast for the same firm 
NumberofCompanies is the number of firms the analysts has issued 
forecasts for in the given calendar quarter 
Size Logarithm of market value of equity at the month 
before the end of the financial quarter of the given 
firm 
Coverage number of analysts covering the same firm at the 
given financial quarter 
Difficulty the negative of the average number of firms 
followed by the firm's analysts 
TopBroker dummy which is one when the forecast was issued 
on behalf of a top broker and zero otherwise 
Top brokers Bank of America/Montgomery Securities, Bear 
Stearns, Credit Suisse/DLJ, First Boston, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, UBS/Warburg, Alex 
Brown, Salomon, and Sanford Bernstein 
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Panel C: Regressors of the panel regressors 
Regressors of panel regressions Description 
MeanMaturity Mean maturity of the forecasts issued by the same 
analyst in the same quarter 
MeanExperience Mean experience for the same analyst in the same 
quarter 
MeanFirmExperience Mean firm experience for the same analyst in the 
same quarter 
MeanNumberofCompanies The number of firms the analysts has issued 
forecasts for in the given calendar quarter 
MeanSize Mean of size of the firms covered by the analyst in 
the same quarter. 
MeanCoverage Mean of the coverage of the firms covered by the 
analyst in the same quarter 
MeanDifficulty Mean of difficulty of the firms covered by analyst at 
the same quarter. 
TopBroker dummy which is one when the forecast was issued 
on behalf of a top broker and zero otherwise. If the 
analyst has moved during the quarter he is dropped 
from the given quarter. 
Top brokers Bank of America/Montgomery Securities, Bear 
stearns, Credit Suisse/DLJ, First Boston, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, UBS/Warburg, Alex 
Brown, Salomon, and Sanford Bernstein 
 
Table 8: The table presents the accuracy metrics and the regressors used at equations [6]. 
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Table 9. Summary statistics for error metrics
                                                                                
      sd    215.4716  215.4709  39.02066  .7635448  .7639026  2.092748  .3884016
     p90         .07       .17  .0101695         1         1  .0015152         1
     p10       -.095         0         0  -.764706 -.7647059 -.0013962         0
     p50        -.01     .0249  .0012632         0         0         0  .6666666
    mean    .6538275   .845209  .1255962 -1.70e-09  3.28e-11  6.46e-10  .5694327
                                                                                
   stats       Error  abserror  AbsMea~e     Pmafe    Pmafep     Dafep     Range
Table 9: The table presents summary statistics for the 7 error metrics. 
Table 10. Pooled regression results
Panel A: Results without quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                         1182437         1163457         1161538         1182437         1072255   
R-squared                   0.016           0.008           0.008           0.000           0.020   
                                                                                                    
                           (44.8)          (57.3)          (57.3)           (1.2)         (272.9)   
Constant                  0.00540***      0.13605***      0.13672***      0.00883         0.60401***
                          (-18.3)           (5.0)           (5.0)           (1.0)           (7.7)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00059***      0.00660***      0.00667***      0.00523         0.00596***
                           (11.7)         (-14.2)         (-14.2)           (2.1)         (-10.0)   
difficulty                0.00009***     -0.00230***     -0.00231***      0.00017*       -0.00141***
                          (-46.8)           (9.0)           (8.8)          (-1.2)          (54.1)   
Coverage                 -0.00026***      0.00057***      0.00056***     -0.00009         0.00522***
                           (-1.3)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)          (-2.7)          (-0.4)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00000        -0.00011        -0.00011        -0.00027**      -0.00003   
                           (-2.9)           (6.6)           (6.5)           (0.9)          (10.7)   
FirmExperience           -0.00000**       0.00000***      0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000***
                            (3.3)          (-1.1)          (-1.1)          (-0.8)          (-6.6)   
AnalystExperience         0.00002***     -0.00020        -0.00019        -0.00080        -0.00080***
                           (24.7)         (-57.5)         (-57.4)          (-1.3)         (-59.2)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00175***     -0.00176***     -0.00011        -0.00119***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression, whole sample
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Panel B: Results with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                         1182437         1163457         1161538         1182437         1072255   
R-squared                   0.054           0.009           0.009          -0.000           0.020   
                                                                                                    
                           (19.3)          (34.4)          (34.4)           (1.5)         (102.1)   
Constant                  0.00910***      0.10750***      0.10793***      0.00490         0.58529***
                           (-8.3)           (5.7)           (5.7)           (1.0)           (6.7)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00026***      0.00767***      0.00775***      0.00562         0.00518***
                           (-1.1)         (-11.9)         (-11.9)           (2.0)          (-8.9)   
difficulty               -0.00001        -0.00193***     -0.00193***      0.00016*       -0.00127***
                          (-50.9)           (3.6)           (3.3)          (-1.1)          (54.0)   
Coverage                 -0.00029***      0.00024***      0.00022***     -0.00015         0.00528***
                            (4.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-2.8)          (-0.2)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00001***      0.00002         0.00001        -0.00025**      -0.00002   
                            (1.8)           (7.6)           (7.5)           (0.9)          (10.4)   
FirmExperience            0.00000         0.00001***      0.00001***      0.00000         0.00000***
                           (-9.5)          (-5.8)          (-5.8)          (-0.8)          (-6.8)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00005***     -0.00120***     -0.00120***     -0.00099        -0.00086***
                           (22.5)         (-56.9)         (-56.8)          (-1.3)         (-58.4)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00182***     -0.00182***     -0.00012        -0.00121***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression with quarter fixed effects, whole sample
Table 10: The table reports the results from the pooled regression [6]. The dependent  and independent 
variables are described at Table [8]. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. Numbers 
in parentheses are clustered corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 11. Pooled and panel regression estimation of the whole sample.
Panel A: Pooled regression
Panel B: Pooled regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                         1182437         1161541         1161538         1182437         1072255   
R-squared                   0.106           0.009           0.009          -0.000           0.020   
                                                                                                    
                           (67.9)          (33.8)          (33.8)           (1.2)          (84.3)   
Constant                  0.04054***      0.14430***      0.14429***      0.01175         0.60524***
                           (31.9)           (6.6)           (6.6)           (1.0)           (7.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00101***      0.00920***      0.00921***      0.00590         0.00590***
                            (5.7)         (-11.6)         (-11.6)           (2.3)          (-8.7)   
difficulty                0.00004***     -0.00189***     -0.00189***      0.00018*       -0.00124***
                           (20.8)           (9.1)           (9.1)          (-1.2)          (44.9)   
Coverage                  0.00018***      0.00075***      0.00075***     -0.00005         0.00555***
                          (-82.9)         (-12.3)         (-12.3)          (-1.1)          (-4.4)   
size                     -0.00255***     -0.00294***     -0.00294***     -0.00056        -0.00158***
                           (-9.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-2.8)          (-0.3)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00001***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00025**      -0.00002   
                           (29.6)           (9.0)           (9.0)           (0.9)          (11.7)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001***      0.00001***      0.00000         0.00001***
                          (-12.8)          (-6.7)          (-6.7)          (-0.8)          (-7.3)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00006***     -0.00135***     -0.00135***     -0.00095        -0.00091***
                           (18.3)         (-56.9)         (-56.9)          (-1.3)         (-58.5)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00001***     -0.00183***     -0.00183***     -0.00012        -0.00121***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression with quarter fixed effects, whole sample
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                         1182437         1161541         1161538         1182437         1072255   
R-squared                   0.076           0.008           0.008           0.000           0.020   
                                                                                                    
                           (94.1)          (45.6)          (45.6)           (1.1)         (130.5)   
Constant                  0.03869***      0.16577***      0.16576***      0.01503         0.62140***
                           (24.9)           (5.7)           (5.7)           (1.1)           (8.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00080***      0.00781***      0.00783***      0.00549         0.00659***
                           (15.0)         (-14.2)         (-14.2)           (2.2)          (-9.9)   
difficulty                0.00012***     -0.00230***     -0.00230***      0.00018*       -0.00141***
                           (26.7)          (12.3)          (12.3)           (0.4)          (44.6)   
Coverage                  0.00024***      0.00099***      0.00099***      0.00001         0.00546***
                          (-83.1)          (-9.9)          (-9.9)          (-1.1)          (-3.9)   
size                     -0.00272***     -0.00234***     -0.00234***     -0.00050        -0.00138***
                          (-15.3)          (-0.8)          (-0.8)          (-2.7)          (-0.4)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00002***     -0.00012        -0.00012        -0.00028**      -0.00004   
                           (25.5)           (7.7)           (7.7)           (0.9)          (11.8)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001***      0.00001***      0.00000         0.00001***
                            (2.7)          (-1.8)          (-1.8)          (-0.8)          (-7.0)   
AnalystExperience         0.00001**      -0.00031        -0.00031        -0.00075        -0.00082***
                           (21.3)         (-57.5)         (-57.5)          (-1.3)         (-59.3)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00176***     -0.00176***     -0.00011        -0.00119***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression, whole sample
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Panel C: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          117814          117807          117807          117814          117578   
R-squared                   0.096          -0.042          -0.042          -0.063          -0.042   
                                                                                                    
                          (134.9)          (10.2)          (10.1)           (1.5)          (51.2)   
Constant                  0.05987***      0.21003***      0.20945***      0.11332         0.65837***
                            (0.9)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)           (0.1)           (0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00008        -0.00561        -0.00563         0.00159         0.00030   
                           (-1.3)          (-4.7)          (-4.6)           (0.2)          (-3.3)   
meandifficulty           -0.00002        -0.00281***     -0.00278***      0.00053        -0.00124***
                           (48.6)          (-2.6)          (-2.6)          (-0.3)          (17.8)   
meanCoverage              0.00046***     -0.00113**      -0.00114**      -0.00045         0.00484***
                         (-133.6)          (-1.8)          (-1.8)          (-1.2)          (-3.6)   
meansize                 -0.00433***     -0.00274        -0.00269        -0.00681        -0.00338***
                           (20.1)         (-45.8)         (-45.8)          (-0.0)         (-42.3)   
meanMat                   0.00002***     -0.00213***     -0.00213***     -0.00000        -0.00122***
                           (14.5)          (-4.8)          (-4.8)           (0.8)          (-2.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001***     -0.00001***      0.00001        -0.00000*  
                            (5.4)           (4.1)           (4.1)          (-1.8)           (1.3)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00003***      0.00119***      0.00118***     -0.00200         0.00024   
                           (17.1)           (4.3)           (4.4)          (-0.4)           (0.6)   
meanexp                   0.00018***      0.00216***      0.00218***     -0.00072         0.00019   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
Panel D: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          117814          117807          117807          117814          117578   
R-squared                   0.201          -0.037          -0.037          -0.064          -0.037   
                                                                                                    
                           (34.1)          (16.4)          (16.4)          (-0.2)          (17.1)   
Constant                  0.14145***      3.35481***      3.36226***     -0.13431         2.18531***
                            (0.3)          (-2.0)          (-1.9)           (0.0)          (-0.8)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00003        -0.00838        -0.00837         0.00007        -0.00221   
                           (-9.6)          (-0.4)          (-0.4)           (0.8)          (-0.4)   
meandifficulty           -0.00013***     -0.00028        -0.00025         0.00206        -0.00018   
                           (41.1)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)          (-0.2)          (19.0)   
meanCoverage              0.00038***     -0.00078        -0.00078        -0.00035         0.00539***
                         (-104.7)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)          (-1.6)          (-2.7)   
meansize                 -0.00345***     -0.00200        -0.00196        -0.01005        -0.00274** 
                           (28.5)         (-12.9)         (-12.9)          (-0.4)         (-13.1)   
meanMat                   0.00005***     -0.00117***     -0.00117***     -0.00012        -0.00074***
                           (18.5)          (-3.6)          (-3.7)           (0.9)          (-2.0)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001***     -0.00001***      0.00001        -0.00000   
                            (8.0)           (3.0)           (3.0)          (-2.0)           (0.6)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005***      0.00088**       0.00086**      -0.00219*        0.00012   
                           (21.1)          (15.6)          (15.6)          (-0.4)          (12.3)   
meanexp                   0.01389***      0.50601***      0.50727***     -0.04385         0.24847***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 11: The table presents the results from the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6]. The 
dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. Data is the intersection of IBES details 
file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. 
Only the last  forecast  of  every analyst  for a given firm at  the given quarter  was used.  The panel 
dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the 
corresponding  variables  (Table  [8])  for  the  same  analyst  over  the  same  quarter.  For  the  panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. The quarter dummies are not reported. For pooled regressions we 
report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 12. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers
Panel A: Pooled regression
                                                                                                    
N                           97264           95816           95816           97264           89884   
R-squared                   0.075           0.012           0.012           0.000           0.025   
                                                                                                    
                           (46.7)           (5.3)           (5.3)           (0.8)          (42.1)   
Constant                  0.03370***      0.11828***      0.11836***      0.00111         0.61317***
                            (6.0)           (1.1)           (1.1)          (-1.0)          (-0.0)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00060***      0.00593         0.00590        -0.00021        -0.00011   
                            (4.4)          (-2.6)          (-2.6)           (0.4)          (-2.1)   
difficulty                0.00007***     -0.00190**      -0.00189**       0.00001        -0.00099*  
                           (15.2)           (1.4)           (1.4)           (0.2)          (19.8)   
Coverage                  0.00016***      0.00066         0.00066         0.00000         0.00532***
                          (-44.9)           (1.9)           (1.9)          (-0.5)           (0.3)   
size                     -0.00228***      0.00304         0.00303        -0.00005         0.00028   
                           (-2.3)           (1.0)           (1.0)          (-0.2)           (0.9)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00002*        0.00050         0.00049        -0.00000         0.00023   
                           (10.8)           (3.1)           (3.1)          (-0.6)           (4.6)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001**       0.00001**      -0.00000         0.00001***
                           (-0.8)          (-3.0)          (-3.0)           (1.4)          (-3.0)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00001        -0.00242**      -0.00241**       0.00010        -0.00138** 
                           (10.3)         (-29.6)         (-29.6)          (-5.9)         (-31.5)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00211***     -0.00211***     -0.00001***     -0.00137***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            9021            9021            9021            9021            9016   
R-squared                   0.102          -0.016          -0.016          -0.040          -0.016   
                                                                                                    
                           (36.2)           (3.0)           (2.9)           (0.8)          (15.7)   
Constant                  0.04955***      0.21868**       0.21781**       0.00290         0.65895***
                            (2.0)           (0.6)           (0.6)          (-1.5)           (1.0)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00034*        0.00512         0.00576        -0.00066         0.00534   
                           (-2.8)          (-2.7)          (-2.7)           (1.0)          (-2.1)   
meandifficulty           -0.00011**      -0.00592**      -0.00594**       0.00010        -0.00265*  
                           (11.7)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-0.1)           (5.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00031***     -0.00309*       -0.00306*       -0.00001         0.00431***
                          (-35.2)           (0.5)           (0.5)          (-0.9)          (-0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00345***      0.00271         0.00280        -0.00021        -0.00052   
                            (5.7)         (-13.8)         (-13.8)          (-2.5)         (-13.1)   
meanMat                   0.00002***     -0.00239***     -0.00239***     -0.00002*       -0.00129***
                            (5.5)          (-0.0)          (-0.0)          (-2.4)           (0.3)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00000        -0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                            (3.9)           (1.0)           (0.9)          (-0.7)          (-0.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007***      0.00099         0.00096        -0.00003        -0.00006   
                            (1.4)          (-0.5)          (-0.6)           (3.4)          (-1.4)   
meanexp                   0.00005        -0.00111        -0.00124         0.00033***     -0.00169   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
                                                                                                    
N                            9021            9021            9021            9021            9016   
R-squared                   0.201          -0.013          -0.013          -0.043          -0.009   
                                                                                                    
                           (11.4)           (2.4)           (2.5)          (-0.9)           (3.3)   
Constant                  0.10329***      1.23681*        1.27508*       -0.02094         0.95742** 
                            (0.5)          (-0.2)          (-0.1)          (-1.3)           (0.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00008        -0.00154        -0.00093        -0.00059         0.00161   
                           (-5.5)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)           (0.5)           (0.1)   
meandifficulty           -0.00024***     -0.00030        -0.00030         0.00005         0.00009   
                           (11.3)          (-2.0)          (-2.0)           (0.1)           (6.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00030***     -0.00308*       -0.00304*        0.00001         0.00540***
                          (-30.8)          (-0.0)           (0.0)          (-1.0)          (-1.1)   
meansize                 -0.00301***     -0.00011         0.00007        -0.00027        -0.00337   
                            (7.7)          (-5.6)          (-5.5)          (-2.1)          (-5.9)   
meanMat                   0.00005***     -0.00205***     -0.00202***     -0.00004*       -0.00124***
                            (7.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-2.2)           (0.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                            (4.4)           (0.3)           (0.3)          (-0.6)          (-0.7)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00008***      0.00035         0.00032        -0.00003        -0.00041   
                            (5.8)           (2.0)           (2.1)          (-1.0)           (1.0)   
meanexp                   0.01298***      0.25341*        0.26333*       -0.00609         0.07187   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table  12: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker (see 
Table [8] for the regressors definition). The coefficients come from the pooled and panel estimation of 
equation  [6].  The  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  described  at  Table  [8].  The  panel 
dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the 
corresponding  variables  (Table  [8])  for  the  same  analyst  over  the  same  quarter.  For  the  panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 13. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers.
Panel A: pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           88469           87223           87223           88469           82377   
R-squared                   0.081           0.010           0.010           0.000           0.023   
                                                                                                    
                           (46.8)           (8.7)           (8.7)          (-1.3)          (40.6)   
Constant                  0.04338***      0.22101***      0.22096***     -0.00808         0.64621***
                          (-11.2)          (-2.5)          (-2.5)           (0.7)          (-0.4)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00117***     -0.01339*       -0.01339*        0.00047        -0.00123   
                            (6.1)          (-2.2)          (-2.2)           (0.3)          (-1.9)   
difficulty                0.00012***     -0.00170*       -0.00170*        0.00003        -0.00094   
                           (14.2)           (3.4)           (3.4)          (-1.7)          (20.5)   
Coverage                  0.00019***      0.00171***      0.00171***     -0.00007         0.00578***
                          (-45.0)          (-2.8)          (-2.8)           (1.7)          (-2.4)   
size                     -0.00293***     -0.00488**      -0.00488**       0.00063        -0.00252*  
                           (-1.6)           (1.4)           (1.4)           (1.8)           (1.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00002         0.00072         0.00072         0.00006         0.00028   
                           (13.9)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)          (-2.4)           (1.5)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***     -0.00000        -0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                           (-0.9)          (-4.5)          (-4.5)           (0.5)          (-6.1)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00001        -0.00308***     -0.00308***      0.00003        -0.00238***
                            (8.8)         (-25.0)         (-25.0)          (-3.0)         (-27.2)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00199***     -0.00199***     -0.00003**      -0.00130***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8390            8389            8389            8390            8387   
R-squared                   0.126          -0.019          -0.020          -0.042          -0.015   
                                                                                                    
                           (38.4)           (2.4)           (2.3)          (-1.1)          (14.0)   
Constant                  0.06240***      0.17545*        0.16335*       -0.01298         0.58553***
                           (-2.1)          (-3.2)          (-3.2)           (0.5)          (-2.1)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00045*       -0.03146**      -0.03152**       0.00081        -0.01182*  
                           (-2.4)           (0.6)           (0.7)           (0.4)           (1.6)   
meandifficulty           -0.00012*        0.00139         0.00146         0.00012         0.00197   
                           (11.8)           (0.4)           (0.4)          (-0.3)           (4.8)   
meanCoverage              0.00039***      0.00058         0.00052        -0.00008         0.00407***
                          (-37.2)          (-0.5)          (-0.3)           (1.0)           (0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00430***     -0.00233        -0.00151         0.00080         0.00065   
                            (2.7)         (-12.3)         (-12.3)          (-0.4)         (-12.2)   
meanMat                   0.00001**      -0.00215***     -0.00215***     -0.00001        -0.00122***
                            (6.5)          (-1.3)          (-1.4)          (-2.4)          (-1.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000*       -0.00001   
                            (1.1)           (1.6)           (1.6)           (0.6)           (1.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00002         0.00168         0.00163         0.00010         0.00067   
                            (3.1)          (-1.6)          (-1.5)           (1.2)          (-1.6)   
meanexp                   0.00013**      -0.00300        -0.00286         0.00035        -0.00174   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8390            8389            8389            8390            8387   
R-squared                   0.231          -0.019          -0.019          -0.043          -0.010   
                                                                                                    
                           (10.4)           (2.1)           (2.1)           (1.3)           (4.0)   
Constant                  0.12529***      1.18234*        1.19120*        0.12032         1.31104***
                           (-0.5)          (-3.2)          (-3.2)           (0.4)          (-2.6)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00011        -0.03168**      -0.03176**       0.00065        -0.01464** 
                           (-6.7)           (1.8)           (1.8)          (-0.0)           (2.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00035***      0.00444         0.00458        -0.00002         0.00356*  
                           (10.4)           (0.7)           (0.7)          (-0.4)           (5.1)   
meanCoverage              0.00034***      0.00115         0.00112        -0.00010         0.00450***
                          (-31.0)          (-0.5)          (-0.3)           (1.3)           (0.4)   
meansize                 -0.00359***     -0.00257        -0.00184         0.00116         0.00118   
                            (6.1)          (-4.6)          (-4.6)           (1.2)          (-4.0)   
meanMat                   0.00005***     -0.00173***     -0.00171***      0.00007        -0.00087***
                            (7.2)          (-1.2)          (-1.3)          (-2.5)          (-1.6)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000*       -0.00001   
                            (3.4)           (1.2)           (1.2)           (0.6)           (0.9)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007***      0.00128         0.00122         0.00010         0.00052   
                            (5.3)           (1.8)           (1.9)           (1.5)           (2.4)   
meanexp                   0.01466***      0.23746         0.24253         0.03163         0.17714*  
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 13: The table  presents the results for analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker (see 
Table [8] for the regressors definition). The coefficients come from the pooled and panel estimation of 
equation  [6].  The  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  described  at  Table  [8].  The  panel 
dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the 
corresponding  variables  (Table  [8])  for  the  same  analyst  over  the  same  quarter.  For  the  panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 14. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
and from top to non-top brokers.
Panel A: pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          185733          183039          183039          185733          172261   
R-squared                   0.077           0.011           0.011           0.000           0.024   
                                                                                                    
                           (58.3)           (9.2)           (9.2)          (-1.0)          (55.0)   
Constant                  0.03782***      0.15680***      0.15683***     -0.00282         0.62457***
                           (-4.2)           (0.6)           (0.6)           (1.3)           (1.9)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00029***      0.00196         0.00196         0.00038         0.00360   
                            (7.3)          (-3.5)          (-3.5)           (0.1)          (-2.9)   
difficulty                0.00010***     -0.00193***     -0.00193***      0.00001        -0.00106** 
                           (17.2)           (3.3)           (3.3)          (-1.8)          (25.7)   
Coverage                  0.00018***      0.00118***      0.00118***     -0.00004         0.00551***
                          (-55.6)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)           (1.5)          (-1.0)   
size                     -0.00258***     -0.00031        -0.00031         0.00026        -0.00080   
                           (-3.8)           (1.9)           (1.9)           (1.6)           (1.7)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00002***      0.00071         0.00071         0.00003         0.00035   
                           (15.3)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-2.5)           (4.2)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000***
                            (4.8)          (-4.9)          (-4.9)           (1.1)          (-7.3)   
AnalystExperience         0.00006***     -0.00229***     -0.00229***      0.00003        -0.00200***
                           (12.6)         (-35.4)         (-35.4)          (-4.4)         (-36.8)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00206***     -0.00206***     -0.00002***     -0.00134***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           16511           16510           16510           16511           16503   
R-squared                   0.120          -0.018          -0.018          -0.038          -0.015   
                                                                                                    
                           (53.1)           (3.1)           (3.0)          (-0.8)          (20.9)   
Constant                  0.05671***      0.15717**       0.15128**      -0.00465         0.61452***
                           (-1.2)          (-1.9)          (-2.0)           (0.7)          (-0.4)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00011        -0.00894        -0.00913         0.00040        -0.00102   
                           (-3.7)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)           (0.6)          (-0.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00012***     -0.00181        -0.00178         0.00010        -0.00040   
                           (17.4)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)          (-0.3)           (7.0)   
meanCoverage              0.00038***     -0.00132        -0.00133        -0.00004         0.00417***
                          (-51.4)           (0.4)           (0.5)           (0.7)           (0.0)   
meansize                 -0.00395***      0.00152         0.00195         0.00030         0.00008   
                            (5.0)         (-17.5)         (-17.4)          (-1.1)         (-17.1)   
meanMat                   0.00001***     -0.00219***     -0.00218***     -0.00002        -0.00123***
                            (7.9)          (-1.5)          (-1.6)          (-2.7)          (-1.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000**      -0.00000   
                            (3.6)           (1.2)           (1.1)           (0.3)           (0.4)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005***      0.00085         0.00081         0.00003         0.00017   
                            (6.7)           (0.8)           (0.8)           (1.8)          (-0.3)   
meanexp                   0.00016***      0.00085         0.00090         0.00023        -0.00017   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           16511           16510           16510           16511           16503   
R-squared                   0.227          -0.016          -0.016          -0.039          -0.009   
                                                                                                    
                           (15.5)           (2.8)           (2.9)           (1.1)           (5.3)   
Constant                  0.11827***      1.09473**       1.11952**       0.04873         1.18035***
                           (-0.1)          (-2.5)          (-2.5)           (0.8)          (-1.3)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00001        -0.01191*       -0.01214*        0.00047        -0.00355   
                           (-9.1)           (1.2)           (1.3)           (0.2)           (1.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00031***      0.00217         0.00223         0.00004         0.00154   
                           (15.6)          (-0.8)          (-0.8)          (-0.2)           (7.9)   
meanCoverage              0.00033***     -0.00083        -0.00083        -0.00003         0.00494***
                          (-43.6)          (-0.1)          (-0.0)           (0.8)          (-0.5)   
meansize                 -0.00334***     -0.00053        -0.00011         0.00036        -0.00103   
                            (9.5)          (-7.0)          (-6.9)           (0.6)          (-6.5)   
meanMat                   0.00005***     -0.00186***     -0.00183***      0.00002        -0.00099***
                           (10.0)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)          (-2.8)          (-1.3)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000**      -0.00000   
                            (6.1)           (0.4)           (0.4)           (0.3)          (-0.2)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00009***      0.00030         0.00026         0.00003        -0.00007   
                            (8.1)           (2.4)           (2.5)           (1.2)           (2.6)   
meanexp                   0.01465***      0.22534*        0.23288*        0.01284         0.13917** 
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 14: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker and vice 
versa (see Table [8] for the  regressors definition). The coefficients come from the pooled and panel 
estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. The 
panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values 
of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 15. Regressions results for the period before Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
                                                                                                    
N                          635206          619475          619472          635206          555025   
R-squared                   0.080           0.011           0.011          -0.000           0.023   
                                                                                                    
                           (72.7)          (32.5)          (32.5)           (0.6)          (98.2)   
Constant                  0.03707***      0.16585***      0.16583***      0.00130         0.61108***
                           (19.8)          (17.5)          (17.5)           (0.2)          (15.7)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00076***      0.03205***      0.03206***      0.00006         0.01683***
                           (-2.8)          (-9.5)          (-9.5)           (2.6)          (-8.3)   
difficulty               -0.00002**      -0.00210***     -0.00210***      0.00036*       -0.00150***
                           (18.5)           (6.1)           (6.1)          (-1.0)          (33.2)   
Coverage                  0.00028***      0.00079***      0.00079***     -0.00001         0.00601***
                          (-61.8)          (-5.8)          (-5.8)          (-1.1)          (-0.7)   
size                     -0.00254***     -0.00195***     -0.00195***     -0.00004        -0.00032   
                            (5.8)          (-2.6)          (-2.6)          (-2.8)          (-2.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00001***     -0.00054**      -0.00055**      -0.00038**      -0.00024*  
                           (20.2)           (7.4)           (7.4)          (-1.0)          (10.4)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001***      0.00001***     -0.00000         0.00001***
                          (-19.6)           (1.8)           (1.8)           (1.5)           (0.1)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00019***      0.00058         0.00058         0.00047         0.00003   
                           (21.4)         (-45.2)         (-45.2)          (-1.9)         (-55.0)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00003***     -0.00217***     -0.00217***     -0.00003        -0.00144***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression, whole sample
Panel B: Pooled regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          635206          619475          619472          635206          555025   
R-squared                   0.090           0.012           0.012          -0.000           0.024   
                                                                                                    
                           (58.6)          (26.4)          (26.4)           (1.6)          (72.5)   
Constant                  0.04010***      0.14680***      0.14679***      0.00232         0.59659***
                           (16.9)          (17.9)          (17.9)           (0.0)          (15.8)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00063***      0.03285***      0.03287***      0.00000         0.01699***
                            (1.4)          (-6.6)          (-6.6)           (2.6)          (-6.7)   
difficulty                0.00001        -0.00143***     -0.00143***      0.00035**      -0.00121***
                           (18.9)           (4.5)           (4.5)          (-0.4)          (33.1)   
Coverage                  0.00028***      0.00058***      0.00058***     -0.00001         0.00598***
                          (-62.1)          (-7.1)          (-7.1)          (-0.5)          (-1.1)   
size                     -0.00255***     -0.00240***     -0.00240***     -0.00002        -0.00051   
                           (-1.9)          (-1.9)          (-1.9)          (-2.7)          (-1.6)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00000        -0.00039        -0.00039        -0.00039**      -0.00018   
                           (23.9)           (8.7)           (8.7)          (-1.0)          (10.9)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001***      0.00001***     -0.00000         0.00001***
                          (-13.4)          (-3.3)          (-3.3)           (1.5)          (-2.5)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00011***     -0.00132***     -0.00132***      0.00057        -0.00063*  
                           (20.1)         (-44.1)         (-44.1)          (-1.8)         (-54.1)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00225***     -0.00225***     -0.00003        -0.00148***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression with quarter fixed effects, whole sample
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Panel C: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           65946           65935           65935           65946           65737   
R-squared                   0.068          -0.055          -0.055          -0.078          -0.053   
                                                                                                    
                           (94.8)           (8.1)           (8.1)           (1.7)          (38.2)   
Constant                  0.04966***      0.22926***      0.22868***      0.06775         0.67902***
                            (2.1)           (0.6)           (0.6)          (-0.0)           (0.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00024*        0.00378         0.00379        -0.00028         0.00193   
                          (-17.0)          (-2.8)          (-2.7)           (0.3)          (-3.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00027***     -0.00233**      -0.00230**       0.00034        -0.00187***
                           (37.4)          (-2.0)          (-2.0)          (-0.8)          (13.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00045***     -0.00130*       -0.00132*       -0.00073         0.00553***
                          (-87.9)          (-2.6)          (-2.5)          (-1.6)          (-3.6)   
meansize                 -0.00342***     -0.00533*       -0.00527*       -0.00472        -0.00471***
                           (29.2)         (-36.7)         (-36.7)           (0.0)         (-34.7)   
meanMat                   0.00004***     -0.00240***     -0.00241***      0.00000        -0.00144***
                           (-2.6)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)           (0.9)           (1.8)   
meanFirmExp              -0.00000**      -0.00001        -0.00001         0.00001         0.00000   
                            (8.8)           (4.4)           (4.4)          (-0.6)           (2.7)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007***      0.00181***      0.00179***     -0.00037         0.00071** 
                            (0.6)           (4.7)           (4.7)           (0.3)           (1.5)   
meanexp                   0.00001         0.00403***      0.00406***      0.00036         0.00079   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
Panel D: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           65946           65935           65935           65946           65737   
R-squared                   0.119          -0.050          -0.050          -0.079          -0.049   
                                                                                                    
                           (35.8)          (11.8)          (11.8)          (-0.5)          (14.8)   
Constant                  0.09984***      1.82138***      1.82634***     -0.09969         1.44052***
                           (-1.3)           (0.6)           (0.6)          (-0.1)           (0.4)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00014         0.00349         0.00353        -0.00080         0.00147   
                           (-4.2)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)           (0.5)          (-2.4)   
meandifficulty           -0.00007***     -0.00122        -0.00119         0.00067        -0.00140*  
                           (35.6)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)          (-0.7)          (13.7)   
meanCoverage              0.00044***     -0.00086        -0.00088        -0.00068         0.00589***
                          (-86.6)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)          (-1.9)          (-2.4)   
meansize                 -0.00344***     -0.00261        -0.00256        -0.00570        -0.00327*  
                           (26.6)         (-11.4)         (-11.3)          (-0.7)         (-11.5)   
meanMat                   0.00006***     -0.00152***     -0.00152***     -0.00013        -0.00097***
                            (7.1)          (-1.3)          (-1.4)           (1.1)           (1.9)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001         0.00001         0.00000   
                            (4.0)           (3.9)           (3.8)          (-0.7)           (2.5)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00003***      0.00161***      0.00159***     -0.00042         0.00066*  
                           (17.3)          (10.7)          (10.8)          (-0.8)           (8.3)   
meanexp                   0.01474***      0.50545***      0.50718***     -0.05536         0.24664***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 15: The table presents the results from the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6] for the 
period before Global Settlement. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. 
The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the  
values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the 
panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the 
topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly 
CRSP for  1990  to  2002.  Observations  are  earnings  forecasts  for  financial  quarters.  Only  the  last 
forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not 
reported. For pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based 
on quarter and firm. 
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Table 16. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
for the period before Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           61088           59900           59900           61088           54978   
R-squared                   0.089           0.013           0.013           0.000           0.027   
                                                                                                    
                           (39.8)           (5.0)           (5.0)           (0.3)          (33.4)   
Constant                  0.03700***      0.13501***      0.13513***      0.00037         0.61134***
                            (0.8)           (1.9)           (1.9)           (0.5)           (0.9)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00009         0.01250         0.01245         0.00008         0.00364   
                            (1.0)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)          (-0.8)          (-0.6)   
difficulty                0.00002        -0.00114        -0.00113        -0.00002        -0.00035   
                           (11.8)           (3.5)           (3.5)          (-0.5)          (17.1)   
Coverage                  0.00019***      0.00232***      0.00232***     -0.00001         0.00655***
                          (-36.8)           (0.2)           (0.2)           (0.6)          (-0.4)   
size                     -0.00248***      0.00034         0.00033         0.00005        -0.00048   
                           (-1.4)           (1.2)           (1.2)           (0.5)           (0.2)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00001         0.00073         0.00072         0.00001         0.00005   
                           (13.9)           (0.2)           (0.2)          (-0.8)           (2.5)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00001*  
                           (-7.6)          (-0.0)          (-0.0)          (-0.3)           (0.1)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00018***     -0.00004        -0.00003        -0.00001         0.00007   
                           (10.5)         (-26.5)         (-26.5)          (-5.9)         (-28.2)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00235***     -0.00235***     -0.00001***     -0.00154***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            5907            5906            5906            5907            5901   
R-squared                   0.130          -0.024          -0.024          -0.049          -0.024   
                                                                                                    
                           (32.6)           (3.1)           (3.1)           (1.3)          (12.7)   
Constant                  0.05375***      0.29026**       0.28890**       0.00475         0.69069***
                            (3.4)           (0.6)           (0.7)          (-0.4)           (0.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00072***      0.00718         0.00794        -0.00020         0.00200   
                           (-6.4)          (-1.1)          (-1.1)          (-0.7)          (-1.9)   
meandifficulty           -0.00031***     -0.00314        -0.00310        -0.00008        -0.00305   
                           (10.7)          (-1.9)          (-1.9)          (-0.4)           (4.4)   
meanCoverage              0.00038***     -0.00378        -0.00375        -0.00003         0.00521***
                          (-30.0)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)          (-0.6)          (-0.8)   
meansize                 -0.00361***     -0.00500        -0.00487        -0.00016        -0.00327   
                            (8.7)         (-12.0)         (-12.0)          (-2.5)         (-11.0)   
meanMat                   0.00003***     -0.00263***     -0.00263***     -0.00002*       -0.00141***
                            (3.9)           (0.4)           (0.4)          (-1.4)           (1.0)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (3.1)           (0.3)           (0.3)           (0.4)           (0.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007**       0.00040         0.00033         0.00002         0.00000   
                           (-3.9)           (0.8)           (0.7)           (0.9)          (-0.1)   
meanexp                  -0.00023***      0.00260         0.00241         0.00012        -0.00022   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            5907            5906            5906            5907            5901   
R-squared                   0.179          -0.024          -0.024          -0.054          -0.019   
                                                                                                    
                           (13.8)           (1.1)           (1.1)          (-0.6)           (2.3)   
Constant                  0.10050***      0.47000         0.48413        -0.01064         0.57400*  
                            (0.1)           (0.4)           (0.4)          (-0.3)           (0.4)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00002         0.00483         0.00558        -0.00014         0.00268   
                           (-2.9)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)   
meandifficulty           -0.00015**      -0.00104        -0.00099        -0.00007        -0.00106   
                           (10.9)          (-1.6)          (-1.6)          (-0.3)           (5.0)   
meanCoverage              0.00040***     -0.00352        -0.00349        -0.00003         0.00622***
                          (-28.5)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)          (-1.6)   
meansize                 -0.00352***     -0.00651        -0.00632        -0.00026        -0.00677   
                            (8.2)          (-5.5)          (-5.4)          (-1.8)          (-5.8)   
meanMat                   0.00007***     -0.00273***     -0.00271***     -0.00004        -0.00167***
                            (6.2)           (0.7)           (0.7)          (-1.3)           (1.1)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (1.7)           (0.0)          (-0.0)           (0.4)          (-0.3)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00004         0.00006        -0.00000         0.00002        -0.00022   
                            (6.2)           (0.4)           (0.4)          (-1.0)          (-0.6)   
meanexp                   0.01805***      0.06622         0.07298        -0.00678        -0.06066   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 16: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker (see  
Table [8]) for the period before Global Settlement. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel 
estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8].  The 
panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values 
of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2002. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 17. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers 
for the period before Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           34186           33502           33502           34186           30677   
R-squared                   0.087           0.016           0.016           0.003           0.029   
                                                                                                    
                           (31.7)           (5.8)           (5.8)           (0.1)          (25.0)   
Constant                  0.04255***      0.23583***      0.23586***      0.00025         0.64686***
                           (-0.4)          (-1.6)          (-1.6)           (0.7)           (0.0)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00006        -0.01448        -0.01448         0.00022         0.00008   
                           (-0.2)          (-3.1)          (-3.1)           (0.1)          (-2.7)   
difficulty               -0.00001        -0.00344**      -0.00344**       0.00000        -0.00212** 
                           (11.9)           (2.0)           (2.0)          (-1.3)          (12.9)   
Coverage                  0.00029***      0.00178*        0.00178*       -0.00007         0.00647***
                          (-30.0)          (-1.6)          (-1.6)           (0.8)          (-1.2)   
size                     -0.00291***     -0.00465        -0.00465         0.00016        -0.00205   
                            (1.5)           (3.5)           (3.5)           (0.4)           (3.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00002         0.00266***      0.00266***      0.00001         0.00129** 
                            (6.5)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.1)           (2.2)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001*  
                           (-5.1)          (-1.5)          (-1.5)          (-0.7)          (-1.3)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00019***     -0.00243        -0.00243        -0.00007        -0.00121   
                            (8.9)         (-22.4)         (-22.4)          (-2.6)         (-23.7)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00003***     -0.00273***     -0.00273***     -0.00004**      -0.00169***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            3343            3343            3343            3343            3341   
R-squared                   0.106          -0.022          -0.022          -0.041          -0.009   
                                                                                                    
                           (22.8)           (0.0)          (-0.2)          (-0.9)           (6.6)   
Constant                  0.05404***      0.00143        -0.02500        -0.00377         0.47243***
                           (-3.0)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)          (-2.2)          (-0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00098**      -0.02793        -0.02742        -0.00125*       -0.00105   
                           (-7.1)           (0.7)           (0.7)          (-0.4)           (0.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00049***      0.00228         0.00244        -0.00005         0.00097   
                            (9.2)           (1.4)           (1.4)          (-0.3)           (4.7)   
meanCoverage              0.00045***      0.00352         0.00343        -0.00002         0.00693***
                          (-20.4)           (0.9)           (1.1)           (2.0)           (1.3)   
meansize                 -0.00339***      0.00754         0.00926         0.00060*        0.00658   
                            (7.5)          (-9.1)          (-9.0)          (-4.0)          (-9.3)   
meanMat                   0.00004***     -0.00267***     -0.00266***     -0.00004***     -0.00161***
                            (0.5)           (0.4)           (0.3)          (-1.5)           (0.6)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000         0.00001         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00000   
                            (2.4)           (1.4)           (1.3)           (1.7)           (2.2)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00008*        0.00229         0.00219         0.00010         0.00217*  
                           (-4.2)          (-1.1)          (-1.0)          (-2.2)          (-0.3)   
meanexp                  -0.00033***     -0.00448        -0.00394        -0.00031*       -0.00077   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            3343            3343            3343            3343            3341   
R-squared                   0.199          -0.022          -0.022          -0.026          -0.008   
                                                                                                    
                            (9.5)           (2.2)           (2.2)           (3.7)           (3.2)   
Constant                  0.08653***      1.10644*        1.10126*        0.06412***      0.92293** 
                            (0.5)          (-1.5)          (-1.5)          (-2.5)          (-0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00014        -0.02572        -0.02521        -0.00150*       -0.00132   
                           (-4.1)           (1.6)           (1.6)          (-0.3)           (1.3)   
meandifficulty           -0.00029***      0.00586         0.00605        -0.00003         0.00280   
                            (8.8)           (1.8)           (1.8)           (0.3)           (4.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00043***      0.00483         0.00476         0.00003         0.00713***
                          (-20.9)           (0.8)           (1.0)           (1.9)           (1.3)   
meansize                 -0.00347***      0.00744         0.00908         0.00058         0.00698   
                            (5.4)          (-2.0)          (-1.9)           (2.0)          (-2.7)   
meanMat                   0.00007***     -0.00137*       -0.00131         0.00005*       -0.00109** 
                            (2.7)           (0.6)           (0.4)          (-1.3)           (0.6)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000**       0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (1.6)           (1.0)           (0.9)           (1.6)           (1.9)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005         0.00168         0.00156         0.00009         0.00181   
                            (3.2)           (2.3)           (2.3)           (4.0)           (1.7)   
meanexp                   0.01366**       0.53075*        0.54147*        0.03226***      0.23196   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 17: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker (see  
Table [8]) for the period before Global Settlement. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel 
estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. The 
panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values 
of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
1990 to 2002. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 18. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
and analysts moving from top to non-top brokers for the period before Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           95274           93402           93402           95274           85655   
R-squared                   0.088           0.014           0.014           0.001           0.027   
                                                                                                    
                           (45.5)           (7.2)           (7.2)           (0.3)          (40.2)   
Constant                  0.03887***      0.16202***      0.16212***      0.00042         0.62180***
                            (1.8)           (0.8)           (0.8)           (1.5)           (1.2)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00016         0.00377         0.00376         0.00022         0.00336   
                            (0.6)          (-3.0)          (-3.0)          (-0.7)          (-2.2)   
difficulty                0.00001        -0.00211**      -0.00210**      -0.00002        -0.00108*  
                           (13.3)           (3.8)           (3.8)          (-1.4)          (19.6)   
Coverage                  0.00023***      0.00210***      0.00210***     -0.00003         0.00648***
                          (-41.8)          (-0.6)          (-0.7)           (0.9)          (-0.8)   
size                     -0.00263***     -0.00110        -0.00110         0.00009        -0.00090   
                            (0.3)           (2.8)           (2.8)           (0.6)           (2.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00000         0.00141**       0.00140**       0.00001         0.00055*  
                           (13.2)           (1.0)           (1.0)          (-0.6)           (3.2)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00001** 
                           (-8.8)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-1.0)          (-0.5)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00018***      0.00012         0.00013        -0.00004        -0.00029   
                           (12.8)         (-33.0)         (-33.0)          (-4.1)         (-35.0)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00248***     -0.00248***     -0.00002***     -0.00159***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8914            8913            8913            8914            8906   
R-squared                   0.124          -0.022          -0.022          -0.045          -0.017   
                                                                                                    
                           (39.6)           (2.5)           (2.4)           (0.2)          (14.6)   
Constant                  0.05377***      0.18189*        0.17241*        0.00049         0.62580***
                            (2.2)           (0.0)          (-0.0)           (0.0)           (0.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00027*        0.00018        -0.00007         0.00001         0.00129   
                           (-9.5)          (-0.6)          (-0.5)          (-0.9)          (-1.3)   
meandifficulty           -0.00039***     -0.00128        -0.00120        -0.00008        -0.00172   
                           (14.4)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)          (-0.5)           (6.4)   
meanCoverage              0.00042***     -0.00105        -0.00106        -0.00003         0.00594***
                          (-36.1)          (-0.2)          (-0.1)           (0.8)          (-0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00355***     -0.00100        -0.00034         0.00016        -0.00072   
                           (10.7)         (-14.9)         (-14.8)          (-4.2)         (-14.2)   
meanMat                   0.00004***     -0.00266***     -0.00265***     -0.00003***     -0.00149***
                            (1.8)           (0.1)           (0.0)          (-2.0)           (1.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000         0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (3.7)           (0.9)           (0.8)           (1.3)           (1.3)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007***      0.00094         0.00085         0.00005         0.00076   
                           (-3.2)           (1.4)           (1.5)           (0.1)          (-0.1)   
meanexp                  -0.00012**       0.00288         0.00302         0.00001        -0.00015   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8914            8913            8913            8914            8906   
R-squared                   0.194          -0.022          -0.022          -0.047          -0.014   
                                                                                                    
                           (16.7)           (2.8)           (2.8)           (1.6)           (4.3)   
Constant                  0.09629***      0.89726**       0.90496**       0.01987         0.82546***
                           (-0.8)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)           (0.2)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00010        -0.00123        -0.00150        -0.00004         0.00061   
                           (-5.0)           (0.5)           (0.6)          (-0.6)           (0.0)   
meandifficulty           -0.00021***      0.00121         0.00131        -0.00005         0.00003   
                           (14.1)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)           (0.0)           (6.7)   
meanCoverage              0.00042***     -0.00041        -0.00041         0.00000         0.00660***
                          (-35.0)          (-0.3)          (-0.2)           (0.4)          (-0.7)   
meansize                 -0.00348***     -0.00162        -0.00096         0.00008        -0.00228   
                            (9.6)          (-5.2)          (-5.1)          (-0.3)          (-5.8)   
meanMat                   0.00007***     -0.00209***     -0.00206***     -0.00000        -0.00137***
                            (5.5)           (0.5)           (0.4)          (-1.8)           (1.4)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (2.5)           (0.6)           (0.5)           (1.1)           (0.9)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005*        0.00059         0.00051         0.00004         0.00052   
                            (6.9)           (2.2)           (2.3)           (1.5)           (1.1)   
meanexp                   0.01678***      0.30467*        0.31250*        0.00805         0.08644   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 18: The table  presents the results for analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker and 
from a  top  to  a  non-top  broker  (see  Table  [8])  for  the  period  before  the  Global  Settlement.  The  
coefficients  come  from  the  pooled  and  panel  estimation  of  equation  [6].  The  dependent  and 
independent variables are described at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The 
regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for 
the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the 
analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is 
the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2002. Observations are earnings 
forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given 
quarter was used.  The quarter  dummies are not reported.  For pooled regressions we report  cluster 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 19. Pooled and panel regression results for the period after Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          547231          542066          542066          547231          517230   
R-squared                   0.084           0.006           0.006          -0.000           0.018   
                                                                                                    
                           (61.9)          (28.2)          (28.2)           (1.1)          (83.0)   
Constant                  0.04334***      0.16691***      0.16690***      0.03706         0.62627***
                           (26.5)          (-9.6)          (-9.6)           (1.0)          (-5.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00152***     -0.02051***     -0.02050***      0.01273        -0.00632***
                           (20.0)         (-11.6)         (-11.6)           (0.6)          (-4.2)   
difficulty                0.00032***     -0.00285***     -0.00285***      0.00004        -0.00097***
                           (15.9)           (8.5)           (8.5)          (-1.1)          (32.2)   
Coverage                  0.00018***      0.00089***      0.00089***     -0.00004         0.00534***
                          (-55.8)          (-6.5)          (-6.5)          (-1.0)          (-5.2)   
size                     -0.00307***     -0.00229***     -0.00229***     -0.00146        -0.00277***
                          (-16.5)           (3.0)           (3.0)          (-0.9)           (1.4)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00003***      0.00067**       0.00067**      -0.00017         0.00017   
                           (21.6)           (4.2)           (4.2)           (1.0)           (5.8)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000***      0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000***
                            (0.8)          (-6.6)          (-6.6)          (-1.0)          (-6.7)   
AnalystExperience         0.00000        -0.00154***     -0.00154***     -0.00152        -0.00097***
                            (4.2)         (-35.7)         (-35.7)          (-1.1)         (-34.0)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00000***     -0.00143***     -0.00143***     -0.00019        -0.00097***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression, whole sample
Panel B: Pooled regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                          547231          542066          542066          547231          517230   
R-squared                   0.121           0.007           0.007          -0.000           0.018   
                                                                                                    
                           (40.8)          (18.5)          (18.5)           (1.1)          (46.4)   
Constant                  0.04210***      0.18568***      0.18567***      0.04102         0.62365***
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
o.quarter==199            0.00000         0.00000         0.00000         0.00000         0.00000   
                           (29.0)          (-9.7)          (-9.7)           (1.0)          (-5.6)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00162***     -0.02071***     -0.02070***      0.01281        -0.00645***
                            (6.8)         (-10.8)         (-10.8)          (-0.9)          (-5.3)   
difficulty                0.00010***     -0.00266***     -0.00266***     -0.00004        -0.00125***
                           (11.6)           (8.9)           (8.9)          (-1.1)          (32.3)   
Coverage                  0.00012***      0.00094***      0.00094***     -0.00004         0.00536***
                          (-54.4)          (-7.4)          (-7.4)          (-1.0)          (-5.3)   
size                     -0.00270***     -0.00269***     -0.00269***     -0.00149        -0.00285***
                          (-12.2)           (2.9)           (3.0)          (-0.9)           (1.5)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00002***      0.00066**       0.00066**      -0.00017         0.00017   
                           (20.4)           (4.3)           (4.3)           (1.0)           (5.9)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000***      0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000***
                           (-5.7)          (-6.4)          (-6.4)          (-1.0)          (-6.9)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00003***     -0.00150***     -0.00150***     -0.00153        -0.00100***
                            (5.9)         (-35.4)         (-35.4)          (-1.1)         (-33.9)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00001***     -0.00144***     -0.00144***     -0.00020        -0.00098***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Pooled regression with quarter fixed effects, whole sample
CHAPTER 1
53
Panel C: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           53502           53481           53481           53502           53378   
R-squared                   0.171          -0.058          -0.058          -0.084          -0.060   
                                                                                                    
                           (95.0)           (8.3)           (8.3)           (1.3)          (29.2)   
Constant                  0.08026***      0.30786***      0.30833***      0.26508         0.65363***
                            (3.8)          (-5.6)          (-5.6)           (0.1)          (-2.8)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00089***     -0.05775***     -0.05763***      0.00525        -0.01696** 
                           (-6.2)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)           (0.9)           (2.3)   
meandifficulty           -0.00018***     -0.00076        -0.00072         0.00606         0.00175*  
                           (40.9)           (1.3)           (1.3)          (-0.2)          (13.5)   
meanCoverage              0.00064***      0.00090         0.00092        -0.00082         0.00557***
                          (-99.4)          (-3.1)          (-3.2)          (-1.2)          (-3.2)   
meansize                 -0.00598***     -0.00835**      -0.00840**      -0.01741        -0.00515** 
                            (5.2)         (-31.4)         (-31.4)           (0.1)         (-29.0)   
meanMat                   0.00001***     -0.00203***     -0.00203***      0.00002        -0.00112***
                           (12.6)          (-1.6)          (-1.6)           (0.6)          (-1.4)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001         0.00002        -0.00000   
                            (1.3)           (2.6)           (2.6)          (-2.2)          (-0.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00001         0.00126**       0.00125*       -0.00600*       -0.00003   
                           (33.4)          (-4.7)          (-4.7)          (-0.8)          (-2.4)   
meanexp                   0.00092***     -0.00573***     -0.00573***     -0.00514        -0.00178*  
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
Panel D: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           53502           53481           53481           53502           53378   
R-squared                   0.252          -0.054          -0.054          -0.085          -0.053   
                                                                                                    
                           (-6.5)          (-3.0)          (-3.0)           (0.4)          (-4.4)   
Constant                 -0.06512***     -0.87241**      -0.87376**       0.94849        -1.20986***
                              (.)          (-5.8)          (-5.8)             (.)             (.)   
o.quarter==199            0.00000        -2.36562***     -2.36251***      0.00000         0.00000   
                            (3.7)          (-5.8)          (-5.8)           (0.1)          (-3.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00082***     -0.05978***     -0.05963***      0.00462        -0.02003** 
                           (-8.3)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)           (0.9)           (2.7)   
meandifficulty           -0.00023***     -0.00025        -0.00021         0.00635         0.00205** 
                           (23.9)           (1.8)           (1.8)          (-0.0)          (13.4)   
meanCoverage              0.00037***      0.00129         0.00131        -0.00005         0.00576***
                          (-62.5)          (-2.1)          (-2.2)          (-1.5)          (-2.0)   
meansize                 -0.00405***     -0.00641*       -0.00652*       -0.02510        -0.00359*  
                           (16.0)          (-8.9)          (-8.9)          (-0.3)          (-7.6)   
meanMat                   0.00004***     -0.00114***     -0.00115***     -0.00019        -0.00059***
                           (12.3)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)           (0.6)          (-0.4)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00000        -0.00000         0.00002        -0.00000   
                            (2.8)           (2.3)           (2.3)          (-2.3)          (-0.3)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00003**       0.00113*        0.00112*       -0.00608*       -0.00009   
                           (12.9)           (7.6)           (7.6)          (-0.3)           (6.6)   
meanexp                   0.01330***      0.36320***      0.36312***     -0.06746         0.18910***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e          PmafeQ         PmafepQ          DafepY          RangeQ   
                                                                                                    
Whole sample, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 19: The table presents the results from the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6] for the 
period after Global Settlement. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. 
The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the  
values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the 
panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the 
topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly 
CRSP for  2003  to  2009.  Observations  are  earnings  forecasts  for  financial  quarters.  Only  the  last 
forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not 
reported. For pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based 
on quarter and firm. 
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Table 20. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
for the period after Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           14214           14138           14138           14214           13861   
R-squared                   0.072           0.009           0.009           0.000           0.017   
                                                                                                    
                           (16.0)           (3.8)           (3.8)          (-0.0)          (17.6)   
Constant                  0.03079***      0.25822***      0.25819***     -0.00004         0.65517***
                           (14.5)          (-2.0)          (-2.0)          (-0.9)           (0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00319***     -0.02532*       -0.02531*       -0.00023         0.00091   
                            (4.3)          (-1.8)          (-1.8)          (-1.2)          (-1.9)   
difficulty                0.00021***     -0.00382        -0.00382        -0.00007        -0.00242   
                            (1.1)          (-1.4)          (-1.4)          (-1.6)           (7.3)   
Coverage                  0.00002        -0.00160        -0.00160        -0.00002         0.00427***
                          (-16.3)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)           (0.5)          (-0.6)   
size                     -0.00214***     -0.00089        -0.00089         0.00008        -0.00136   
                           (-2.7)          (-1.5)          (-1.5)           (1.3)          (-1.6)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00007**      -0.00185        -0.00185         0.00004        -0.00101   
                            (5.1)           (4.5)           (4.5)           (1.0)           (3.4)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00004***      0.00004***      0.00000         0.00001***
                            (3.9)          (-3.1)          (-3.1)           (0.0)          (-1.9)   
AnalystExperience         0.00019***     -0.00833**      -0.00833**       0.00000        -0.00259   
                            (0.8)          (-8.7)          (-8.7)          (-2.8)          (-9.3)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00000        -0.00154***     -0.00154***     -0.00001**      -0.00089***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1199            1199            1199            1199            1199   
R-squared                   0.191          -0.017          -0.018          -0.057          -0.024   
                                                                                                    
                           (11.1)           (1.1)           (1.1)           (0.0)           (3.7)   
Constant                  0.06059***      0.29211         0.28823         0.00005         0.47892***
                           (-0.1)          (-2.1)          (-2.0)          (-0.2)          (-1.6)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00005        -0.06137*       -0.06069*       -0.00015        -0.02412   
                           (-3.5)           (1.8)           (1.8)          (-0.5)           (2.7)   
meandifficulty           -0.00061***      0.01507         0.01505        -0.00009         0.01124** 
                            (7.5)          (-0.4)          (-0.4)          (-0.7)           (1.8)   
meanCoverage              0.00066***     -0.00148        -0.00148        -0.00006         0.00377   
                          (-11.7)          (-0.8)          (-0.8)           (0.3)           (0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00440***     -0.01393        -0.01369         0.00012         0.00214   
                           (-0.5)          (-2.9)          (-2.8)          (-1.0)          (-4.2)   
meanMat                  -0.00000        -0.00127**      -0.00127**      -0.00001        -0.00093***
                            (1.8)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.0)           (1.0)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000         0.00006         0.00006        -0.00000         0.00002   
                            (2.9)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)           (0.9)          (-1.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00018**      -0.00274        -0.00267         0.00006        -0.00148   
                            (5.4)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-0.1)          (-1.2)   
meanexp                   0.00127***     -0.02377*       -0.02409*       -0.00002        -0.00651   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1199            1199            1199            1199            1199   
R-squared                   0.270          -0.021          -0.022          -0.062          -0.012   
                                                                                                    
                            (1.5)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-0.5)          (-1.6)   
Constant                  0.02479        -1.72150*       -1.74186*       -0.00872        -0.65620   
                            (0.2)          (-1.9)          (-1.9)          (-0.2)          (-1.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00015        -0.05847        -0.05792        -0.00014        -0.01948   
                           (-3.4)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.3)           (2.4)   
meandifficulty           -0.00058***      0.01444         0.01448        -0.00006         0.01022*  
                            (4.1)           (0.0)           (0.0)          (-0.1)           (1.9)   
meanCoverage              0.00036***      0.00016         0.00014        -0.00001         0.00417   
                           (-7.2)          (-1.1)          (-1.0)          (-0.2)           (0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00286***     -0.02119        -0.02076        -0.00009         0.00190   
                            (1.2)           (1.1)           (1.1)           (0.3)           (1.3)   
meanMat                   0.00002         0.00112         0.00114         0.00001         0.00067   
                            (1.5)           (1.9)           (1.9)           (0.0)           (1.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000         0.00007         0.00007         0.00000         0.00002   
                            (3.0)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)           (0.8)          (-0.8)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00018**      -0.00264        -0.00257         0.00005        -0.00125   
                            (1.3)           (2.9)           (2.9)           (0.7)           (3.4)   
meanexp                   0.00968         1.04307**       1.04969**       0.00527         0.60962***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 20: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker (see  
Table [8]) for the period after Global Settlement. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel 
estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. The 
panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values 
of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
2003 to 2009 Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
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Table 21. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers 
for the period after Global Settlement
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           20690           20557           20557           20690           20068   
R-squared                   0.115           0.009           0.009           0.001           0.023   
                                                                                                    
                           (26.2)           (2.0)           (2.0)          (-0.5)          (19.2)   
Constant                  0.05299***      0.10648*        0.10628*       -0.00424         0.59925***
                          (-14.9)          (-4.3)          (-4.3)          (-1.0)          (-4.0)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00358***     -0.04217***     -0.04215***     -0.00069        -0.02156***
                           (10.1)          (-2.3)          (-2.3)          (-1.2)          (-2.0)   
difficulty                0.00049***     -0.00430*       -0.00431*       -0.00014        -0.00219*  
                            (3.6)           (2.8)           (2.8)          (-1.2)          (11.9)   
Coverage                  0.00007***      0.00253**       0.00253**      -0.00005         0.00580***
                          (-25.6)           (1.1)           (1.1)           (0.9)           (0.5)   
size                     -0.00358***      0.00395         0.00397         0.00056         0.00099   
                           (-5.4)          (-0.0)          (-0.0)           (0.7)          (-0.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00013***     -0.00002        -0.00002         0.00005        -0.00003   
                           (11.5)          (-0.5)          (-0.5)          (-2.4)           (0.1)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***     -0.00000        -0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                           (-1.0)          (-2.4)          (-2.4)           (1.1)          (-3.2)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00003        -0.00315*       -0.00315*        0.00008        -0.00241** 
                            (3.5)          (-9.9)          (-9.9)          (-2.7)         (-11.7)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00001***     -0.00147***     -0.00147***     -0.00004**      -0.00098***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1869            1868            1868            1869            1867   
R-squared                   0.249          -0.015          -0.015          -0.055          -0.016   
                                                                                                    
                           (21.0)           (2.4)           (2.4)          (-0.4)           (6.5)   
Constant                  0.11051***      0.45592*        0.45871*       -0.00571         0.68453***
                            (2.2)          (-4.2)          (-4.2)          (-1.0)          (-3.4)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00136*       -0.09424***     -0.09420***     -0.00184        -0.04153***
                           (-5.8)           (2.1)           (2.1)           (0.2)           (2.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00105***      0.01391*        0.01407*        0.00009         0.00902*  
                            (7.0)           (0.2)           (0.2)          (-1.0)           (1.0)   
meanCoverage              0.00065***      0.00082         0.00073        -0.00028         0.00182   
                          (-21.0)          (-1.3)          (-1.4)           (0.6)          (-0.6)   
meansize                 -0.00768***     -0.01780        -0.01796         0.00066        -0.00464   
                           (-1.1)          (-6.3)          (-6.4)          (-1.4)          (-6.9)   
meanMat                  -0.00001        -0.00209***     -0.00210***     -0.00004        -0.00123***
                            (4.9)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)          (-1.6)          (-0.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000        -0.00001   
                            (1.9)           (1.0)           (1.0)           (1.2)           (0.7)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00012         0.00232         0.00227         0.00022         0.00089   
                            (6.2)          (-3.4)          (-3.4)           (0.3)          (-2.7)   
meanexp                   0.00132***     -0.02642***     -0.02646***      0.00020        -0.01132** 
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1869            1868            1868            1869            1867   
R-squared                   0.294          -0.009          -0.008          -0.055           0.001   
                                                                                                    
                           (-1.7)           (1.0)           (1.0)          (-0.1)          (-0.0)   
Constant                 -0.06137         1.19671         1.22135        -0.01093        -0.00781   
                            (3.1)          (-4.3)          (-4.3)          (-0.8)          (-3.6)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00193**      -0.10097***     -0.10093***     -0.00142        -0.04589***
                           (-6.0)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.1)           (2.1)   
meandifficulty           -0.00108***      0.01151         0.01167        -0.00004         0.00780*  
                            (5.1)          (-0.0)          (-0.1)          (-1.2)           (0.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00049***     -0.00014        -0.00024        -0.00033         0.00120   
                          (-15.3)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)           (0.8)          (-0.0)   
meansize                 -0.00614***     -0.01770        -0.01800         0.00089        -0.00002   
                            (3.6)          (-3.1)          (-3.1)          (-0.6)          (-1.6)   
meanMat                   0.00007***     -0.00232**      -0.00235**      -0.00004        -0.00066   
                            (4.3)          (-0.5)          (-0.5)          (-1.7)          (-0.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000        -0.00001   
                            (2.1)           (0.9)           (0.9)           (1.3)           (0.6)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00013*        0.00220         0.00215         0.00024         0.00073   
                            (4.1)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)           (0.1)           (1.1)   
meanexp                   0.02971***     -0.16701        -0.17170         0.00131         0.15266   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 21: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker (see  
Table [8]) for the period after Global Settlement. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel 
estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table [8]. The 
panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values 
of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel 
regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker 
dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 
2003 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every 
analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter dummies are not reported. For 
pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and 
firm. 
CHAPTER 1
58
Table 22. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
and analysts moving from top to non-top brokers for the period after Global Settlement.
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           34904           34695           34695           34904           33929   
R-squared                   0.088           0.009           0.009           0.001           0.021   
                                                                                                    
                           (28.7)           (3.9)           (3.9)          (-0.5)          (24.9)   
Constant                  0.04350***      0.16393***      0.16381***     -0.00251         0.62153***
                           (-5.3)          (-4.6)          (-4.6)          (-0.9)          (-2.5)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00097***     -0.03440***     -0.03438***     -0.00040        -0.01024*  
                           (11.2)          (-2.4)          (-2.4)          (-1.4)          (-2.2)   
difficulty                0.00042***     -0.00337*       -0.00337*       -0.00009        -0.00186*  
                            (4.6)           (1.4)           (1.4)          (-1.5)          (13.4)   
Coverage                  0.00008***      0.00102         0.00102        -0.00004         0.00538***
                          (-28.4)           (0.7)           (0.7)           (1.0)          (-0.1)   
size                     -0.00304***      0.00197         0.00198         0.00036        -0.00021   
                           (-5.7)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)           (1.1)          (-0.9)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00010***     -0.00074        -0.00074         0.00004        -0.00040   
                           (10.9)           (1.8)           (1.8)          (-2.2)           (1.4)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                            (5.9)          (-5.0)          (-5.0)           (0.8)          (-4.7)   
AnalystExperience         0.00015***     -0.00550***     -0.00550***      0.00004        -0.00293***
                            (2.7)         (-11.9)         (-11.9)          (-3.2)         (-13.3)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00001**      -0.00149***     -0.00149***     -0.00002**      -0.00094***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            2989            2988            2988            2989            2987   
R-squared                   0.225          -0.017          -0.017          -0.053          -0.021   
                                                                                                    
                           (24.3)           (2.6)           (2.6)          (-0.4)           (7.3)   
Constant                  0.09424***      0.38929*        0.38917*       -0.00360         0.59072***
                            (3.2)          (-5.5)          (-5.4)          (-1.4)          (-3.2)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00092**      -0.06095***     -0.06085***     -0.00096        -0.01900** 
                           (-7.1)           (2.9)           (2.9)           (0.1)           (3.6)   
meandifficulty           -0.00094***      0.01516**       0.01525**       0.00004         0.01000***
                           (10.6)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)          (-1.1)           (1.7)   
meanCoverage              0.00072***     -0.00028        -0.00032        -0.00019         0.00242   
                          (-24.1)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)           (0.6)          (-0.4)   
meansize                 -0.00658***     -0.01856        -0.01855         0.00039        -0.00240   
                           (-1.5)          (-6.7)          (-6.7)          (-1.7)          (-8.1)   
meanMat                  -0.00001        -0.00178***     -0.00179***     -0.00003        -0.00114***
                            (5.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-1.8)          (-0.4)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000        -0.00000   
                            (4.0)          (-0.5)          (-0.5)           (1.2)          (-0.4)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00018***     -0.00087        -0.00088         0.00013        -0.00037   
                            (9.4)          (-4.0)          (-4.0)           (1.1)          (-2.4)   
meanexp                   0.00118***     -0.01968***     -0.01973***      0.00033        -0.00629*  
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            2989            2988            2988            2989            2987   
R-squared                   0.282          -0.015          -0.015          -0.051          -0.003   
                                                                                                    
                           (-1.3)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)          (-0.5)          (-1.5)   
Constant                 -0.02985        -0.68965        -0.68753        -0.02729        -0.62892   
                            (2.9)          (-5.4)          (-5.4)          (-1.2)          (-3.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00081**      -0.06170***     -0.06161***     -0.00082        -0.02088***
                           (-7.5)           (2.9)           (2.9)           (0.1)           (3.6)   
meandifficulty           -0.00097***      0.01501**       0.01514**       0.00004         0.00989***
                            (7.3)           (0.0)           (0.0)          (-1.1)           (1.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00050***      0.00009         0.00004        -0.00019         0.00230   
                          (-17.1)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)           (0.7)           (0.3)   
meansize                 -0.00504***     -0.02004        -0.02005         0.00049         0.00213   
                            (4.1)          (-1.5)          (-1.6)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)   
meanMat                   0.00006***     -0.00093        -0.00094        -0.00001        -0.00010   
                            (4.8)           (0.3)           (0.3)          (-1.9)          (-0.3)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000        -0.00000   
                            (4.3)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)           (1.1)          (-0.6)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00019***     -0.00120        -0.00121         0.00012        -0.00061   
                            (4.7)           (1.5)           (1.4)           (0.5)           (3.0)   
meanexp                   0.02527***      0.31949         0.31863         0.00664         0.35143** 
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 22: The table presents the results for analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker and  
from a  top  to  a  non-top  broker  (see  Table  [8])  for  the  period  before  the  Global  Settlement.  The 
coefficients  come  from  the  pooled  and  panel  estimation  of  equation  [6].  The  dependent  and 
independent variables are described at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The 
regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for 
the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the 
analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is 
the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 2003 to 2009. Observations are earnings 
forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given 
quarter was used.  The quarter  dummies are not reported.  For pooled regressions we report  cluster 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 23. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
and also restricting the firms covered to the ones covered before and after the move
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           49018           48100           48100           49018           44058   
R-squared                   0.083           0.010           0.010           0.000           0.022   
                                                                                                    
                           (38.7)           (3.2)           (3.2)           (0.6)          (29.5)   
Constant                  0.04123***      0.09912**       0.09928**       0.00131         0.59673***
                            (5.1)           (1.3)           (1.3)          (-1.4)          (-0.3)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00093***      0.01059         0.01060        -0.00063        -0.00162   
                            (2.6)           (0.2)           (0.2)           (0.4)          (-0.7)   
difficulty                0.00006*        0.00017         0.00017         0.00002        -0.00048   
                           (13.9)           (0.1)           (0.1)           (0.3)          (14.3)   
Coverage                  0.00024***      0.00008         0.00008         0.00001         0.00568***
                          (-37.3)           (1.0)           (1.0)          (-0.5)           (0.0)   
size                     -0.00288***      0.00234         0.00233        -0.00009         0.00006   
                            (0.4)          (-1.0)          (-1.0)           (0.1)           (0.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00000        -0.00070        -0.00070         0.00000         0.00001   
                           (11.1)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-1.0)           (1.9)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                           (-2.8)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.7)   
AnalystExperience        -0.00007**      -0.00186        -0.00185         0.00019        -0.00044   
                            (8.8)         (-20.6)         (-20.6)          (-4.2)         (-22.2)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00197***     -0.00197***     -0.00002***     -0.00132***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8464            8441            8441            8464            8326   
R-squared                   0.079          -0.026          -0.026          -0.043          -0.024   
                                                                                                    
                           (29.4)           (0.5)           (0.6)           (0.3)          (12.1)   
Constant                  0.04762***      0.04399         0.04915         0.00112         0.59226***
                           (-0.1)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)          (-2.0)           (0.5)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00005        -0.01108        -0.01079        -0.00171*        0.00518   
                           (-0.7)           (0.2)           (0.2)           (0.8)           (0.3)   
meandifficulty           -0.00004         0.00053         0.00042         0.00010         0.00055   
                           (10.0)          (-2.5)          (-2.4)          (-0.7)           (4.0)   
meanCoverage              0.00037***     -0.00445*       -0.00437*       -0.00006         0.00428***
                          (-28.6)           (2.0)           (1.9)          (-0.2)           (0.7)   
meansize                 -0.00348***      0.01211*        0.01179        -0.00005         0.00260   
                            (8.2)         (-11.0)         (-11.0)          (-2.2)         (-11.0)   
meanMat                   0.00003***     -0.00230***     -0.00230***     -0.00002*       -0.00136***
                            (5.4)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)          (-2.1)           (0.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                            (2.4)          (-0.4)          (-0.5)          (-0.3)          (-1.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00007*       -0.00065        -0.00071        -0.00002        -0.00092   
                            (1.2)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)           (2.6)          (-1.5)   
meanexp                   0.00007        -0.00266        -0.00265         0.00036**      -0.00265   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            8464            8441            8441            8464            8326   
R-squared                   0.132          -0.022          -0.022          -0.047          -0.019   
                                                                                                    
                           (12.2)           (2.3)           (2.3)           (0.0)           (3.2)   
Constant                  0.12993***      1.25902*        1.24911*        0.00086         1.07012** 
                           (-1.5)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)          (-2.0)           (0.3)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00055        -0.01167        -0.01141        -0.00173*        0.00294   
                           (-1.1)           (1.5)           (1.4)           (0.5)           (1.2)   
meandifficulty           -0.00006         0.00436         0.00425         0.00007         0.00210   
                            (9.1)          (-2.1)          (-2.0)          (-0.7)           (4.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00033***     -0.00386*       -0.00379*       -0.00006         0.00506***
                          (-25.2)           (1.6)           (1.5)          (-0.1)           (0.4)   
meansize                 -0.00310***      0.00981         0.00951        -0.00003         0.00167   
                           (10.5)          (-4.8)          (-4.8)          (-1.2)          (-5.3)   
meanMat                   0.00008***     -0.00185***     -0.00186***     -0.00002        -0.00123***
                            (6.0)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)          (-2.1)           (0.3)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***     -0.00000        -0.00000        -0.00000*        0.00000   
                            (1.7)          (-0.5)          (-0.6)          (-0.2)          (-1.2)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005        -0.00080        -0.00086        -0.00001        -0.00108   
                            (7.5)           (2.3)           (2.3)          (-0.0)           (1.4)   
meanexp                   0.01947***      0.30362*        0.30026*       -0.00009         0.11466   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 23: The table presents the results for i)  analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker and  
ii) common firms before and after the move (see Table [8] for the  regressors definition). A firm is 
considered to be covered if there is at least on forecast for the firm in both periods, before and after the 
move. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and 
independent variables are described at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The 
regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for 
the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the 
analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is 
the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings 
forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given 
quarter was used.  The quarter  dummies are not reported.  For pooled regressions we report  cluster 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 24. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers 
and also restricting the firms covered to the ones covered before and after the move
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                           49535           48650           48650           49535           44949   
R-squared                   0.087           0.008           0.008           0.000           0.019   
                                                                                                    
                           (40.4)           (6.9)           (6.9)          (-0.2)          (30.0)   
Constant                  0.04799***      0.22826***      0.22824***     -0.00184         0.63556***
                           (-4.8)          (-2.2)          (-2.2)          (-0.8)          (-0.7)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00076***     -0.01696*       -0.01698*       -0.00058        -0.00320   
                            (5.4)          (-1.5)          (-1.5)          (-0.4)          (-1.5)   
difficulty                0.00015***     -0.00148        -0.00148        -0.00005        -0.00102   
                           (15.0)           (1.6)           (1.6)          (-1.6)          (14.8)   
Coverage                  0.00031***      0.00120         0.00120        -0.00014         0.00586***
                          (-38.7)          (-3.0)          (-2.9)           (0.7)          (-1.9)   
size                     -0.00337***     -0.00703**      -0.00703**       0.00039        -0.00268   
                            (0.1)           (1.0)           (1.0)           (1.6)           (1.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00000         0.00066         0.00066         0.00007         0.00038   
                            (5.9)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-0.4)           (1.4)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***      0.00000         0.00000        -0.00000         0.00000   
                            (0.0)          (-2.3)          (-2.3)          (-0.7)          (-3.3)   
AnalystExperience         0.00000        -0.00204*       -0.00204*       -0.00004        -0.00177***
                            (6.6)         (-16.9)         (-16.9)          (-3.7)         (-18.6)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00002***     -0.00173***     -0.00173***     -0.00004***     -0.00119***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            7908            7897            7897            7908            7849   
R-squared                   0.089          -0.031          -0.031          -0.045          -0.027   
                                                                                                    
                           (31.7)           (1.4)           (1.3)          (-0.2)          (12.5)   
Constant                  0.05790***      0.11178         0.11073        -0.00140         0.61651***
                            (0.5)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-0.8)          (-1.6)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00017        -0.03532*       -0.03566*       -0.00122        -0.01651   
                           (-2.6)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)          (-0.2)           (0.5)   
meandifficulty           -0.00016**      -0.00037        -0.00030        -0.00004         0.00079   
                           (10.1)           (0.3)           (0.4)          (-0.5)           (5.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00039***      0.00059         0.00063        -0.00007         0.00552***
                          (-31.4)           (0.6)           (0.6)           (0.8)          (-0.6)   
meansize                 -0.00402***      0.00351         0.00348         0.00040        -0.00215   
                            (3.7)          (-9.8)          (-9.8)          (-1.8)          (-8.8)   
meanMat                   0.00002***     -0.00208***     -0.00207***     -0.00003        -0.00110***
                            (0.8)           (1.0)           (1.0)          (-0.1)           (1.9)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000         0.00001         0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                            (1.5)           (0.9)           (0.9)           (0.5)           (1.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00005         0.00139         0.00134         0.00007         0.00085   
                            (4.8)          (-2.4)          (-2.4)          (-1.0)          (-2.6)   
meanexp                   0.00025***     -0.00560*       -0.00557*       -0.00020        -0.00367** 
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
CHAPTER 1
63
Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            7908            7897            7897            7908            7849   
R-squared                   0.170          -0.030          -0.030          -0.047          -0.026   
                                                                                                    
                           (10.8)          (-0.9)          (-0.9)           (1.5)           (1.7)   
Constant                  0.13477***     -0.53721        -0.53266         0.07935         0.61125   
                            (0.8)          (-2.2)          (-2.2)          (-0.7)          (-2.0)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00030        -0.03822*       -0.03876*       -0.00111        -0.02056*  
                           (-3.9)           (0.5)           (0.5)          (-0.1)           (0.8)   
meandifficulty           -0.00025***      0.00140         0.00154        -0.00001         0.00149   
                            (8.0)           (0.8)           (0.8)          (-0.7)           (5.6)   
meanCoverage              0.00030***      0.00139         0.00145        -0.00011         0.00596***
                          (-27.4)           (0.2)           (0.1)           (1.2)          (-0.7)   
meansize                 -0.00350***      0.00099         0.00089         0.00063        -0.00246   
                            (6.7)          (-6.4)          (-6.3)           (0.7)          (-4.8)   
meanMat                   0.00006***     -0.00253***     -0.00251***      0.00002        -0.00114***
                            (3.8)           (1.0)           (1.0)           (0.0)           (2.0)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000***      0.00001         0.00001         0.00000         0.00001*  
                            (1.8)           (0.9)           (0.8)           (0.5)           (1.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00006         0.00131         0.00126         0.00007         0.00088   
                            (6.0)          (-1.1)          (-1.1)           (1.6)           (0.1)   
meanexp                   0.01735***     -0.15046        -0.14911         0.01962         0.00439   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 24: The table presents the results for i) analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker and ii) 
common firms  before  and after  the  move (see  Table  [8]  for  the   regressors  definition).  A firm is 
considered to be covered if there is at least on forecast for the firm in both periods, before and after the 
move. The coefficients come from the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and 
independent variables are described at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The 
regressors in the panel cases are the mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8]) for 
the same analyst over the same quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the 
analyst changed employment to ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is 
the intersection of IBES details file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings 
forecasts for financial quarters. Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given 
quarter was used.  The quarter  dummies are not reported.  For pooled regressions we report  cluster 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 25. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers 
and also restricting the firms covered to the ones continuously covered during the last two quarters at 
the non-top broker and the third and fourth quarter at the top broker
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            5672            5610            5610            5672            5390   
R-squared                   0.056           0.024           0.024           0.003           0.029   
                                                                                                    
                            (9.3)           (2.3)           (2.3)           (0.6)          (12.0)   
Constant                  0.01940***      0.23635*        0.23642*        0.00205         0.69988***
                            (2.3)           (3.7)           (3.6)           (0.8)           (2.5)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00052*        0.07441***      0.07434***      0.00023         0.02608*  
                            (1.9)          (-2.9)          (-2.9)          (-0.3)          (-1.7)   
difficulty                0.00008        -0.00952**      -0.00952**      -0.00001        -0.00335   
                            (2.8)          (-1.0)          (-1.0)           (0.2)           (4.2)   
Coverage                  0.00006**      -0.00190        -0.00189         0.00000         0.00406***
                           (-9.3)           (0.8)           (0.8)          (-0.3)          (-0.7)   
size                     -0.00132***      0.00609         0.00608        -0.00009        -0.00259   
                           (-2.2)           (0.6)           (0.6)          (-0.5)           (0.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00006*        0.00129         0.00130        -0.00001         0.00012   
                            (2.5)          (-1.3)          (-1.3)           (1.7)           (0.2)   
FirmExperience            0.00000*       -0.00002        -0.00002         0.00000         0.00000   
                            (1.8)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)          (-1.1)           (0.7)   
AnalystExperience         0.00013        -0.00069        -0.00069        -0.00016         0.00178   
                            (3.7)         (-11.8)         (-11.8)          (-4.6)         (-11.4)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00001***     -0.00328***     -0.00328***     -0.00001***     -0.00170***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1511            1505            1505            1511            1484   
R-squared                  -0.169          -0.205          -0.206          -0.225          -0.224   
                                                                                                    
                            (8.7)           (1.3)           (1.3)          (-1.6)           (3.7)   
Constant                  0.03414***      0.42865         0.43410        -0.00901         0.66143***
                           (-0.7)           (2.1)           (2.1)          (-3.9)          (-0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00034         0.08708*        0.08709*       -0.00279***     -0.00277   
                           (-3.1)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)           (1.3)           (0.4)   
meandifficulty           -0.00035**      -0.01637        -0.01632         0.00020         0.00234   
                            (4.6)          (-1.5)          (-1.5)          (-1.1)           (1.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00032***     -0.00839        -0.00838        -0.00011         0.00387   
                           (-9.0)           (0.3)           (0.3)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)   
meansize                 -0.00230***      0.00600         0.00558        -0.00025        -0.00794   
                            (2.6)          (-7.9)          (-7.9)          (-2.3)          (-7.2)   
meanMat                   0.00002**      -0.00384***     -0.00383***     -0.00002*       -0.00188***
                            (3.0)          (-0.7)          (-0.7)          (-2.6)          (-0.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000**      -0.00004        -0.00004        -0.00000**      -0.00001   
                            (0.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)           (0.1)          (-0.7)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00002         0.00059         0.00054         0.00001        -0.00191   
                            (0.4)           (0.1)           (0.1)           (6.3)           (1.6)   
meanexp                   0.00014         0.00161         0.00167         0.00333***      0.02537   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            1511            1505            1505            1511            1484   
R-squared                  -0.144          -0.197          -0.198          -0.167          -0.214   
                                                                                                    
                            (2.9)           (1.3)           (1.3)           (0.9)           (2.4)   
Constant                  0.05642**       2.15620         2.15662         0.02381         2.10161*  
                           (-0.9)           (2.3)           (2.3)          (-3.9)          (-0.1)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00050         0.10380*        0.10388*       -0.00304***     -0.00252   
                           (-1.7)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)           (0.0)          (-0.2)   
meandifficulty           -0.00021        -0.02275*       -0.02267*        0.00000        -0.00138   
                            (4.4)          (-1.7)          (-1.7)          (-1.6)           (1.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00031***     -0.01000        -0.00995        -0.00016         0.00414   
                           (-7.7)           (0.9)           (0.9)           (0.4)          (-0.2)   
meansize                 -0.00212***      0.02089         0.02034         0.00014        -0.00210   
                            (2.3)          (-3.1)          (-3.1)          (-0.7)          (-2.4)   
meanMat                   0.00003*       -0.00333**      -0.00333**      -0.00001        -0.00135*  
                            (3.0)          (-0.6)          (-0.6)          (-3.3)          (-0.5)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000**      -0.00003        -0.00003        -0.00000***     -0.00001   
                            (0.3)           (0.3)           (0.3)          (-0.1)          (-0.5)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d      0.00002         0.00173         0.00168        -0.00001        -0.00141   
                            (1.4)           (0.7)           (0.7)           (1.6)           (1.5)   
meanexp                   0.00544         0.23372         0.23237         0.00895         0.25840   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 25: The table presents the results for i)  analysts who moved from a non-top to a top broker, ii) 
common firms before and after the move and iii) the two last quarters at the non-top broker and the 
third and fourth quarters at  the top broke  (see Table [8] for the  regressors definition).  A firm is 
considered to be covered if it is covered at all the four quarters considered. The coefficients come from 
the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described 
at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the 
mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8])  for the same analyst  over the same 
quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to 
ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details 
file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. 
Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter  
dummies are not reported. For pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are 
formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table 26. Regressions results of the sample consisting of analysts moving from top to non-top brokers 
and also restricting the firms covered to the ones continuously covered during the last two quarters at 
the top broker and the third and fourth quarter at the non-top broker
Panel A: Pooled regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                            2968            2948            2948            2968            2905   
R-squared                   0.121           0.037           0.037           0.012           0.049   
                                                                                                    
                           (10.8)           (1.7)           (1.7)          (-0.9)           (9.3)   
Constant                  0.04986***      0.27228         0.27228        -0.00726         0.74373***
                           (-1.2)          (-4.9)          (-4.9)          (-0.5)          (-3.8)   
TopBrokerDummy           -0.00070        -0.14334***     -0.14334***     -0.00054        -0.05393***
                            (3.3)           (0.4)           (0.4)          (-1.0)          (-0.3)   
difficulty                0.00039**       0.00250         0.00250        -0.00023        -0.00075   
                           (-0.1)           (0.5)           (0.5)           (2.3)           (3.5)   
Coverage                 -0.00000         0.00141         0.00141         0.00012*        0.00446***
                          (-11.1)           (0.1)           (0.1)           (1.3)          (-0.4)   
size                     -0.00358***      0.00117         0.00117         0.00102        -0.00203   
                           (-1.0)           (0.2)           (0.2)           (1.0)           (0.1)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00008         0.00073         0.00073         0.00019         0.00021   
                            (6.4)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)          (-1.2)          (-1.1)   
FirmExperience            0.00000***     -0.00002        -0.00002        -0.00000        -0.00001   
                            (0.3)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-1.2)          (-2.1)   
AnalystExperience         0.00003        -0.00990*       -0.00990*       -0.00046        -0.00475*  
                            (4.1)          (-8.9)          (-8.9)          (-3.1)         (-10.5)   
ForecastMaturity          0.00004***     -0.00359***     -0.00359***     -0.00006**      -0.00206***
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from bottom to top, Pooled regression
Panel B: Panel regression
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                             992             990             989             992             981   
R-squared                  -0.080          -0.168          -0.168          -0.232          -0.143   
                                                                                                    
                            (8.5)           (0.7)           (0.7)           (0.7)           (4.3)   
Constant                  0.07405***      0.37594         0.37826         0.01948         1.19880***
                            (1.4)          (-2.0)          (-2.0)          (-1.1)          (-1.9)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00109        -0.10361*       -0.10448*       -0.00266        -0.04819   
                            (0.6)          (-1.7)          (-1.8)          (-1.9)          (-2.0)   
meandifficulty            0.00014        -0.02670        -0.02684        -0.00136        -0.01555*  
                            (1.9)           (1.1)           (1.0)           (1.5)           (3.2)   
meanCoverage              0.00024         0.00855         0.00814         0.00057         0.01274** 
                           (-9.4)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)          (-0.2)          (-1.7)   
meansize                 -0.00529***     -0.00505        -0.00482        -0.00030        -0.03154   
                            (0.6)          (-6.5)          (-6.5)          (-0.7)          (-7.2)   
meanMat                   0.00001        -0.00408***     -0.00410***     -0.00002        -0.00226***
                            (2.2)          (-0.3)          (-0.3)          (-0.9)          (-0.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000*       -0.00002        -0.00002        -0.00000        -0.00001   
                           (-1.9)           (2.2)           (2.2)           (2.1)           (2.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00021         0.01524*        0.01532*        0.00067*        0.00693*  
                            (1.0)           (0.3)           (0.3)          (-0.5)          (-0.2)   
meanexp                   0.00052         0.00986         0.01002        -0.00071        -0.00258   
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Both bottom to top and top to bottom, panel regression (no quarter fixed effects)
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Panel C: Panel regression with quarter dummies 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                                                    
N                             992             990             989             992             981   
R-squared                  -0.094          -0.185          -0.185          -0.318          -0.139   
                                                                                                    
                            (2.3)           (2.4)           (2.4)           (0.2)           (3.5)   
Constant                  0.10285*        6.96771*        6.97084*        0.03026         5.01499***
                            (1.7)          (-2.1)          (-2.1)          (-1.6)          (-1.9)   
TopBrokerDummy            0.00151        -0.12246*       -0.12299*       -0.00454        -0.05379   
                            (0.5)          (-1.4)          (-1.4)          (-0.9)          (-1.6)   
meandifficulty            0.00014        -0.02456        -0.02477        -0.00081        -0.01441   
                            (1.9)           (1.1)           (1.1)           (2.0)           (3.3)   
meanCoverage              0.00026         0.00955         0.00917         0.00083*        0.01405** 
                           (-7.4)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)          (-0.9)          (-1.8)   
meansize                 -0.00485***     -0.00903        -0.00880        -0.00188        -0.03729   
                            (0.8)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)          (-0.2)          (-0.4)   
meanMat                   0.00002        -0.00040        -0.00041        -0.00002        -0.00035   
                            (1.8)          (-0.1)          (-0.1)          (-0.8)           (0.2)   
meanFirmExp               0.00000        -0.00001        -0.00001        -0.00000         0.00001   
                           (-1.8)           (2.1)           (2.1)           (2.0)           (2.0)   
NumberOfCompaniesF~d     -0.00020         0.01519*        0.01524*        0.00070         0.00709   
                            (0.8)           (2.2)           (2.2)           (0.0)           (2.4)   
meanexp                   0.00698         1.28269*        1.28388*        0.00019         0.68472*  
                                                                                                    
                     abs(FE)/Pr~e           Pmafe          Pmafep           Dafep           Range   
                                                                                                    
Analysts who moved from top to bottom, panel regression with quarter fixed effects
Table 26: The table presents the results for i)  analysts who moved from a top to a non-top broker, ii) 
common firms before and after the move and iii) the two last quarters at the-top broker and the third 
and fourth quarters  at  the  non-top broke  (see Table [8]  for  the  regressors  definition).  A firm is  
considered to be covered if it is covered at all the four quarters considered. The coefficients come from 
the pooled and panel estimation of equation [6]. The dependent and independent variables are described 
at Table [8]. The panel dimensions are analyst and quarter. The regressors in the panel cases are the 
mean of the values of the corresponding variables (Table [8])  for the same analyst  over the same 
quarter. For the panel regressions we drop the quarters in which the analyst changed employment to 
ensure that the topbroker dummy has only 0 and 1 as values. Data is the intersection of IBES details 
file and monthly CRSP for 1990 to 2009. Observations are earnings forecasts for financial quarters. 
Only the last forecast of every analyst for a given firm at the given quarter was used. The quarter  
dummies are not reported. For pooled regressions we report cluster corrected t-statistics. Clusters are 
formulated based on quarter and firm. 
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Table  27.   Recommendations evaluation for non-top and top brokers
Table 27: The table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for portfolios of buy 
and hold/sell recommendations of top and non-top brokers (see Table [8] for the top brokers). One * means 
significance at the 10% level and ** significance at the 5% or better. The average daily abnormal return is the
intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return over the risk free rate on i)the excess of the  
market return over the risk-free rate, ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of  
small stocks and one of large stocks, iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of 
high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and iv) the difference between the daily  
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high price momentum stocks and one of low price momentum stocks.  
The data is  from the 1993-2009 period.  At  least  50 recommendations are required to be active for  a daily  
portfolio return to be included the regression estimation. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns  
from CRSP and the regressors from the Kenneth French's website.
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0000563 0.0000794** 0.448
sell -0.0000289 -0.0000178 -0.218
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Table  28.   Recommendations evaluation of analysts moving from non-top brokers to top brokers and 
top brokers to non-top brokers
Panel A
Panel B
Table 28: The table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for portfolios of buy 
and hold/sell recommendations of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers and top to non-top brokers (see 
Table [8] for the top brokers). One * means significance at the 10% level and ** significance at the 5% or better.  
The average daily abnormal return is the intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return over the  
risk free rate on i)the excess of the market return over the risk-free rate, ii) the difference between the daily 
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks, iii) the difference between the daily 
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and 
iv) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high price momentum stocks and  
one of low price momentum stocks. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. At least 50 recommendations are 
required to be active for a daily portfolio return to be included the regression estimation. Recommendations  
come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP and the regressors from the Kenneth French's website.
Non-top to top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0001483** 0.0001156* -0.466
sell -0.0000543 0.000056 1.27
Top to non-top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0000202 0.0000622 0.521
sell 0.000003 0.0000294 -0.0069
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Table 29. Recommendations evaluation of analysts moving from non-top brokers to top brokers and 
top brokers to non-top brokers for the period before the Global Settlement
Panel A
Panel B
Table 29: The table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for portfolios of buy 
and hold/sell recommendations of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers and top to non-top brokers for  
the period before Global Settlement (see Table [8] for the top brokers). One * means significance at the 10%  
level and ** significance at the 5% or better. The average daily abnormal return is the intercept from a regression  
of the daily portfolio excess return over the risk free rate on i)the excess of the market return over the risk-free  
rate, ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large  
stocks, iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks  
and one of low book-to-market stocks, and iv) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of high price momentum stocks and one of low price momentum stocks. The data is from the 1993-
2002 period. At least 50 recommendations are required to be active for a daily portfolio return to be included the  
regression estimation. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP and the regressors 
from the Kenneth French's website.
Non-top to top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.000117 0.000038 -0.57
sell 0.0000219 0.0000396 0.122
Top to non top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy -0.0000369 0 0.2985
sell 0.000106 0.0000564 -0.35
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Table  30  .  Recommendations evaluation of analysts moving from non-top brokers to top brokers and 
top brokers to non-top brokers for the period after the Global Settlement.
Panel A
Panel B
Table 30: The table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for portfolios of buy 
and hold/sell recommendations of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers and top to non-top brokers for  
the period afterGlobal Settlement (see Table [8] for the top brokers). One * means significance at the 10% level  
and ** significance at the 5% or better. The average daily abnormal return is the intercept from a regression of  
the daily portfolio excess return over the risk free rate on i)the excess of the market return over the risk-free rate,  
ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks,  
iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one  
of low book-to-market stocks, and iv) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of 
high price momentum stocks and one of low price momentum stocks. The data is from the 2002-2009 period.  At 
least 50 recommendations are required to be active for a daily portfolio return to be included the regression 
estimation. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP and the regressors from the 
Kenneth French's website.
Top to non top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0000379 0.0001231 0.69715
sell -0.0001095 0.0000213 1.0204
Non-top to top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0001728 0.000253** 0.53
sell -0.0001534** 0 1.28
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Table 31. Recommendations evaluation of analysts moving from non-top brokers to top brokers and 
top brokers to non-top brokers acting on the recommendation one day before its release
Panel A
Panel B
Table 31: The table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for portfolios of buy 
and hold/sell  recommendations of analysts moving from non-top to top brokers and top to non-top brokers,  
acting on the recommendation one day before its  release (see Table [8] for the top brokers).  One * means  
significance at the 10% level and ** significance at the 5% or better. The average daily abnormal return is the 
intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return over the risk free rate on i)the excess of the  
market return over the risk-free rate, ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of  
small stocks and one of large stocks, iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of 
high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and iv) the difference between the daily  
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high price momentum stocks and one of low price momentum stocks.  
The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP and 
the regressors from the Kenneth French's website.
Non top to top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0002507** 0.0002521** -0.01469
sell -0.0002471** -0.0001241** 1.17
Top to non top
Non-top top T-stat of difference
buy 0.0001407** 0.0001455** -0.05908
sell -0.0001483** -0.0001092 -0.06305
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Table  32  .  Non Top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 32: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the buy recommendations issued by non-top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. 
Volume  reaction  is  defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10] and  cumulative  size-
adjusted return at equation [11]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, 
daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
-3 24278 0.9962226 0.9931647 -0.5926257
-2 24278 1.0257998 1.0572880 3.8021521
-1 24278 1.1074046 1.2624930 13.2556295
0 24278 1.2989026 1.4774470 31.5227600
1 24278 1.0172226 1.0043610 2.6718700
2 24278 0.9733835 0.9431921 -4.3970029
3 24278 0.9658925 0.9429116 -5.6361800
days T-stat
-3 24278 1.0264656 2.0258940 2.0355017
-2 24278 1.0281551 1.4236740 3.0814347
-1 24278 1.1217808 2.1573530 8.7955715
0 24278 1.3018124 1.9796650 23.7548246
1 24278 1.0980523 1.8258940 8.3673643
2 24278 1.0123248 3.7251410 0.5155177
3 24278 0.9757229 1.5672480 -2.4136063
N(volRatio) mean(volRatio) sd(volRatio)
0 24278 0.0121414 0.0727658 25.9984773
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Table  33  .  Non Top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 33: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the sell recommendations issued by non-top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. 
Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-
adjusted return at equation [11]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, 
daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
days T-stat
-3 17698 1.0527105 1.963212 3.5718402858
-2 17698 1.0927029 5.631943 2.1897632603
-1 17698 1.2540082 3.003918 11.249203131
0 17698 1.4666247 2.978518 20.841529629
1 17698 1.1194328 1.567702 10.134963689
2 17698 1.0167548 1.444182 1.5434032689
3 17698 0.99183418 1.496854 -0.725742332
N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio)
0 17698 -0.0094555 0.0809235 -15.54432745
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 17698 1.0192678 1.13229 2.2637921691
-2 17698 1.0642521 1.576368 5.4224032502
-1 17698 1.1695254 1.796834 12.551305959
0 17698 1.3334147 1.978675 22.416735752
1 17698 0.99594418 0.9687779 -0.556950432
2 17698 0.95274039 1.010007 -6.224835012
3 17698 0.94771562 1.112958 -6.249644044
CHAPTER 1
75
Table  34  .  Top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 34: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the buy recommendations issued by top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  
Volume  reaction  is  defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  cumulative  size-
adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, 
daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 9436 1.0241087 1.398623 1.6744303725
-2 9436 1.0839789 2.139006 3.813749336
-1 9436 1.2168185 2.22795 9.4533309336
0 9436 1.5014338 2.668785 18.251307537
1 9436 1.1410797 1.542288 8.8857279819
2 9436 1.0712384 1.882026 3.6769058026
3 9436 1.0217394 1.582104 1.3347701663
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 9436 1.0069623 0.9670393 0.6993628757
-2 9436 1.028332 1.043361 2.6377680292
-1 9436 1.1409803 1.256758 10.896844113
0 9436 1.4230301 1.552887 26.462165532
1 9436 1.0215531 0.9432313 2.2196551465
2 9436 0.9668746 0.9345699 -3.443049828
3 9436 0.96772178 0.9076402 -3.454536777
0 9436 0.015294 0.0684771 21.695501439
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Table  35  .  Top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 35: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the sell recommendations issued by top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. 
Volume  reaction  is  defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  cumulative  size-
adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, 
daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 9738 0.99771545 1.285063 -0.175432937
-2 9738 1.0022111 1.236808 0.176417224
-1 9738 1.1326767 1.762715 7.427581843
0 9738 1.3685039 1.930448 18.837309179
1 9738 1.0860605 1.204235 7.0522468355
2 9738 1.0005066 1.24911 0.0400220551
3 9738 1.0459521 3.383077 1.3403813172
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 9738 0.98415035 0.9461882 -1.653015911
-2 9738 1.013715 1.19974 1.1280895036
-1 9738 1.0973764 1.626665 5.9073197307
0 9738 1.3341529 1.475134 22.353660288
1 9738 0.99526478 0.9278118 -0.503634132
2 9738 0.96344036 0.8927542 -4.041149281
3 9738 0.96426068 0.8851654 -3.984343203
0 9738 -0.0106121 0.0684128 -15.30730915
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Table  36  .  Non-top to top brokers, non top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 36: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the non-top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to 
top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 1033 1.1081067 1.940081 1.7909477216
-2 1033 1.1284736 2.418265 1.7074978451
-1 1033 1.2434793 2.28833 3.4197436439
0 1033 1.6092481 3.874193 5.0543241612
1 1033 1.1293154 1.454436 2.8576286585
2 1033 0.98013912 0.9836642 -0.648935873
3 1033 1.0086959 1.224861 0.2281801655
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio) T-stat
-3 1033 1.0013211 1.029322 0.0412510111
-2 1033 1.0438489 1.207448 1.1671869612
-1 1033 1.1088602 1.225083 2.8559708819
0 1033 1.3634805 1.547762 7.547916685
1 1033 1.0937057 0.9838874 3.0610524501
2 1033 1.0428337 0.9548711 1.4417534594
3 1033 0.99958274 1.014764 -0.013215751
0 1033 0.0120756 0.0865934 4.4820230677
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Table  37  .  Non-top to top brokers, non top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 37: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the non-top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to  
top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 585 0.89613144 0.7728645 -3.250563725
-2 585 1.0422497 1.863668 0.5483186456
-1 585 1.3112682 5.013748 1.5015859137
0 585 1.4229821 2.749811 3.720463748
1 585 1.0413178 1.33906 0.7463028241
2 585 1.0837892 2.031276 0.9976932631
3 585 1.0232575 1.678906 0.335053826
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 585 0.89613144 0.7728645 -3.250563725
-2 585 1.0422497 1.863668 0.5483186456
-1 585 1.3112682 5.013748 1.5015859137
0 585 1.4229821 2.749811 3.720463748
1 585 1.0413178 1.33906 0.7463028241
2 585 1.0837892 2.031276 0.9976932631
3 585 1.0232575 1.678906 0.335053826
0 585 -0.0125121 0.0762023 -3.971367341
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Table  38  .  Non-top to Top brokers,  top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 38: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non top to top  
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 862 0.95305096 0.9397403 -1.466805392
-2 862 0.99362624 0.8853612 -0.211362946
-1 862 1.1350976 1.759849 2.2538544211
0 862 1.4892187 1.883458 7.6260692038
1 862 1.1282724 0.9868989 3.8160511608
2 862 1.1404007 2.234995 1.844362783
3 862 1.0283121 0.8184733 1.0155965104
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 862 0.9485556 0.9551733 -1.581282866
-2 862 1.0162605 0.9341661 0.5110500387
-1 862 1.1173304 1.341073 2.5686904157
0 862 1.5574936 1.829936 8.9445319139
1 862 1.0699546 0.9590695 2.1415086386
2 862 0.98583328 0.9547411 -0.435649605
3 862 0.98323077 0.887835 -0.554542062
0 862 0.0205353 0.0911004 6.6181163938
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Table  39  .  Non-top to Top brokers,  top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 39: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non top to top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].   Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 954 0.92181313 0.6472661 -3.730999177
-2 954 0.94965458 0.8564257 -1.81570155
-1 954 1.1007077 1.404327 2.2149739303
0 954 1.4666954 2.729717 5.2806828256
1 954 1.0436075 0.9141954 1.4733174922
2 954 0.96335147 0.8104384 -1.396724452
3 954 0.96127603 0.7831584 -1.527230019
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 954 1.0085062 0.985609 0.2665662218
-2 954 0.99421201 0.9935806 -0.179928043
-1 954 1.10442 1.08887 2.9619781039
0 954 1.3444447 1.428303 7.4485775817
1 954 0.93088536 0.8374118 -2.549207346
2 954 0.97425117 0.8938185 -0.889779402
3 954 0.97778509 0.9110112 -0.753173497
0 954 -0.0101587 0.0732427 -4.283985349
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Table  40.   Top to non-top brokers,  non-top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 40: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the non-top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-
top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 726 1.0200838 1.25347 0.431718097
-2 726 1.020333 1.073763 0.5102245322
-1 726 1.0728199 1.081649 1.8139780828
0 726 1.2536477 0.9544045 7.1608860119
1 726 1.0614727 1.171035 1.414427604
2 726 0.95046516 1.013771 -1.31655562
3 726 0.90786861 0.670498 -3.702358311
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 726 1.0530244 0.9934454 1.4381363718
-2 726 1.0303045 0.9776399 0.8352115958
-1 726 1.1672448 1.084616 4.1547502927
0 726 1.308758 1.27372 6.5314944368
1 726 0.97124662 0.8806271 -0.879761937
2 726 0.93427689 0.7985149 -2.217703041
3 726 0.94711753 0.8893909 -1.602091663
0 726 0.0120286 0.0665732 4.8683742936
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Table 41. Top to non-top brokers,  non-top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 41: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the non-top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-
top brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 633 1.0057917 1.737845 0.0838488044
-2 633 0.9771611 0.7926358 -0.724942155
-1 633 1.1508539 1.583984 2.3961147191
0 633 1.5119732 2.186341 5.8915719213
1 633 1.1498639 2.021585 1.8651204282
2 633 1.0039038 0.8934319 0.1099329696
3 633 0.92348372 0.6574798 -2.92801494
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 633 0.94142086 0.836083 -1.762769199
-2 633 1.0152595 0.9285109 0.4134806137
-1 633 1.1164012 1.539059 1.9028477615
0 633 1.4308351 2.02606 5.3500843652
1 633 1.0285846 1.047611 0.6864895401
2 633 0.94419437 0.837539 -1.676389111
3 633 0.85410412 0.7767923 -4.725415167
0 633 -0.0066033 0.0840033 -1.977727882
CHAPTER 1
83
Table 42. Top to non-top brokers, top brokers, buy recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 42: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].   Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11].  The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 816 0.95630266 0.9725156 -1.283522552
-2 816 1.1322075 1.715142 2.2019177397
-1 816 1.124468 1.317423 2.6988425544
0 816 1.41193 1.546624 7.6082321562
1 816 1.017976 0.9968525 0.5151186055
2 816 0.98533572 1.000401 -0.418727714
3 816 0.99752564 1.081797 -0.065337452
day N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio) T-stat
-3 816 1.0246632 1.266669 0.5562004837
-2 816 1.3596049 5.120454 2.0061444988
-1 816 1.1461227 1.584119 2.6349656909
0 816 1.5681059 2.831032 5.732309101
1 816 1.145425 1.235739 3.3616879591
2 816 1.0585689 1.038806 1.6105629251
3 816 1.1195186 2.190121 1.5588792177
0 816 0.0160101 0.0731423 6.2527420266
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Table 43. Top to non-top brokers, top brokers, sell recommendations
Panel A: Volume reaction
Panel B: Return reaction
Panel C: Cumulative size adjusted return
Table 43: The table presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the cumulative size-adjusted 
return of the top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].   Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and cumulative size-adjusted return at equation [11]. The data is from the 1993-
2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns and size deciles returns from CRSP. 
T-stat
675 0.92983458 1.191312 -1.530204586
675 0.99691497 1.409899 -0.056849058
675 1.1498801 2.03604 1.9125357182
675 1.5198078 3.02415 4.4657185644
675 1.0947445 1.327642 1.8540648127
675 1.1269237 2.84268 1.1600230966
675 0.99641951 0.96561 -0.096336884
N(volRatio) mean(volRatio)sd(volRatio)
day N(retRatio) mean(retRatio)sd(retRatio)
-3 675 0.95648624 1.039898 -1.087145708
-2 675 1.0704445 1.869893 0.978773543
-1 675 1.1024133 1.408974 1.8884490307
0 675 1.3432384 1.933111 4.6130797552
1 675 0.89546634 0.8655088 -3.137881618
2 675 0.94982043 0.9318777 -1.399007049
3 675 0.96581504 0.905811 -0.980504005
0 675 -0.0127686 0.0776455 -4.27246858
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Figure  1.   Recommendations' value and active recommendations for the non-top and top brokers
Panel A: Non-top brokers, buy recommendations
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Panel B: Non-top brokers, sell recommendations
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Panel C: Top brokers, buy recommendations
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Panel D: Top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 1: The figure presents the daily value of  buy-and-hold strategy and active recommendations 
for portfolios of buy and hold/sell recommendations of top and non-top brokers (see Table [8] for 
the top brokers). After having calculating the returns of each buy/sell portfolio, we invest one $1.00 
at  the portfolio  and we track its  value.  The recommendations  active  at  each portfolio  are  also 
presented. VwValue is the value of $1.00 invested at the CRSP value weighted dividends-included 
index. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES and daily stock 
returns from CRSP.
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Figure 2. Recommendations' value and active recommendations for analysts moving from non-top 
to top brokers and analysts moving from top to non-top brokers for the period before Global 
Settlement 
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ii) Non‐top to top: Non top sell 
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iii) Non‐top to top: top buy 
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iv) Non‐top to top: top sell 
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Panel B: Top to non‐top 
i) Top to non‐top: non‐top buy 
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ii) Top to non‐top: non‐top sell 
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iii) Top to non‐top: top buy 
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iv) Top to non‐top: top sell 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The figure presents the daily value of buy and hold strategy and active recommendations for 
portfolios of buy and hold/sell recommendations of analysts moving from a non-top to a top broker and 
from a top to a non-top broker fro the period after Global Settlement (see table [8] for the top brokers). After 
having calculating the returns of each buy/sell portfolio, we invest one $1.00 at the portfolio and we track its 
value. The recommendations active at each portfolio are also presented. VwValue is the value of $1.00 
invested at the CRSP value weighted dividends-included index. The data are from 1994-2009 period. 
Recommendations come from IBES and daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure  3.   Recommendations' value and active recommendations for analysts moving from non-top 
to  top  brokers  and  analysts  moving  from top  to  non-top  brokers  for  the  period  before  Global  
Settlement
Panel A: Non-top to Top
i) Non-top to top: non-top buy
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ii) Not-top to top: non-top sell
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iii) Not-top to top: top buy
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iv) Not-top to top: non-top sell
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Panel B: Top to non-top
i) Top to non-top: non-top buy
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ii) Top to non-top: non-top sell
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iii) Top to non-top: top buy  
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iv) Top to non-top: top sell
Figure 3: The figure presents the daily value of  buy-and-hold strategy and active recommendations 
for portfolios of buy and hold/sell recommendations of  analysts moving from a non-top to a top 
broker and  from a top to a non-top broker fro the period before Global Settlement (see Table [8] for 
the top brokers). After having calculating the returns of each buy/sell portfolio, we invest one $1.00 
at  the portfolio  and we track its  value.  The recommendations  active  at  each portfolio  are  also 
presented. VwValue is the value of $1.00 invested at the CRSP value weighted dividends-included 
index. The data is from the 1993-2002 period. Recommendations come from IBES and daily stock 
returns from CRSP.
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Figure 4  .  Recommendations' value and active recommendations for analysts moving from non-top 
to  top  brokers  and  analysts  moving  from  top  to  non-top  brokers  for  the  period  after  Global 
Settlement
Panel A:Non-top to Top
i) Non-top to top: non-top buy
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ii) Non-top to top: non-top sell
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iii) Non-top to top: top sell
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iv) Non-top to top: top sell
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Panel B: Top to non-top
i) Top to non-top: non-top buy
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ii) Top to non-top: non-top sell
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iii) Top to non-top: top buy
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iv) Top to non-top: top sell
Figure 4: The figure presents the daily value of  buy-and-hold strategy and active recommendations 
for portfolios of buy and hold/sell recommendations of  analysts moving from a non-top to a top 
broker and  from a top to a non-top broker fro the period after Global Settlement (see Table [8] for 
the top brokers). After having calculating the returns of each buy/sell portfolio, we invest one $1.00 
at  the portfolio  and we track its  value.  The recommendations  active  at  each portfolio  are  also 
presented. VwValue is the value of $1.00 invested at the CRSP value weighted dividends-included 
index. The data is from the 2003-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES and daily stock 
returns from CRSP.
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Figure 5  .  Recommendations' value acting on the recommendation one day before its release and 
active recommendations for analysts moving from non-top to top brokers and analysts moving from 
top to non-top brokers
Panel A:Non-top to Top
i) Non-top to top: non-top buy
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ii) Non-top to top: non-top sell
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iii) Non-top to top: top buy
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iv) Non-top to top: top sell
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Panel B: Top to bottom
i) Top to non-top: non-top buy
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i) Top to non-top: non-top sell
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iii) Top to non-top: top buy
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iv) Top to non-top: top sell
Figure 5: The figure presents the daily value of  buy-and-hold strategy and active recommendations 
for portfolios of buy and hold/sell recommendations of analysts moving from a non-top to a top 
broker and  from a top to a non-top broker if an investor acts on the recommendation one day before 
its release (see Table [8] for the top brokers). After having calculating the returns of each buy/sell 
portfolio, we invest one $1.00 at the portfolio and we track its value. The recommendations active 
at each portfolio are also presented. VwValue is the value of $1.00 invested at the CRSP value 
weighted  dividends-included  index.  The  data  is  from the  1993-2002 period.  Recommendations 
come from IBES and daily stock returns from CRSP.
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Figure 6. Non top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 6: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return of 
the non-top broker buy recommendations. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is 
defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  market-adjusted  return  is  defined  at 
equation [12]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns 
from CRSP. 
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Figure 7. Non top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 7: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return of 
the non-top broker sell recommendations. The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is 
defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  market-adjusted  return  is  defined  at 
equation [12]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns 
from CRSP. 
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Figure 8.  Top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 8: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return of 
the top broker buy recommendations. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is 
defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  market-adjusted  return  is  defined  at 
equation [12]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns 
from CRSP. 
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Figure 9. Top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 9: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return of 
the top broker sell  recommendations.  The top brokers are defined at  Table [8].  Volume reaction is 
defined  at  equation  [9],  return  reaction  at  equation  [10]  and  market-adjusted  return  is  defined  at 
equation [12]. The data is from the 1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns 
from CRSP. 
-.
00
8
-.
00
6
-.
00
4
-.
00
2
0
.0
02
A
dj
R
et
R
ea
ct
io
n
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
-4 -2 0 2 4
da
V o lR e ac ti on R e tR ea ct io n
A d jR e tR e act io n
CHAPTER 1
125
Figure 10. Non-top to top brokers, non-top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 10: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the non-top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 
1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 11. Non-top to top brokers, non-top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 11: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the non-top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 
1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 12. Non-top to top brokers, top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 12: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to top brokers.  
The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return reaction at 
equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 1993-2009 
period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 13. Non-top to top brokers, top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 13: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from non-top to top brokers. 
The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return reaction at 
equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 1993-2009 
period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 14. Top to non-top brokers, non-top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 14: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the non-top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 
1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 15. Top to non-top brokers, non-top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 15: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the non-top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top 
brokers. The top brokers are defined at Table [8].  Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return 
reaction at equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 
1993-2009 period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 16. Top to non-top brokers, top brokers, buy recommendations
Figure 16: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the top broker buy recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top brokers.  
The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return reaction at 
equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 1993-2009 
period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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Figure 17. Top to non-top brokers, top brokers, sell recommendations
Figure 17: The figure presents the volume reaction, the return reaction and the market-adjusted return 
of the top broker sell recommendations issued by the analysts who moved from top to non-top brokers. 
The top brokers are defined at Table [8]. Volume reaction is defined at equation [9], return reaction at 
equation [10] and market-adjusted return is defined at equation [12].  The data is from the 1993-2009 
period. Recommendations come from IBES, daily stock returns from CRSP. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
Do Dividends Impose Discipline? Evidence from 
Earnings Forecasts 
 
Abstract 
I study financial analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion with respect to dividends paying firms. I 
find that errors and the dispersion for firms that pay ordinary quarterly dividends are lower than for 
firms that do not. I examine if there is more information or better quality information for dividend 
paying firms as an explanation for the lower errors and dispersion. The empirical results confirm 
this hypothesis. I also examine the market reactions for forecasts announcements and 
recommendations releases and I find evidence of lower return and volume reactions for dividend-
paying firms. Finally, I use the propensity matching method to check for endogeneity and the 
results confirm that dividend-paying firms exhibit lower forecast errors and lower dispersion. 
 
I. Introduction 
The corporate finance literature has long striven to explain the dividends puzzle. Modigliani and 
Miller (AER 1958, JB1961) proved that in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by 
how a firm is financed. However, markets are not perfect and agency considerations plague 
contracts. So, dividends may play some role in the corporate strategies of firms. The seminal paper 
by Lintner (AER, 1956) sheds some light on corporations’ payout policy. Since then, signaling 
models, agency models and tax considerations have been put forth to provide explanations for the 
existence of dividends. Most studies examining the information content of dividends focused on 
whether dividends signal profitability. The reached consensus perceives dividends as having very 
limited, if any, signaling content for future earnings. Instead, dividend seem to be related to past 
profitability; as Miller put it, dividends lag earnings. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (JB 2002) 
see dividends as signaling the maturity of the firm, which leads to lower discount rates because of 
the reduction in risk. In this study I provide evidence that dividends have an information role, but a 
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 different one than the one assumed by signaling studies: I find that paying firms exhibit more 
information dissemination than their non-paying counterparts. 
The proposition of this paper is that dividend-paying firms exhibit higher information efficiency 
than non-paying firms and dividends are an important factor towards information efficiency. 
Managers are imperfect agents of shareholders and because of that there is a need to be monitored. 
On the other hand, monitoring is expensive, because the agent performing the monitoring pays all 
the cost and gets only part of the reward. However, the monitoring problem is less serious if the 
firm is constantly monitored (Easterbrook, AER 1984). By paying dividends a firm is more 
thoroughly monitored by the financial markets, as it is more probable to raise external capital. 
Because of this monitoring, dividend-paying firms are more disciplined than the non-paying ones. 
Dividends may also impose discipline by limiting the degrees of freedom the management has. For 
example, the manager will not undertake a very risky project that may have negative NPV, since 
this means that the future dividends may be cut, a very unpleasant prospect for most managers. 
Firms that exhibit higher discipline will also be less opaque to shareholders and lenders. This can be 
achieved in two ways. First, it will be easier to examine and evaluate the data regarding the firm and 
second the firm’s management will have relatively fewer things to hide and numbers to manipulate. 
In other words, dividends improve the information efficiency of the paying firms by imposing 
discipline on them.  
The main challenge is to provide a measure for the information available to investors for each firm. 
I opt for an indirect way and I use the analysts’ forecasts as a way to proxy for this information. 
More specifically, I use the errors and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a proxy to measure the 
information available to investors. If the forecasts of dividend paying firms are more accurate than 
the forecasts produced for non-paying firms, it means that the information available to analysts was 
more abundant or of higher quality than the information available for non-paying firms.  
The same logic applies to forecast dispersion. Higher dispersion means higher disagreement 
between analysts. Disagreement may stem from differences in information sets among analysts and 
different abilities of analysts. If the analysts covering dividend paying and non-paying firms have 
on average the same skills, then a difference in dispersion between firms may be attributed to the 
heterogeneity of information among the analysts covering the firm. In turn, heterogeneity may be 
attributed to difference in the amount of information or the quality of information available to 
analysts. This means that some analysts possess more or better information than others, which is a 
sign of flawed information flow. So, lower dispersion for a firm may suggest a better information 
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 flow than the flow of higher dispersion firm. The assumption behind the use of forecast accuracy 
and forecast dispersion is of course that analysts’ expectations proxy for the ones of the investors. 
After having established that dividend paying firms are actually more information efficient based on 
forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion, I investigate the factors which may contribute to this 
efficiency. First, I document that analysts covering dividend-paying firms issue on average more 
forecasts than their colleagues covering non-paying firms. Assuming that analysts release a new 
forecast every time they receive new information, then more forecasts per analyst means more 
information for dividend-paying firms. The fact that there are  more forecasts per analyst for 
dividend paying firms means that more information becomes available for dividend-paying firms 
during the course of the quarter and the analysts respond to this flow of information by issuing new 
forecasts updating their estimates, thus resulting in more forecasts per analyst for the dividend-
paying firms. 
In order to investigate the quality of information, I use as a proxy the accruals quality for each firm. 
Since the financial statements are one of the most influential inputs for the analysis of firms, good 
quality of financial statements is of high important to financial analysts, and will produce higher 
quality forecasts. I find that dividend-paying firms have higher quality accruals, and thus the 
information about them appears to be of higher quality. 
As an additional step to examine the quantity of information, I examine the time clustering  of 
forecasts for paying and non-paying firms. I find that the forecasts of paying firms are less clustered 
than the forecasts of non-paying firms. Clusters are formed when all analysts update their forecasts 
at the same time, possibly as a result of new public information. Less forecast clustering may 
indicate less dependence on publicly available news. If each analyst has his own sources which he 
can use to produce forecasts, the information efficiency is increased, meaning that the information 
efficiency for dividend paying firms is higher than the non-paying ones. 
Next, I examine the market reactions to forecast releases, recommendation releases and earnings 
announcements. I find that market return reactions are more moderate for favorable forecast 
releases, hold/sell recommendations and favorable earnings announcements for dividend paying 
firms. Lower return reactions mean that or the news innovation was taken already partially into 
account, or that the innovation was not marginally important. In any case, stocks with these 
characteristics appear to be more information efficient. Moreover, in all cases, favorable or 
unfavorable forecasts, buy or sell recommendations, and earnings announcements  the volume 
CHAPTER 2
136
 reactions is lower for dividend paying firms. If the volume reaction is treated as a measure of 
information heterogeneity, then there is evidence that the paying firms are more efficient. 
Additionally, I examine the effect of dividends on each size and book-to-market decile. If the 
hypothesis that monitoring is expensive and shareholders use dividends as an efficient and effective 
way to monitor a firm’s management, dividends’ effect on monitoring will be more evident in the 
cases where monitoring is more difficult. It is natural to assume that big firms with many lines of 
business are more difficult to be monitored than smaller firms with limited business scope. In the 
same logic, it is natural to assume that firms with many growth opportunities are more difficult to 
monitor. The results confirm the above hypothesis: Distribution of dividends seems to have the 
strongest effect on large and growth firms.  
Finally, I address the endogeneity problem. The finding that forecasts for dividend-paying firms are 
more accurate and the corresponding market reactions milder provides evidence that dividend 
payers are information efficient as result of more disciplined practices, but the same results may 
come from the fact that  the already disciplined firms are the ones to distribute dividends at the first 
place, while the non-disciplined ones don’t initiate dividends. In this view, it is not dividends that 
make firms disciplined, it is that disciplined firms pay dividends. I address the endogeneity problem 
in two ways. First, I use the dividend tax cut of 2003 as a natural experiment. Second, I use a 
propensity matching method to compare dividend paying firms with non-paying firms with the 
same characteristics. In both cases, the results show  that paying dividends results in lower forecast 
errors.  
The results of the current study point to agency theory as a partial explanation of the dividend 
puzzle. If firms become more transparent and efficient to disseminate information to investors, it 
means that the cost of controlling the management and the overall performance of firm is 
substantially reduced.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III investigates the forecast 
errors and dispersion. Section IV provide some possible explanations for the findings of Section III. 
Section V examines the market reaction to new forecasts and recommendations. Section VI 
examines the effects for size and book-to-market deciles. Section VII investigates the endogeneity 
issue. Section VIII includes some robustness checks and Section IX concludes. 
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II. Data 
The data comes from IBES, CRSP and Compustat. I use quarterly earnings forecasts from the IBES 
Details unadjusted file from 1990 to 2009, the IBES Recommendations file from 1993 to 2009, the 
CRSP monthly and daily file from 1990 to 2009, the CRSP events file from 1960 to 2009, the 
Compustat annual fundamentals file from 1960 to 2009 and the Thompson 13F database from 1990 
to 2009. For the analysis related to the quarterly earnings forecasts accuracy I use the intersection of 
firms between CRSP monthly file, IBES Details unadjusted file and Compustat. For the analysis of 
the firms’ accounting data I use the intersection between CRSP events file and Compustat annual 
fundamentals file. Finally, for the investigation of market’s reaction, I use the intersection between 
IBES unadjusted Details File, CRSP daily file and Compustat annual fundamentals file for the 
forecasts case and the intersection between IBES recommendations file, CRSP daily file and 
Compustat annual fundamentals file for the recommendations case. 
I create the intersection between the IBES Details file and CRSP monthly and IBES 
Recommendations file and CRSP daily file using the connection Table provided by WRDS. I also 
use the procedure proposed by WRDS to connect CRSP and Compustat. I use the CRSP identifier 
(permno) to connect IBES and Compustat files. I use cusip to connect 13F file to the other datasets. 
Descriptive statistics for the IBES Details unadjusted file (intersection with CRSP) are presented at 
Table [1], Panel A. The table reports the number of firms per year, the number of forecasts, analysts, 
the mean number of companies covered by analyst, the mean number of analysts covering a firm 
and the mean firm size defined as the logarithm of the market equity. Descriptive statistics for all 
years are presented at Panel B. On average there are 4.5 analysts per firm with a standard deviation 
of 4.4 and median of 3. The average analyst covers 9.9 firms (median 9) with a standard deviation 
of 5.11.  
Table [2] presents descriptive statistics for the IBES recommendations file. The file starts at 1993 
(with only one recommendation in 1992) and contains more than 500,000 recommendations. IBES 
assigns each recommendation to five categories (related but distinct to the different ones used by 
each broker): strong buy, buy, hold, underperform and sell. I group the number of buy and strong 
buy together and the number of hold, underperform and sell together. The reason is that 
underperform and sell recommendations are relatively rare, and it seems that hold recommendations 
serve the role of a sell recommendation in disguise (Barber, Lehavy and Trueman, JFE 2007).  
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 Table [3] presents summary statistics about the size of the firms of the CRSP monthly database. The 
dataset includes 21120 firms, from three exchanges ( NYSE, AmEx and NASDAQ).The CRSP 
stocks are assigned to ten size deciles. The decile breakpoints correspond to NYSE deciles, and 
each stock is assigned to each portfolio at the beginning of each year, based on its market equity at 
the end of the previous year. Each stock stays at the portfolio for a year. 
Table [4] Panel A presents the average number of firms per size decile and the average number of 
forecasts per size decile over a typical year for the whole IBES Details unadjusted and CRSP 
intersection. The number of firms is larger for the lower size deciles, however the number of 
forecasts is much larger for each of the larger firms. This confirms a well-documented regularity in 
the literature, namely that the IBES forecasts are geared towards larger firms. Panel B presents the 
same numbers for the case of the dividend paying firms.  
 
III. Hypothesis Formulation and Empirical Evidence 
A. Choice of measure 
The literature on analysts' forecasts has used a variety of measures to measure the accuracy of the 
released forecasts. In order to adjust for scale and to put all forecasts on equal footing, many 
researchers have divided the forecast error by a scale factor, usually price. However, a recent paper 
by Cheong and Thomas (JAR 2011) casts doubts on this practice: by using the unadjusted IBES file, 
they find that actually the variability of forecast errors across stocks is actually small and dividing 
by price to adjust for scale actually introduces a lot more variability. Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (JB 1999) also document such a phenomenon: the error increases with price very slowly 
and only after the 80th centile of the price distribution there is a distinct increase in the error.  
At the first part of their paper, Cheong and Thomas (JAR 2011)  studied the properties of absolute 
mean forecast error (AMFE), defined at equation (1) below, and the distribution of the commonly 
used absolute forecast error standardized by price (PSAMFE), defined at equation (2) below. After 
calculating both AMFE and PSAMFE, they constructed bar charts of AMFE and PSAMFE with 
respect to ten price deciles. They find that the practice of dividing by price actually distorts the 
distribution of errors, rather than fixing any problems. Since the choice of error metric influences 
directly any conclusions on forecast accuracy, I study the choice of measure more in depth below. 
As a first step to the choice of a reliable accuracy metric, I repeat here a part of the analysis of 
Cheong and Thomas (JAR 2011) in order to investigate the distribution of the errors of the sample 
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 of this study. The results are presented at Table [5]. Panel A presents the average absolute mean 
forecast error (AMFE) for each firm-quarter, as it is also described in Table[6] Panel A: 
ܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ฬ∑ ൫௩௔௟௨௘೔,ೕ,೟ି௔௖௧௨௔௟೔,೟൯
೙ೕసభ
௡ ฬ         (1) 
With ݊ the number of forecasts for the given firm-quarter, ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ the actual value of the earnings 
for the firm ݅ at quarter ݐ and ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ the value of the forecast issued by analyst ݆ for the firm ݅ at 
quarter t. Notice that for the calculation of the AMFE of every firm quarter I keep only the last 
forecast by every analyst. Table [5] Panel A presents the means, medians, 75th and 90th percentiles 
of AMFE for each price decile.  
Table [5] Panel C presents the distribution for the case that AMFE is divided by price (PSAMFE), 
also described at Table [6]: 
ܲܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ
อ∑ ቀೡೌ೗ೠ೐೔,ೕ,೟షೌ೎೟ೠೌ೗೔,೟ቁ
೙ೕసభ
೙ อ
௉௥௜௖௘೔,೟          (2)
  
The price chosen to divide the AMFE is the closing price of the second month of the fiscal quarter 
for each firm.  
Two things are evident from Panels A and C. First, the distributions of AMFE and PSAMFE 
confirm the results presented by Cheong and Thomas (JAR 2011). The distribution is greatly altered 
by dividing with price, instead of becoming smoother, which was the purpose of dividing by price; 
There is evidence that dividing by price creates more problems than solves the problems 
encountered in the initial distribution. Second , there is actually a mild variance by scale in AMFE, 
with the means increasing monotonically after the 5th price decile, the medians after the 7th decile, 
and the 75th and 90th percentiles after the 6th price decile. As a conclusion, the purpose of altering 
the distribution of AMFE is legitimate, but trying to achieve it by dividing AMFE by price will lead 
to erroneous conclusions. 
Below I try to mitigate the scale problems of AMFE (small AMFE for small prices, large AMFE for 
large prices). As mentioned in Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (JB 1999), the error increases 
slightly and only after the price has increased enough. However, price increases steadily and 
linearly, so when the AMFE has increased only slightly, price is already greatly  increased. The 
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 results of dividing by a large price slightly increased AMFE will lead to small outcome. On the 
other hand, dividing an average AMFE with a small price will lead to a large outcome. 
A way to solve the problem is to divide AMFE with a factor that also increases only slightly by 
price, i.e. a non-linear scaling factor. In order to mitigate the scaling problems, I divide AMFE with 
the following scaling factor (also at Table [6] Panel A): 
ܵܨ ൌ ቀ௉௥௜௖௘೔,೟ଶ଴଴ ቁ
ଵ.ଵ ൅ 1            (3) 
The purpose is to eliminate the large AMFE variation by price with respect to the median. The 
construction of the scaling factor is simple. First, for small prices the SF is close to one, so for the 
small price deciles the AMFE is not altered. In order to accommodate larger prices, I divide price 
by large number and raise the fraction to 1.1. The 1.1 power ensures that the SF is an increasing 
function of price, but the increase is moderate. So, even if the price is a large number, I avoid 
altering the distribution of errors with respect to price too much. The reason for choosing 200 is that 
the resulting variation of error by price decile is low, observed ex post by trying different values of 
the denominator. The specification of equation [3] is robust and the use of e.g. 180 or 220 wouldn’t 
change the results. Also, since the median variation is zero up to the 6th decile and it is monotonic 
and non-linear after the 7th decile, I need a function which exhibits a non-linear behavior after high 
input values and it has also low values for low input values. The low exponential of 1.1 
approximately delivers this behavior: low increase for low input values, coupled with non-linear 
increase for high values .  
The results of the AMFE divided by the scaling factor (SAMFE) are reported at Table [5] Panel B. 
The median, 75th and 90th percentile of the 8th, 9th and 10th price deciles are now close to the other 
deciles, while the values of the other lower deciles remain virtually unchanged. Table [5] Panel D 
presents the values of SAMFE with winsorization at the 99th percentile, which is the practice to be 
followed at the subsequent sections. There is an improvement in the means, with the average 
SAMFE of the first price decile to drop and take a value much closer to the other deciles.  
Since AMFE scaled by the factor of equation (3) seems to mitigate the scaling problems with 
relative success, it will be used to the subsequent section to measure forecast accuracy. Since the 
scaling of the absolute error by prices is widespread in the literature, I repeat the analysis by 
dividing the absolute error by price (PSAMFE) and without dividing with price at all (AMFE) as a 
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 robustness check for the sake of comparability with other studies. The results remain qualitatively 
the same as in the case with dividing with the scale factor of equation (3) (see Section VI). 
I avoid subtracting and dividing by the mean error, as carried through a number of papers (e.g. Bae, 
Stulz and Tan JFE 2008, Clement JAR 1999), since this measure is more adequate to evaluate the 
differences of performance among analysts, and not the across the cross section of different firms. I 
don't standardize by earnings because earnings close to zero will create numerical problems and 
because the treatment of negative earnings could obscure the interpretation of the results. 
Finally, I use the IBES unadjusted Details file to calculate means and standard deviations. The use 
of the unadjusted data is motivated by the results of Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (JF, 2002), who 
report that there are problems with the use of diluted earnings when they calculate means and 
standard deviations.  
 
B. Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion 
B1. Forecast Error 
As a first step towards the investigation of the information advantages of the dividend paying firms, 
I study the error of the financial analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The intuition is that the 
smaller error, the more information is available to the analysts who produce the forecasts, thus the 
reduced error relative to the forecast errors of the non-paying firms. 
The error metric is the AMFE divided by the standardized factor, as described in the previous 
section: 
ܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ
อ∑ ቀೡೌ೗ೠ೐೔,ೕ,೟షೌ೎೟ೠೌ೗೔,೟ቁ
೙ೕసభ
೙ อ
൬ುೝ೔೎೐೔,೟మబబ ൰
భ.భ
ାଵ
         (4) 
In order to investigate if there are any advantages of the dividend paying firms, I regress SAMFE on 
a dummy (dividend dummy: ddum) which is one if the firm is paying an ordinary dividend that 
quarter and zero otherwise, and a number of controls. If the SAMFE of the dividend paying firms 
are smaller than the SAMFE of the non-paying firms, the sign of the coefficient of the dividend 
dummy will be negative, meaning that the error is smaller, since the absolute error takes only 
positive values. The controls include the maturity of the forecast, the general experience of the 
analyst issuing the forecast, the firm specific experience of the analyst, the number of companies 
the analyst covered at the given quarter, the size decile of the firm, the book-to-market decile of the 
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 firm, the coverage of the firm at the given quarter, the difficulty of covering the given firm, the 
percentage of shares owned by institutions, the variance of earnings, the correlation of earnings and 
year and industry dummies. Since I am using an average measure of the errors, SAMFE is the mean 
of analysts’ forecast over the firm-quarter, I have to use the average of the maturity of the forecasts 
of the analysts issuing a forecast for the given firm-quarter, their mean experience at the given 
quarter, their mean firm specific experience at the given quarter, the mean number of firms they 
covered during the given quarter and the mean difficulty over the given quarter. More specifically, I 
estimate the following equation: 
 
ܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଷܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵସܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ        (5) 
 
Maturity of the forecast is defined as the difference in days between the forecast’s release date and 
the announcement the actual earnings, i.e. the higher the maturity, the earlier the forecast. I expect 
that forecasts with higher maturity will have higher forecast errors. The forecast announcement date 
is from IBES. For the actual announcement, I keep the earlier date between IBES and Compustat, as 
prescribed by DellaVigna and Pollet (JF, 2009). The experience of an analyst is defined as the 
difference in years between his first ever forecast and the given forecast. Experience is expected to 
improve the forecasting performance of the analyst. The firm specific experience is defined as the 
difference in days between the analyst's first ever forecast for the given firm and his current forecast 
for the same firm. The number of firms covered is the number of firms for which the analyst has 
issued forecasts in the given calendar quarter. The size deciles are defined at the beginning of the 
current year using the market equity at the end of the previous year, using only NYSE firms to 
define the breakpoints for each decile. Each stock stays at its current size decile for a year. The 
rationale of the inclusion of size is that bigger firms maybe have different patterns of earnings (e.g. 
more stable), and this could introduce bias in the results. Book-to-market is defined as the book 
value of the firm at the end of its fiscal year which happened at the previous calendar year over its 
market equity at the end of the previous calendar year. As in the case of size, I use deciles which are 
based on NYSE breakpoints. Coverage measures the number of analysts covering the same firm at 
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 the given fiscal quarter. The more extensive the coverage, the lower the forecasting errors of 
analysts, because of the higher diffusion of information for the given firm. The difficulty is defined 
as the average number of firms followed by the firm's analysts (Barth, Kasznik and McNichols, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 1999) and is designed to capture the difficulty of estimating the 
EPS of the given firm. The notion is that if the coverage of a firm is intrinsically more difficult, then 
the firm's analysts will cover less firms. The percentage of institutional holdings comes from 
Thomson Reuters 13F. The higher the percentage, the more and the better information is expected 
for the given firm. The variance of earnings is calculated as the variance at the last 12 quarters 
before a given quarter. A number of at least five observations is required. The earnings variance for 
each firm-quarter enters equation (5) as deciles. The earnings correlation is defined as the first order 
autocorrelation between earnings at the last 12 quarters before the current one. The earnings 
correlation also enters the equation (5) as deciles. I have also included year and industry fixed 
effects. The industry codes used are the two digit SIC of each firm. Table [6] Panel B provides a 
short description of the above variables. 
Summary statistics for the independent variables of equation (5) are reported at Table [7]. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics for the whole sample, while Panel B the summary statistics for the 
dividend paying firms. The maturity of the forecasts and the general experience of the analysts is 
the fairly the same for both categories. The analysts that cover dividend paying firms appear to have 
higher firm specific experience. The number of companies covered by the analysts covering a given 
firm is the same for both categories, meaning that an analysts that covers a dividend paying firm on 
average will cover the same number of firms as an analyst that covers a non-paying firm. As 
expected, the size of the dividend paying is on average larger that the size of non-paying firms. 
Book-to-market on the other hand seems to be the same for both categories. Mean coverage is 
higher for dividend paying firms. However, coverage is highly correlated with size, so a difference 
in coverage communicates the same message with size up to a certain degree. The remaining 
variables, difficulty, institutional holdings, variance of earnings and earnings correlations are the 
same across firm categories. 
For the estimation of equation (5), I drop utilities and firms that belong to the financial, agricultural 
and public sectors. I use forecasts with a maturity of 60 days or less to avoid including stale 
forecasts. Extension of this condition to 90 days doesn’t alter the results. I use only the last forecast 
of each analyst for the given firm for the given quarter. I drop analysts who cover less than four or 
more than forty stocks per quarter: less than four firms may imply an analyst with very limited 
sources to follow a more typical number of firms by the brokerage industry standards and more than 
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 40 than because the analyst cannot possibly produce reliable forecasts if he follows so many stocks. 
I also drop forecasts made by teams of analysts and windsorize the results at the 99% of the 
SAMFE. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and quarter. 
The first column of Table [8] presents the coefficients of the multivariate regression of SMAFE on 
all control variables and the dividend dummy. The R2 of the model stands at 0.142. The dividend 
dummy ddum, the focus of this study, is negative and significant indicating improved accuracy for 
the firms that distribute quarterly dividends. Maturity is positive and significant at the 0.1%, 
indicating that the later forecasts are more accurate. The general experience of the analysts doesn’t 
seem to have a significant influence on their performance. The firms specific experience is 
significant at the 10% level and marginally significant at the 5%, but it has the wrong sign: the more 
experienced is an analyst on a specific firm, the worse his forecasts. Also, the mean number of 
companies covered by the analysts is not significant. Size and book-to-market are both significant, 
but with different signs. Size enters the regression with a negative sign, indicating that the accuracy 
for the bigger firms is improved. On the other hand, the accuracy for high book-to-market firms is 
lower than the one for low book-to-market firms. Coverage is also significant and with the expected 
sign: the more analysts cover a particular firm, the more accurate the forecast in aggregate. 
Difficulty is not significant. Institutional holdings are negative and significant at the 0.1% 
indicating improved accuracy for higher stakes of holdings, as expected. Earnings variance is 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that the higher the variance, the larger the errors in the 
analysts’ forecasts. Earnings correlation is approximately zero and non-significant.  
B2. Forecast Dispersion 
It is relatively intuitive to argue that if all analysts use the same information set, then the 
conclusions they will reach will have more in common than in the case that the information used is 
different. 
If the information available for dividend paying firms is more broadly available and it is of better 
quality, I expect that the forecast dispersion should be lower for the dividend paying firms, since 
abundance of good quality information will lead to less disagreement among analysts. This is 
because the information they will use to produce their forecasts will have more common elements 
than the information used to produce forecasts for non-paying firms. In this section I compare the 
forecast dispersion between paying and non-paying firms. I proxy forecast dispersion by the 
standard deviation of the errors of the last standing forecasts of each analyst issued 60 days before 
the release of the actual quarterly earnings to mitigate the effect of stale forecasts: 
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         (6) 
Increasing the limit to 90 days doesn't change the conclusions.  
In order to test the hypothesis that the dispersion in earnings forecasts of the dividend paying firms 
is lower, I regress SFD of equation (6) on the same control variables as in the case of the equation 
(5). 
 The estimated regression is the following: 
 
ܵܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଷܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵସܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ        (7) 
For the estimation of equation (7), I winsorize the SFD at the 99% percentile and I require that at 
least three forecast are outstanding to calculate the standard deviation. The coefficients of the 
regression are presented at the second column of Table [8]. The R2 of the regression is 21.9%. The 
dividend dummy remains negative and highly significant, indicating that the forecast dispersion of 
the dividend paying is lower than the non-paying ones. This result offers support to the hypothesis 
that the information for the dividend paying firms is more abundant and of higher quality, leading to 
a lower level of disagreement among analysts.The mean maturity is significant at the 5% level, 
implying reduced dispersion for later forecasts. Mean experience, mean firm specific experience 
and mean number of companies are not statistical significant. Size and book-to-market are again 
significant and they have opposite signs. Size carries a negative sign, so the bigger the firm, the 
lower the forecast dispersion. Book-to-market is positive, indicating that dispersion increases for 
higher book-to-market (value) firms. Coverage is significant and positive, with higher coverage to 
increase the dispersion. Mean difficulty becomes negative and significant. The percentage of 
institutional holdings is also negative and significant: the higher the percentage of stock held by 
institutions, the lower the dispersion. The earnings variance is again positive and very significant, 
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 suggesting that the firms with the more volatile earnings exhibit higher dispersion. The correlation 
among earnings is again non-significant.  
B3. Examination with the Use of Payout Deciles 
I proceed to investigate the forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion breaking the dividend dummy 
into ten deciles according to the payout ratio. To that end, I divide the paying firms into ten deciles 
from 1 to 10  based on the amount of dividend they as a percentage of the quarter earnings: 
݌ܽݕ݋ݑݐ௜,௧ ൌ ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௘௡ௗ೔,೟௘௔௥௡௜௡௚௦೔,೟          (8) 
The stocks which pay no dividend are assigned to decile 0. So, overall there are 11 deciles, from 0 
to 10. The decile one of the dividend payout, the one with the smallest payout ratio includes mostly 
firms with negative earnings (and thus negative payout) that continue to pay dividends.  
I modify equations (5) and (7) by removing the dividend dummy and introducing eleven dummies, 
one for each dividend decile:  
 
ܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅
ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ∑ ߙଵଷା௞ܦ݅ݒܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜,௧ଵ଴௞ୀଵ       (9) 
 
ܵܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅
ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ∑ ߙଵଷା௞ܦ݅ݒܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜,௧ଵ଴௞ୀଵ       (10) 
The results of the estimation of the modified equations are presented at Table [9]. The first column 
contains the results with SAMFE  as the dependent variable and the second column the results with 
the SFD as the dependent variable. For the case of SAMFE, except from the coefficient of first and 
(to a lesser degree) second decile, all the other coefficients of the dividend deciles are negative and 
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 significant. There are some elements of non-linearity. The coefficients decrease but not 
monotonically  up to the ninth decile and then increase at the tenth decile. In general, the 
coefficients of the deciles 8 to 10 are close to each other. It seems that increasing the dividends after 
a point doesn’t change the situation drastically with respect to the available information. 
The same behavior is obtained also for the case of SFD. In this case only the coefficient of the first 
decile is positive. Again, the coefficients decrease but not monotonically and in general are close to 
each other. 
 
C. Summary 
The results of this section support the hypothesis that the forecast accuracy is higher dividend 
paying firms. Moreover, the forecast dispersion is lower. These results apply to almost all payout 
deciles that include firms with positive earnings. The results seem to point to a higher information 
efficiency for dividend paying firms. 
 
IV. Possible Explanations 
Being able to forecast a process A more easily than a similar process B, two effects may be taking 
place: i) more information for process A, ii) better information (higher quality information) for 
process A. I investigate these two possibilities with regard to the information asymmetry between 
paying and non-paying firms. 
 
A. More Information 
Quantifying the available information and measuring the flow of information to investors and 
financial analysts using a direct approach is of course a strenuous task. Moreover, all information is 
not born equal; some information is useful and other is not, and distinguishing between can make 
the task even more arduous. For this reason I use an indirect way to proxy for the useful information 
available to analysts (and indirectly to investors): the number of forecasts issued by analysts during 
the quarter for a given firm. The logic is that if new information becomes available to an analyst, 
the analyst will issue a new forecast and will update his previous forecast. This proxy may come 
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 with some disadvantages. If it is easy to forecast for a firm, then just one forecast may be enough. 
Also, if the analysts of a firm are accustomed to issue forecasts relatively later in the quarter, then 
one forecast may be again enough. Moreover, if more experienced and smarter analysts may have 
already taken into account all information and these analysts tend to focus for the non-paying firms, 
then the introduced proxy may be biased. However, despite the above shortcomings, the number of 
forecasts per analyst is a clear manifestation that something relatively important happened and 
compelled the analyst to update his or her views.  
In order to test the hypothesis that there are more forecasts per analyst for the dividend-paying firms, 
I run a probit regression of the probability that an analyst will issue an update forecast. In the 
context of the binary variable is zero if the analyst has issued only one forecast and one if he has 
issued more than one forecasts: 
Pr	ሺܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁௜,௧ ൌ 1|܆ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧  (11) 
Table [10] Panel A reports the results of the probit regression and Panel B reports the marginal 
effects. The dividend dummy is positive and significant, implying that there is 5.7% more 
probability that there is an update forecast for dividend paying firms. This result provides support to 
the hypothesis that there is more information (that can be used by analysts) for dividend-paying 
firms than for non-paying ones. 
 
B.  Higher Quality Information 
A firm's financial accounts (cash flow statements, balance sheet, income statement) are of crucial 
importance to financial analysts, since the data coming from these accounts are used as inputs in 
their models that predict the future performance of the firm. Inasmuch as the quality of the output of 
a model is as good as the input used, the quality of the financial reporting is vital to forecasting the 
quarterly earnings. A proxy of the quality of financial reporting could be the quality of accruals 
(Dechow and Dichev, TAR 2002). Good quality accruals should facilitate forecasting, while bad 
quality will deteriorate the accuracy of the earnings forecasts. In order to test the above conjecture, I 
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 must define first a measure of the quality of a firm’s financial reports and then to use this measure 
to examine if there are differences between paying and non-paying firms. 
The proxy for accrual quality I choose is the one described by Francis, LaFond, Olsson and 
Schipper (JAE 2005 and JBFA 2007). The measure is based on the paper by Dechow and Dichev 
(TAR, 2002) with the additional features proposed by McNichols (TAR, 2002). Accruals are 
mapped to cash flows and the information uncertainty is considered high if the mapping is a poor 
one. The procedure followed includes the regression of working capital accruals on cash from 
operations in the current period, the previous period and the next period, on plant and equipment 
and revenue changes. The unexplained part of the working capital constitutes an inverse measure of 
quality of earnings. The greater the unexplained portion of working capital, the lower the quality of 
earnings. The equation to estimate the working capital accruals is the following: 
ܶܥܣ௜,௧ ൌ ߮଴ ൅ ߮ଵܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߮ଶܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ ൅ ߮ଷܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߮ସ∆ܴ݁ݒ௜,௧ ൅ ߮ହܲܲܧ௜,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧  (12) 
TCA is the total current accruals, CFO the firm’s cash flow from operations, ∆Rev is the change in 
revenues between year t and t-1 and PPE is the value of firm’s i property, plant and equipment. 
Both dependent and independent variables are defined at Table [6]. All variables are divided by 
total assets. 
For the estimation of equation (12). I follow Francis et. al. (JAE 2005 and Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting 2007) who estimate it by running for each year a cross sectional regression 
for each industry. They use Fama-French 48 industries, while I use 25 GIC industries, in order to 
increase the precision of the estimation within each industry. Similarly to Francis et. al. (JAE, 2005 
and JBFA, 2007) I winsorize at the 1 and 99 centiles and I require at least 20 firms at a given year 
for a given industry. The annual cross section regressions yield firm specific and year specific 
residuals, which are used to calculate the information uncertainty metric AQj,t=σ(ui,t). AQj,t is the 
standard deviation of firm's i residuals, ui,t, calculated over years t-5 to t, with at least 4 values 
required for the calculation. Larger standard deviations of residuals indicate poorer accruals quality 
and greater information uncertainty.  
Notice that in order to estimate equation (12) and to calculate AQ, I don' t restraint the sample to the 
one used to estimate the forecast errors and dispersion. The goal is to measure the information 
quality of paying and non-paying firms, not only the ones for which there are analysts’ forecasts. 
Thus, I use the Compustat sample from 1960 to 2009, not limiting the observations to the years 
1990-2009.  
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 The results for AQ are reported at the first column of Table [11] Panel A. The resulting values are 
in good agreement with the results by to Francis et. al. (JAE, 2005 and JBFA, 2007).  
After having defined and constructed a proxy for the reporting quality, I use this proxy to examine 
if the dividend-paying firms have lower accrual quality. If the dividend paying firms exhibit higher 
accrual quality, it could be a sign of enhanced reporting practices. To that end, I estimate the 
following equation (Francis et. al., JAE 2005) : 
ܣܳ௜,௧ ൌ
ߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߣଶߪሺܥܨܱሻ௜,௧ ൅ ߣଷߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௜,௧ ൅ ߣସܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߣହܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ଺݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧        (13) 
where σ(CFO)i,t is the standard deviation of firm i’s CFO, calculated over the past 5 years, 
σ(Sales)i,t is the standard deviation of firm i’s sales calculated over the past 5 years, 
OperatingCyclei,t is the log of firm i’s operating cycle and NegativeEarningsi,t the number of years, 
out of the past 5 years, that firm I reported net negative earnings before extraordinary items and 
ddum the dividend dummy. Description of both the dependent and independent variables can be 
found at Table [6]. Descriptive statistics are provided at Table [11]. Table [11] contains two panels. 
Panel A presents data for the whole sample, while Panel B only for the subsample of the dividend 
paying firms. The median accrual quality is better for the dividend paying firms (lower value means 
lower standard deviation of the residuals from the estimation of equation (12)). Dividend paying 
firms are bigger, as it evident from the median logarithm of total assets. The median of the standard 
deviation of sales is larger for the non-paying firms by approximately 17%. The standard deviation  
of cash flows from operations is lower for dividend paying firms by 20%. The  cash flow from 
operations is also larger for the dividend paying firms by 37%. The operating cycles of both 
categories are fairly identical. 
For the estimation of equation (13) I use Fama-MacBeth regression, correcting the standard errors 
for time series correlation. The results are presented at Table [12]. The dividend dummy is negative, 
indicating better accruals quality. The dividend dummy accounts for 17% of the accruals quality 
difference between paying and non-paying firms. Also, from the 42 coefficients for the dividend 
dummy calculated for each year, only 11 are positive, with none of them significant at the 5%. 
From the remaining 31 negative coefficients, 15 are significant at the 5% or better. These results 
provide evidence that the dividend-paying firms have a better accruals quality, which translates to 
better input into financial analysts models. 
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 C. More Information: Forecast Clusters 
 
In order to investigate further the information about the payer and non-payer firms, I examine the 
clustering of analysts’ forecasts at each quarter. The idea is that when the forecasts are clustered 
together, then most probably the news the analysts used to come up with their updated forecasts is 
public news. Public news doesn’t necessarily mean public announcements, but it encompasses 
every kind of innovation that becomes known to market participants at more or less the same time. 
On the other hand, when forecasts are not clustered together, then the chances are that the news 
come from analysts’ private sources. The difference between public news and news coming from 
private sources is that in the first case the news release may be an initiative of the covered firm, in 
the second comes (most probably) as a result of each analyst’s individual efforts. However, the 
existence of private news means that there are sources that can provide the analysts with the actual 
information.  More private releases may imply more information efficiency, since the frequency of 
private releases of all analysts is greater than the release of public news, so information reaches the 
marketplace faster. 
I put all forecasts that are released the same day into the same cluster. In order for a forecast to be 
considered a member of a cluster it must have been released at the same day with the other forecasts. 
Then, I run the following  probit regression: 
 
Pr	ሺܥ݈ݑݏݐ݁ݎ݁݀௜,௧ ൌ 1|܆ሻ ൌ
ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧  (14) 
 
The results of the probit regressions are reported at Table [13] Panel A, while Panel B reports the 
marginal effects. I keep companies that are covered by more than three analysts, so there is the 
possibility of forming meaningful clusters. The coefficient of the dividend dummy variable is 
negative and significant. This means that there is 2.4%  less probability that the forecasts will form 
clusters in the case of dividend paying firms. In turn, this means that the information regarding the 
dividend payers is more widespread during the quarter. In other words, there are more sources about 
dividend payers and thus higher information efficiency for the dividend paying firms. 
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 D. Summary 
I examined three sources for the higher accuracy of forecasts of dividend-paying firms. First, the 
flow of information for dividend-paying firms seems to be richer than the one of non-paying firms, 
as indicated by the average number of forecasts by analysts. The average number of forecasts is 
used as a proxy for the information flow based on the logic that the more forecasts an analyst 
releases during the quarter, the more information he has received during the quarter, otherwise there 
would no reason to release his view. Second, it appears that the accrual quality of the dividend-
paying firms is higher than the one of the non-paying ones, suggesting better accounting practices 
overall, which helps analysts to produce accurate forecasts and investors to evaluate the firm with 
more precision. Third, the forecasts for dividend paying firms are more evenly distributed across the 
quarter, while the forecasts for the non-paying firms tend to form clusters. This could imply that 
there are more information sources for the paying firms than just public information stemming from 
the firm’s management. In the case of public information releases all analysts would tend to update 
the forecasts as soon as possible, leading to the formation of clusters. When each analyst has also 
his own sources of information, he will update his forecasts independently of other analysts, so the 
clusters formation will be lessened. 
 
V.  Market Reactions 
Section III has provided evidence that the forecasts of the dividend-paying firms are more accurate 
and have lower dispersion. The evidence at section IV suggested that this may be because of the 
more and higher quality information available for dividend-paying firms. In this section I examine 
if the hypothesis of more and better information can find support by investigating the market 
response of dividend-paying and non-paying firms to forecasts, recommendations releases and 
earnings announcements.  
Forecasts announcements usually mark the arrival of some new information in the market, at least 
information that it is not available to everybody, or a new interpretation of already available 
information. If there is an abundance of information in the market for a given firm, it is natural to 
expect that the reaction to new forecasts to be milder than in the case where almost no information 
is available prior to the new forecast. This has to do with the incremental value of new information. 
The arrival of new information to an environment already saturated with information will probably 
have low impact; it may describe the true situation with even more precision, however the broad 
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 picture will be known by then and the investors will have already acted accordingly. Thus, the 
reaction to new information will be milder. On the other hand, in an environment where information 
is scarce, the arrival of new information will allow the investors to take action, exhibiting swift 
reactions. In the framework described above, I expect lower reaction to new information provided 
by analysts' forecasts for dividend-paying firms.  
The above framework may be applied in the case of recommendations as well. Recommendations 
signal a more long term view of the analysts about a stock. In that way, a recommendation 
communicates some new information to the market. If there is more information for dividend-
paying firms in the market, I expect that the market reactions to recommendations announcements 
to be milder for dividend-paying firms. 
Finally, I use the same logic in the case of quarterly earnings announcements. Earnings 
announcements give the actual results of a firm for a given quarter, and are eagerly anticipated by 
investors. If the announcement brings completely new information in the market, the market 
reaction will be swift. If the information doesn’t bring important innovations, the market reaction 
will be mild. In this context, I expect the market reaction to the earnings announcements by the 
dividend-paying firms to be milder than the reactions of the non-paying firms. 
A.  Forecasts 
In order to measure the market reaction to forecasts announcements I have first to isolate the 
forecasts from other news, so the returns surrounding the forecasts announcements are not 
confounded and second to measure the importance of the information the forecast brings to the 
market.  
In order to have a clean sample I remove all forecast of a given firm that are within 4 trading days 
distance from earnings announcements of the same firm, management's pre-announcements, 
recommendations for the same firm and other forecasts from the same or other analysts. However, 
if a given forecast is announced at the same day with other forecasts, I aggregate all the same day 
forecasts and treat them as one. The aggregate forecast will be present at the final sample if it is far 
from earnings announcements, recommendations, pre-announcements and other forecasts. 
The measure I use to proxy for the information content of a new forecast is the difference of value 
between the outstanding mean forecast of the previous forecasts and the current forecast dividend 
by the standardization factor. So, the update is defined as the difference between the average of the 
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 k forecasts released by j analysts for the firm i at the same date t minus the current mean forecast 
divided by the standardizing factor: 
ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁௜,௝,௞,௧ ൌ ௙௢௥௘௖௔௦௧೔,ೕ,ೖ,೟ିெ௘௔௡ி௢௥௘௖௔௦௧೔,ೕ,೅ಬ೟
൬ುೝ೔೎೐೔,೟మబబ ൰
భ.భ
ାଵ
       (15) 
Because of the presence of non-linearities, I group the positive updates separately into 10 positive 
deciles, the negative updates separately into 10 negative quantiles and the zero updates into one 
zero quantile. 
In order to assess the market reactions for dividend-paying and non-paying firms, I run a regression 
of the cumulative abnormal return around the forecast announcement on a number of control 
variables and the dividend dummy. The window chosen includes the return of one day before and 
one day after the announcement [-1, +1]: 
 
ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐݑݎܴ݊݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௞,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௝,௞,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଷܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅
ߙଽܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܹ݁݁݇ܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅
ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ          (16) 
 
The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement. 
The update decile is included to control for the amount of information the new forecast brings to the 
market. The day of the week control is introduced because of the DellaVigna and Pollet (JF 2009) 
finding that the reactions on Fridays are lower than on other days. The other new variables are the 
mean turnover and momentum. The mean turnover is defined as the mean monthly share trading 
volume divided by the average number of shares for the one year before the month of the forecast 
announcement. Momentum is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the market return for 
a period of six months (125 trading days) before the forecast announcement. I winsorize the sample 
at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
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 I also examine the volume reaction to the forecast announcements, by running a regression of the 
mean volume over shares outstanding over the three days window over the same control variables 
as in equation (16) above: 
 
ܸ݋݈ݑܴ݉݁݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ௌ௛௔௥௘௦	்௥௔ௗ௘ௗௌ௛௔௥௘௦	ை௨௧௦௧௔௡ௗ௜௡௚        (17) 
 
 
ܸ݋݈ݑܴ݉݁݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௞,௧ ൌ
ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௝,௞,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙହܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅ ߙଽܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଵܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ     (18) 
I estimate both equations (16) and (18) separately for positive and negative updates. The results are 
presented at Table [14]. The focus is on the coefficient of the dividend dummy. The coefficient is 
negative and significant for the case of return reactions to positive forecast updates. This suggests 
that the return reactions of dividend-paying firms are more moderate relative to the return reactions 
of non-paying firms; investors react more to news for non-paying firms. This is also confirmed by 
the volume reaction at column (3), where the dummy carries a negative sign and it is significant. 
The coefficient for the case of negative return reactions is literally zero, but the volume reaction is 
again negative and significant. 
 
B. Recommendations 
The same procedure is also followed for recommendations. Because the number of underperform 
and sell recommendations is very low, and because of anecdotal evidence that the hold 
recommendation is actually a polished sell recommendation, I combine the hold, underperform and 
sell recommendations together. The return and volume reactions are now defined around the release 
of the recommendations. 
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 ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐݑݎܴ݊݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଷܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܹ݁݁݇ܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଵܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ    (19) 
 
 
ܸ݋݈ݑܴ݉݁݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଷܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽ݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܹ݁݁݇ܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଵܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ    (20) 
 
I estimate both equations (19) and (20) separately for buy and sell recommendations. The results are 
reported at Table [15]. For buy recommendations, the dividend dummy is negative but not 
significant, providing only weak evidence for lower return reaction. However, the coefficient is 
negative and significant for the case of the volume reaction at column (3), indicating lower volume 
reaction for dividend-paying firms. For the sell recommendations the dividend dummy is positive 
and significant for the case of return reactions and negative and significant for the case of volume 
reactions, indicating milder return and volume reactions. 
 
C. Earnings Announcements 
In order to measure the market reaction to earnings announcements I again isolate the earnings 
announcements from other news, so the returns surrounding the earnings announcements are not 
confounded . 
Again, I use the mean forecast of the previous 60 days as a proxy for the investors’ expectations 
The measure I use to proxy for the information content of the earnings announcements is the 
difference of value between the outstanding mean forecast of the previous forecasts and the actual 
earnings dividend by the standardization factor. So, the update is defined as the difference between 
the average of the k forecasts released by j analysts for the firm i at the same date t minus the 
current mean forecast divided by the standardizing factor: 
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       (21) 
As in the case of forecasts, I group the positive updates separately into 10 positive deciles, the 
negative updates separately into 10 negative quantiles and the zero updates into one zero quantile. 
In order to assess the market reactions for dividend-paying and non-paying firms, I run a regression 
of the cumulative abnormal return around the forecast announcement on a number of control 
variables and the dividend dummy. The window chosen includes the return of one day before and 
one day after the announcement [-1, +1]: 
 
ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐݑݎܴ݊݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௞,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௝,௞,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙଷܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅
ߙଽܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܹ݁݁݇ܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅
ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ          (22) 
 
The variables at equation are the same as in equation (16), but now the update decile refers to the 
difference between the actual earnings and the mean forecast of the last 60 days. 
I also examine the volume reaction to the forecast announcements, using the same framework as in 
equations (17) and (18), but now the update decile refers to the difference between the actual 
earnings and the mean forecast of the last 60 days. 
 
ܸ݋݈ݑܴ݉݁݁ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ሺെ1,൅1ሻ௜,௝,௞,௧ ൌ
ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௝,௞,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙହܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଼ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,,௧ ൅ ߙଽܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଵܦܽݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଶܻ݁ܽݎܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߙଵଷܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ     (23) 
I estimate both equations (22) and (23) separately for positive and negative updates. The results are 
presented at Table [16]. The focus is on the coefficient of the dividend dummy. The coefficient is 
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 negative and significant for the case of return reactions to positive forecast updates. This suggests 
that the return reactions of dividend-paying firms are more moderate relative to the return reactions 
of non-paying firms; investors react more to news for non-paying firms. This is also confirmed by 
the volume reaction at column (3), where the dummy carries a negative sign and it is significant. 
The coefficient for the case of negative return reactions is literally zero, but the volume reaction is 
again negative and significant. 
 
D. Summary 
The broad picture from the reactions to forecasts updates and recommendations releases points to 
reduced reaction to news for the dividend paying firms. If the information update is the same for 
two similar stocks, but their reaction is different, this implies that the information content didn't 
make much difference for the case of the stock with the smaller reaction. Also, the consistently 
lower volume reaction suggests lower heterogeneity among investors about dividend paying firms. 
 
VI. Classification by Size and Book-to-Market Deciles 
In this section I investigate the effect of paying dividends with respect to the size and the book-to-
market deciles classification of firms. The main idea that dividends impose some sort of discipline 
in the firms’ finances and reporting. This means that dividends will influence more firms that have 
more degrees of freedom regarding their finances and reporting than firms with less discretion. It is 
expected that firms with more lines of business and a lot of actual growth and growth opportunities 
will probably enjoy more discretion at reporting their earnings every quarter. More discretion leads 
to less discipline and less discipline leads to lower information efficiency. So, the effect of 
dividends will be larger in the cases of firms that enjoy more discretion. I expect that the effects of 
dividends on analysts’ forecast error will be greater between one large payer and one large non-
payer than between one small payer and one small non-payer. In other words, paying dividends  
will influence more the reporting of large firms and low book-to-market firms. 
In order to check the above hypothesis, I run regression [5] for each size and book-to-market decile. 
Table [17] Panel A presents the dividend dummy  coefficients for case of the size deciles. Table [17] 
Panel B presents the results for the case of the book-to-market deciles. In both cases, the results 
confirm the hypothesis that paying dividends has more influence on large and low book-to-market 
firms.  More specifically, for the case of the size deciles, up to the fifth decile, the dummy 
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 coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. However, for  the large firms which belong to 
deciles 5 to 10, the coefficient is negative, large in absolute value and statistically significant. For 
the case of the book-to-market deciles, for the first two deciles, the dummy coefficient is negative, 
large in absolute value and statistically significant. It was also significant at the 10% level for the 
fourth decile. For all the other deciles the coefficient is not significant. Notice that for all deciles, 
both size and book-to-market, the coefficient is always negative, confirming the results of 
regression [5].  
 
VII. Addressing Endogeneity 
Until now, I have provided some evidence that paying dividends forces a firm to be more 
information efficient . The initial hypothesis is that dividends impose discipline on a firm and this 
discipline has as result that the firm becomes more information efficient. It could be however the 
case that disciplined firms are the ones to distribute dividends. I employ two methods to circumvent 
the above endogeneity problem. The first uses the 2003 dividends tax cut as a natural experiment. 
The second uses a matching methodology, matching paying firms with firms with the same 
characteristics but not paying dividends. 
 
A. The 2003 Tax Cut 
The dividend tax reform was first proposed on January 7, 2003 and was signed into law by 
President G. W. Bush on May 28, 2003. As a result of the cut, there was an increase in dividend 
payments. Chetty and Saez (AER 2004, AER 2006) provide evidence that the surge in dividend 
payments is actually because of the change in the tax law. As reported by Chetty and Saez (AER 
2006), total dividends stagnated around $25 billion from 1998 to 2002, and then rose to $33 billion 
by 2005. Most of the increase took place in the last two quarter of 2003. The dividend initiations 
were less than 10 per quarter since 1998 to the second quarter of 2003, and surged to more than 40 
in the third quarter of 2003. However, the firms that initiated dividends share some common traits. 
The response was the strongest for firms with principals that faced a different tax environment after 
the enactment of the law, like individual investors or directors with large holdings (Chetty and Saez, 
AER 2004). Also, firms that had executives with unexercised options but many shares also were 
likely to initiate dividends.  
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 I will use firms that initiated dividends in the first two quarters after the enactment of the law, 
namely 2003 quarter 3 and 2003 quarter 4. The number of firms I have in my dataset  is relatively 
low because the number of firms initiating dividends  is not that large in any case, while the 
problem is aggravating because of data issues. Namely, the need to merge CRSP with Compustat, 
and most importantly the need that the firms are covered by analysts have as result that the available 
number of firms is 30 for both quarters. 
I am using a single time-series difference before and after treatment methodology to investigate if 
there is a difference in the forecast errors for the firms that initiated dividends. For this purpose I 
use the regression framework of equation [5] and [7]. The dependent variables are the average 
SAMFE and average SFD for each firm for one year before and one year after the dividend 
initiation. The results are presented at Table [18]. The ddum coefficient is negative and significant 
at the 10% level (and marginally at the 5%) for both SAMFE and SFD, while the magnitude is 
larger (in absolute value) than the coefficient of ddum at Table [8] for both cases, -0.01311 to          
-0.0041for the case of SAMFE and -0.03418 to -0.00299 for the case of SFD. This implies that after 
the dividend initiation the firms became more disciplined, exhibiting smaller forecast errors and 
lower forecast dispersion. 
 
B. Propensity Matching 
The policy intervention of 2003 with respect to the dividend taxation didn't cause many firms to 
initiate dividends and moreover the firms that initiated dividends may not be a random sub-sample, 
since they had a large shareholder or an agent with considerable stake in the firm. As a consequence, 
the results from examining the behavior of these firms that initiated dividends before and after the 
change in dividend taxation may be biased. For this reason, I employ the methodology by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (Biometrica, 1983). The Rosenbaum and Rubin (Biometrica, 1983) 
methodology uses a propensity score matching procedure as a method to reduce the bias in the 
estimation of treatment effects. A matching method tries to circumvent the problem of not being 
able to observe the counterfactual outcomes by identifying objects within the control group similar 
to the ones in the treatment group. In the framework of firms and dividends, the treatment group are 
the firms that pay dividends and control group are the firms that don't pay dividends. The idea is 
that the bias induced by possible confounding factors is reduced by using treated and control 
subjects that are as similar as possible. A problem with matching is that it is virtually impossible to 
match a subject from the treatment group and one from the control group if the vector of 
characteristics to be used at the matching procedure is large. To address this concern, the 
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 Rosenbaum and Rubin (Biometrica, 1983) methodology summarizes the subjects characteristics to 
one number, the propensity score and then proceeds to match subjects which are close in terms of 
propensity. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (Biometrica, 1983) define the propensity score as the probability of 
receiving treatment conditional on the set of variables that characterize each subject: 
݌ݏሺܺሻ ൌ Prሺ݀ ൌ 1|ܺሻ ൌ ܧሺ݀|ܺሻ         (24) 
with d=(0,1) indicates treatment or no treatment (dividend payment) and X the vector of 
characteristics. The propensity score can be estimated using a probit or a logit regression:  
݀݀ݑ݉௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݉݁ܽ݊ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ݉݁ܽ݊ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷ݉݁ܽ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙସ݉݁ܽ݊ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊݅݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܵ݅ݖ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܤ݋݋݇ݐ݋ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅
ߙ଻ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼݉݁ܽ݊ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݈݁ܿ݅ ௜݁,௧    (25) 
Then, the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) is estimated as follows: 
ܣܶܶ ൌ ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ െ ଴ܻ௜|ܦ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܧሼܧሾ ଵܻ௜|ܦ௜ ൌ 1, ݌ሺ ௜ܺሻሿ െ ܧሾ ଴ܻ௜|ܦ௜ ൌ 0, ݌ሺ ௜ܺሻሿ|ܦ௜ ൌ 1ሽ  (26) 
I choose the probit regression (using logit doesn’t change the results). The results of the estimation 
of equation [22] are presented at Table [19] Panel A. The next step is to assign each treated firm to 
an untreated one. There are various way to perform this step. I choose to match each dividend 
paying firm to the untreated firm with the closest propensity score. The results are reported at Table 
[19] Panel B for the case of SAMFE and at Panel C for the case of SFD. The negative and 
statistically significant results (at ~0.002% for SAMFE and at 10% for SFD) mean that the treated-
dividend paying firms exhibit lower forecast errors and lower forecast dispersion than the non-
paying firms with the same (on average) characteristics, implying that dividends force a firm to 
become more disciplined. Using the Kernel matching or the stratification method produces 
qualitatively the same results. Also, using bootstrap to estimate the standard errors causes almost no 
change to the results. 
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 VIII. Robustness 
In this section I repeat the analysis of section III.B by using AMFE and PSAMFE as dependent 
variables in order to check the robustness of the conclusion that the analyst forecasts are more 
accurate for the case of dividend paying firms. The results are presented at Table [20]. The results 
for both AMFE and PSAMFE for both accuracy and dispersion don’t change the qualitative 
conclusions of section III. In all four regressions the dividend dummy is negative and significant. 
The t-statistics in the case of PSAMFE are much lower, indicating that dividing accuracy and 
dispersion by price may have implications on inference. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
In this study I presented evidence that dividend paying firms are more information efficient than 
non-paying ones. The accuracy of forecasts for the non-paying firms was higher relative to the 
forecast accuracy of the non-paying ones after controlling for a number of factors that influence the 
forecast accuracy. Moreover, the dispersion in forecasts is lower for the dividend-paying firms. I 
also explore three factors which may cause the above results. First, there is more information 
available for dividend paying firms, as testified by the more forecasts per analyst for the dividend 
paying firms. More forecasts per analyst imply more information, since analysts update their 
forecasts when they receive new information.  A second factor that may contribute to higher 
information efficiency is the higher accrual quality of the dividend paying firms. Accrual quality 
has a direct impact on the quality of financial reports used by analysts and investors when they 
evaluate a certain firm. Third, the forecasts for dividend paying firms are more evenly distributed 
across the quarter, implying less reliance on publicly available information and more dependence on 
private sources.  Moreover, the market seems to react more mildly to news regarding dividend 
paying stocks. Dividend paying stocks exhibit lower return reactions with respect to favorable 
forecasts and hold/sell recommendations. Furthermore, both in favorable and unfavorable forecasts, 
buy and sell recommendations, they exhibit lower volume reactions. The reduced forecast errors are 
more pronounced for the cases of large firms and growth firms, which are the firms that have more 
discretion at reporting their quarterly numbers.  
The above results seem to point to an agency explanation of dividends. Easterbrook (AER 1984) 
argues that dividends are used as a way to monitor a firm’s management with the help of financial 
markets. Insofar market monitoring is effective, it has as result more available information. In that 
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 sense, it seems that dividends are successful in playing this role. Another consequence of more 
available information is that it easier to extract the intrinsic value of a firm. More information 
makes valuation easier and this is reflected on the lower reactions to news for the dividend paying 
firms. Easiness of valuation  is more important in the case of bigger firms, with more lines of 
business, whose valuation is more difficult because of their higher complexity. Lower volume 
reactions indicate that there is lower disagreement among investors of dividend paying firms. This 
result, coupled with the lower dispersion in forecasts, means that the market can reach a consensus 
faster and more smoothly when it comes to evaluate the news of dividend firms, than the news of 
non-paying firms. Easier and faster consensus is a sign that market can evaluate a firm more 
efficiently.  
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 Table 1. Basic Statistics of the IBES Details File (unadjusted) 
Panel A: Yearly statistics 
Year Unique Firms Forecasts Analysts
Average # of 
Companies per 
analyst 
Average # 
of analysts 
per firm 
mean firm 
size 
(ln(Market 
Value)) 
1990 1947 21547 781 10.1 3.3 12.5 
1991 2181 26683 938 10.1 3.6 12.6 
1992 2492 32101 1054 10.7 3.8 12.6 
1993 2788 31146 1218 10.5 3.7 12.7 
1994 3400 42782 1427 10.8 3.7 12.5 
1995 3617 44488 1533 10.6 3.7 12.6 
1996 4139 46963 1628 10.3 3.4 12.7 
1997 4431 49970 1917 9.5 3.5 12.7 
1998 4403 54059 2114 9.2 3.8 12.8 
1999 4335 54911 2218 9.0 3.9 12.9 
2000 4049 46554 2189 8.5 4.0 13.1 
2001 3617 56621 2211 8.9 4.7 13.1 
2002 3448 58567 2112 9.1 4.8 13.1 
2003 3444 59998 2157 9.1 5.0 13.2 
2004 3727 70214 2314 9.6 5.3 13.5 
2005 3870 75944 2357 10.0 5.6 13.5 
2006 3917 80869 2433 10.3 5.7 13.6 
2007 4076 83116 2401 10.6 5.7 13.6 
2008 3857 85025 2349 11.2 6.0 13.3 
2009 3461 60149 1878 11.8 5.9 13.1 
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 Panel B: Whole sample statistics 
Unique firms for the whole sample: 9804 
Unique analysts for the whole sample: 8027 
The mean number of covered firms per analyst is 9.9 (median 9) with a  standard deviation of 5.11. 
The average firm is covered on average by 4.5 analysts (median 3) with a standard deviation of 4.4. 
 
Table 1: The table reports descriptive statistics of the data included in the earnings forecasts sample. 
The data come from the IBES Details unadjusted file for the years 1990-2009. Size is the logarithm 
of the market equity. 
 
 
Table 2. Basic statistics of the IBES Recommendations File 
year  Sell  Buy  # analysts 
Total 
recs 
% of 
Buys 
1992 0 1 1  1  100 
1993 6098 8049 1296  14147  56.89545
1994 12268 16637 2000  28905  57.55752
1995 12000 16951 2197  28951  58.55065
1996 10333 18071 2521  28404  63.62132
1997 9369 19003 2866  28372  66.97801
1998 10972 21872 3349  32844  66.59359
1999 10142 23646 3529  33788  69.98343
2000 8615 21230 3418  29845  71.13419
2001 11104 19059 3270  30163  63.18669
2002 22148 22126 3535  44274  49.97515
2003 19536 14356 3300  33892  42.35808
2004 16860 13782 3407  30642  44.97748
2005 15474 13166 3485  28640  45.97067
2006 17072 13498 3485  30570  44.1544 
2007 17013 14307 3520  31320  45.68008
2008 19778 14356 3450  34134  42.05777
2009 17273 13006 3242  30279  42.95386
 
Table 2: The table reports descriptive statistics of the IBES Recommendations file. The strong buy 
and buy recommendations form the buy category and the hold, underperform and sell categories 
form the sell category. The years covered are 1993-2009. 
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 Table 3. CRSP firms per decile 
size decile  Number of firms 
1  3025 
2  866 
3  525 
4  387 
5  312 
6  265 
7  231 
8  219 
9  196 
10  183 
 
Table 3: The table reports the number of the firms per decile for the monthly CRSP dataset for the 
years 1990-2009. The deciles are formed yearly at the beginning of the year and are based on the 
market equity at the end of the previous year. The breakpoints for each decile are calculated using 
only NYSE firms. 
 
Table 4. Number of firms and forecasts for each size decile 
Panel A: Whole sample 
decile  average # firms  average # forecasts 
1  801  4039 
2  621  5202 
3  436  4614 
4  350  4626 
5  299  4797 
6  252  4740 
7  222  5045 
8  213  5990 
9  190  6748 
10  177  8285 
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 Panel B: Dividend paying firms 
decile  average # firms  average # forecasts 
1  44.55 210.2
2  81.2 562.15
3  76.1 649.15
4  77 859.4
5  76.2 1092.4
6  75.85 1359.4
7  76.35 1767.5
8  82.45 2294.9
9  85.85 3061.7
10  101.9 4725.5
 
Table 4: The table reports the average number of firms and the average number of forecasts per size 
decile for the whole sample (Panel A) and the dividend paying firms (Panel B) over the years 1990-
2009. The data come from the intersection of IBES Details unadjusted file and the CRSP monthly 
file for the years 1990-2009. The size deciles are formed yearly at the beginning of the year and are 
based on the market equity at the end of the previous year. The breakpoints for each decile are 
calculated using only NYSE firms. 
 
Table 5. Measures comparison 
Panel A: Absolute Mean Forecast Error (AMFE) 
Price decile  Mean (AMFE)  Median (AMFE)  p75(AMFE)  p95(AMFE) 
1  0.124  0.030  0.080  0.395 
2  0.092  0.030  0.067  0.264 
3  0.072  0.025  0.060  0.240 
4  0.069  0.025  0.060  0.220 
5  0.064  0.025  0.060  0.220 
6  0.066  0.025  0.060  0.220 
7  0.069  0.025  0.065  0.230 
8  0.072  0.028  0.070  0.250 
9  0.080  0.030  0.080  0.290 
10  0.326  0.040  0.109  0.462 
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 Panel B: Standardized AMFE (SAMFE) 
Price decile  mean(SAMFE)  med(SAMFE)  p75(SAMFE)  p95(SAMFE) 
1  0.125  0.030  0.079  0.404 
2  0.089  0.029  0.065  0.257 
3  0.069  0.024  0.058  0.228 
4  0.065  0.023  0.057  0.209 
5  0.059  0.023  0.056  0.204 
6  0.061  0.023  0.055  0.201 
7  0.062  0.023  0.058  0.206 
8  0.063  0.024  0.061  0.215 
9  0.067  0.026  0.067  0.244 
10  0.083  0.030  0.080  0.322 
 
Panel C: AMFE divided by price (PSAMFE) 
Price deciles  mean(PSAMFE)  med(PSAMFE)  p75(PSAMFE)  p95(PSAMFE) 
1  0.0561  0.0074  0.0227  0.1442 
2  0.0118  0.0034  0.0085  0.0348 
3  0.0062  0.0022  0.0053  0.0201 
4  0.0045  0.0016  0.0039  0.0143 
5  0.0033  0.0013  0.0033  0.0113 
6  0.0028  0.0011  0.0027  0.0093 
7  0.0024  0.0009  0.0023  0.0080 
8  0.0020  0.0008  0.0020  0.0070 
9  0.0018  0.0007  0.0018  0.0065 
10  0.0015  0.0006  0.0015  0.0059 
 
Panel D: Winsorized SAMFE 
Price deciles  mean(SAMFE)  med(SAMFE)  p75(SAMFE)  p95(SAMFE) 
1  0.0823  0.0296  0.0787  0.4044 
2  0.0651  0.0290  0.0652  0.2565 
3  0.0579  0.0240  0.0577  0.2285 
4  0.0553  0.0235  0.0567  0.2087 
5  0.0539  0.0233  0.0561  0.2041 
6  0.0535  0.0230  0.0551  0.2011 
7  0.0537  0.0226  0.0581  0.2058 
8  0.0560  0.0244  0.0608  0.2151 
9  0.0617  0.0256  0.0669  0.2440 
10  0.0761  0.0296  0.0798  0.3215 
 
Table 5: The table reports means, medians , the 75th and the 90th percentiles of each price decile for 
three different measures of mean forecast errors. The price used is the price at the end of the second 
month of each firm’s fiscal quarter. 
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 Table 6. List of dependent and independent variables 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Standardization factor. The price used is the 
price at the end of the second month of the 
firm’s fiscal quarter. 
ܵܨ ൌ ൬ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧200 ൰
ଵ.ଵ
൅ 1 
Forecast error for analyst j, for firm i for the 
fiscal quarter t. Valuei,j,t is the value of the EPS 
forecast and actuali,t is the actual value of the 
EPS 
ܧݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ 
Mean forecast error for firm i for the fiscal 
quarter t ܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ
∑ ൫ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧൯௡௝ୀଵ
݊  
Absolute mean forecast error for firm i, over 
analysts’ j forecasts for fiscal quarter t ܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ቤ
∑ ൫ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧൯௡௝ୀଵ
݊ ቤ 
Price Standardized absolute mean forecast error. 
The price used is the price at the end of the 
second month of the the firm’s fiscal quarter. ܲܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ
ቤ∑ ൫ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧൯
௡௝ୀଵ
݊ ቤ
ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧  
Standardized absolute mean forecast error 
ܵܣܯܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ
ቤ∑ ൫ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝,௧ െ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧൯
௡௝ୀଵ
݊ ቤ
൬ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧200 ൰
ଵ.ଵ
൅ 1
 
Forecast dispersion for firm i, over analysts’ j 
forecasts for fiscal quarter t ܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ ඩ1݊෍൫ܯܨܧ௜,௧ െ ܧݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧൯
ଶ
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
Price Standardized forecast dispersion for firm i, 
over analysts’ j forecasts for fiscal quarter t ܲܵܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ
ට1݊∑ ൫ܯܨܧ௜,௧ െ ܧݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧൯
ଶ௡௝ୀଵ
ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧  
Standardized forecast dispersion for firm i, over 
analysts’ j forecasts for fiscal quarter t ܵܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ
ට1݊∑ ൫ܯܨܧ௜,௧ െ ܧݎݎ݋ݎ௜,௝,௧൯
ଶ௡௝ୀଵ
൬ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧200 ൰
ଵ.ଵ
൅ 1
 
Excess stock return over the market return The excess return of the cumulative stock return 
of a given stock minus the cumulative return of 
the value weighted dividends including CRSP 
index for the 3 days window between one day 
before and one day after the event 
Volume reaction The average of the volume over shares 
outstanding for the 3 days window between one 
day before and one day after the event 
Forecasts per analyst for firm i at quarter t Average number of forecast per analyst for a 
given firm for a given fiscal quarter 
Total current accruals (TCA) for firm i at year t It is defined as the the difference in current 
assets minus the difference in current liabilities 
minus the change in cash plus the change in 
debt in current liabilities 
Accruals quality (AQ) for firm i at year t The quality of accruals of firm i for year t 
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 Panel B: Independent variables 
Maturity The difference in days between the 
announcement of the actual earnings and the 
forecast 
Experience Experience is defined in years as the difference 
between analyst’s first forecast and his current 
forecast 
Firm Experience It is defined as the difference in days  between 
the analyst's  first ever forecast for the given 
firm and his current forecast for the same firm 
Number of Companies It is the number of firms the analyst has issued 
forecasts for in the given calendar quarter 
Size decile The size decile of the firm for the given year. 
Each firm is assigned to a decile at the 
beginning of each year based on the market of 
the firm at the end of the previous year. For the 
calculation of the breakpoints only NYSE firms 
are used.  
Book-to-market ratio decile The book-to- market ratio decile is defined as 
the decile of the ratio of  the book equity of the 
firm to the market equity of the firm. They are 
both calcuated at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each 
calendar year and each firm stays at its portfolio 
for the whole calendar year. 
Coverage The number of analysts covering the same firm 
at the given fiscal quarter 
Difficulty The negative of the average number of firms 
followed by the firm's analysts 
Percentage of institutional holdings The percentage of the stock held by institutions. 
The data comes from Thomson Reuters 13F 
dataset. 
Decile of earnings variance The decile of the variance earnings for the given 
year. The variance is defined as the variance of 
diluted quarterly earnings in the previous 3 
years (12 quarters). At least 5 non-missing 
quarters are required for the calculation. 
Decile of earnings autocorrelation The diluted quarterly earnings first order 
autocorrelation calculated over the last 3 years 
(12 quarters). At least 5 non-missing quarters 
are required. 
Dividend dummy-ddum A dummy with value of 1 if the firm paid a 
ordinary dividend at the given fiscal quarter. 
Industry fixed effects One dummy variable for each of the two digit 
SIC codes 
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 Panel C: Independent variables for the forecast mean absolute error and forecast dispersion 
Mean maturity The mean maturity of the forecast issued for the 
a given firm in the current fiscal quarter 
Mean experience The mean experience of the analysts issuing 
forecasts for a given firm for the current fiscal 
quarter 
Mean firm experience The mean firm experience of the analysts 
issuing forecasts for a given firm for the current 
fiscal quarter 
Mean number of companies The mean number of companies covered by 
each analyst covering a given firm a given fiscal 
quarter 
Mean difficulty The mean difficulty of the firms also covered by 
the analysts who issued forecast for the given 
firm the given fiscal quarter. 
 
Panel D: Additional independent variables for the forecast update and recommendations reactions 
Forecast Update decile The decile of the update for a given forecast. 
The update is defined as the difference between 
the average of the k forecasts released by j 
analysts for the firm i at the same date t minus 
the current mean forecast divided by the 
standardizing factor: 
ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁௜,௝,௞,௧
ൌ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,௞,௧ െ ܯ݁ܽ݊ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,்ழ௧
൬ܲݎ݅ܿ݁݅,ݐ200 ൰
1.1
൅ 1
 
Actual Earnings Update decile The decile of the update for a actual earnings. 
The update is defined as the difference between 
the actual earnings announced by firm i at date t 
minus the current mean forecast divided by the 
standardizing factor: 
ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁௜,௧ ൌ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧
െ ܯ݁ܽ݊ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௝,்ழ௧
൬ܲݎ݅ܿ݁݅,ݐ200 ൰
1.1
൅ 1
 
Turnover It is defined as the average monthly share 
trading volume divided by the average number 
of shares over the last year. 
Momentum  The excess return of a given stock over the 
value weighted dividends including CRSP index 
for the previous six months (125 trading days) 
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 Panel E: Variables used for the calculation of accruals quality 
Assets Total assets of a given firm in year t 
Total current accruals The difference in current assets minus the 
difference in current liabilities minus the change 
in cash plus the change in debt in current 
liabilities 
Cash flow from operations (CFO) Cash flow of operations for the given firm in 
year t. 
Income before extraordinary items Net income before extraordinary items 
Change in current assets Change in current assets for firm i between 
years t-1 and t 
Change in current liabilities Change in current liabilities for firm i between 
year t and year t-1 
Change in cash Change in cash for firm i between years t and t-
1 
Change in debt in current liabilities Change in debt in current liabilities for firm i 
between years t and t-1 
Depreciation Depreciation and amortization expense for a 
given firm at year t 
Change in revenue (∆Rev) Change in revenues for firm i between years t 
and t-1 
Property Plant and equipment (PPE) Value of property plant and equipment of firm i 
in year t 
Size The logarithm of total assets in year t 
Standard deviation of sales The standard deviation of yearly sales during 
the past 5 years 
Operating cycle The length of the operating cycle 
Negative earnings The percentage of years with negative earnings 
calculated over the previous 5 years. 
 
Table 6: The table reports the description of dependent and independent variables. 
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 Table 7. Summary statistics 
Panel A: Whole Sample 
  
mean 
Maturity 
mean 
Experience 
mean Firm 
Experience 
mean # of 
Companies 
mean Size 
decile 
mean Book‐
to‐market 
decile 
mean 
Coverage
mean 
Difficulty 
Institutional 
Holdings 
Percentage 
Variance of 
earnings 
decile 
Earnings 
correlation 
decile 
mean  28.97917 4.726265  738.3305  12.04383  4.828917  4.637307  5.630283 12.11849 0.6299124  5.61212  5.653739 
sd  13.98948 3.045614  724.4643  5.139782  2.898863  2.829876  4.861059 4.399423 0.284376  2.835507  2.868907 
p10  11  1.090411  0  6  1  1  1  7.363636 0.2188789  2  2 
p25  19  2.446575  192  8.6  2  2  2  9.285714 0.4022668  3  3 
p50  28.02  4.346849  548.5  11.2  4  4  4  11.5  0.6498894  6  6 
p75  39  6.476712  1081  14.4  7  7  8  14  0.8868659  8  8 
p90  49  8.640182  1689  18.1875  9  9  12  17.33333 1  9  10 
 
Panel B: Dividend paying firms 
  
mean 
Maturity 
mean 
Experience 
mean Firm 
Experience 
mean # of 
Companies  mean Size 
mean Book‐
to‐market 
decile 
mean 
Coverage
mean 
Difficulty 
Institutional 
Holdings 
Percentage 
Variance of 
earnings 
decile 
Earnings 
correlation 
decile 
mean  28.4291  4.959933  1024.824  12.19468  6.540752  4.481006  7.127551 12.27085 0.678669  5.830577  5.358441 
sd  13.00747 3.115675  835.174  4.404586  2.709932  2.672962  5.353678 3.666247 0.2324536  2.605185  2.754925 
p10  12  1.146849  106.5  7  3  1  2  8.222222 0.3572237  2  2 
p25  19.4  2.617808  386  9.333333  4  2  3  10  0.5288597  4  3 
p50  27.88889 4.641096  875.75  11.66667  7  4  6  11.875  0.6949136  6  5 
p75  37  6.767123  1464.5  14.33333  9  7  10  14  0.8550747  8  8 
p90  46.66667 8.947946  2093.5  17.5  10  9  14  16.6  1  9  9 
 
Table 7: The table reports the summary statistics of the independent variables used at equations 5 and 7. 
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 Table 8. Coefficients of the estimation of equations 5 and 7 
   SAMFE  SFD 
mean Maturity  0.00021***  ‐0.00003*   
   (10.0)  (‐2.3)    
mean Experience  ‐0.00016  0.00008 
   (‐1.2)  (0.8) 
mean Firm Experience  0.0  ‐0.0 
   (1.9)  (‐0.2)    
mean Number of Companies  ‐0.00012  0.00008 
   (‐1.1)  (0.9) 
Size decile  ‐0.00045**  ‐0.00024*   
   (‐2.9)  (‐2.6)    
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00326***  0.00207*** 
   (24.5)  (24.9) 
Coverage  ‐0.00030***  0.00048*** 
   (‐4.0)  (12.2) 
mean Difficulty  ‐0.00005  ‐0.00051*** 
   (‐0.4)  (‐4.6)    
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   ‐0.00567***  ‐0.00371*** 
   (‐4.4)  (‐4.5)    
Earnings variance decile  0.00888***  0.00461*** 
   (70.4)  (63.8) 
Earnings correlations decile  0.0  ‐0.00006 
   (0.0)  (‐0.9)    
ddum  ‐0.00410***  ‐0.00299*** 
   (‐5.6)  (‐6.7)    
Constant  0.37491***  0.13956 
   (8.9)  (1.3) 
     
R‐squared  0.142  0.219 
N  120546  64241 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 8: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 5 (SAMFE) and 7 (SFD) 
for the 1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. The 
analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file.  The 
observations are the standardized mean forecast error calculated for each firm’s fiscal quarter. Only 
the last forecast of each analyst was used. Both AMFE and FD used forecasts with maturity of up to 
60 days. For the calculation of forecast dispersion at least three forecasts were required. The year 
and industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered and heteroscedasticity 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
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 Table 9. Coefficients of the estimation of equations 9 and 10 
   SAMFE  SFD 
mean Maturity  0.00013***  ‐0.00001 
   (8.0)  (‐0.8)    
mean Experience  ‐0.00002  0.00009 
   (‐0.2)  (1.6) 
mean Firm Experience  0.0  ‐0.0 
   (0.6)  (‐1.3)    
mean Number of Companies  ‐0.00006  0.00003 
   (‐1.0)  (1.0) 
Size decile  ‐0.0001  ‐0.00008 
   (‐0.6)  (‐0.9)    
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00317***  0.00200*** 
   (24.0)  (24.3) 
Coverage  ‐0.00035***  0.00046*** 
   (‐4.7)  (11.8) 
mean Difficulty  ‐0.00009  ‐0.00042***
   (‐0.9)  (‐5.6)    
Percentage of Institutional Holdings  ‐0.00703***  ‐0.00444***
   (‐5.5)  (‐5.4)    
Earnings variance decile  0.00860***  0.00448*** 
   (68.4)  (62.4) 
Earnings correlations decile  ‐0.00022  ‐0.00017*   
   (‐1.9)  (‐2.5)    
1st dividend decile  0.05110***  0.02053*** 
   (16.5)  (12.8) 
2nd dividend decile  0.00436**  ‐0.00086 
   (2.6)  (‐0.9)    
3rd dividend decile  ‐0.00087  ‐0.00179*   
   (‐0.6)  (‐2.2)    
4th dividend decile  ‐0.00674***  ‐0.00406***
   (‐5.4)  (‐5.7)    
5th dividend decile  ‐0.01144***  ‐0.00681***
   (‐9.5)  (‐9.7)    
6th dividend decile  ‐0.01537***  ‐0.00611***
   (‐13.0)  (‐8.6)    
7th dividend decile  ‐0.01483***  ‐0.00714***
   (‐12.7)  (‐10.3)    
8th dividend decile  ‐0.01406***  ‐0.00814***
   (‐10.6)  (‐11.0)    
9th dividend decile  ‐0.01983***  ‐0.00915***
   (‐14.4)  (‐11.6)    
10th dividend decile  ‐0.01526***  ‐0.00617***
   (‐8.4)  (‐5.9)    
Constant  0.38298***  0.12986 
   (9.3)  (1.3) 
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R‐squared  0.15  0.228 
N  120546  64241 
 
     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 9: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 9 (SAMFE) and 10 
(SFD) for the 1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. 
The analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file.  
The observations are the standardized mean forecast error calculated for each firm’s fiscal quarter. 
Only the last forecast of each analyst was used. Both AMFE and FD used forecasts with maturity of 
up to 60 days. For the calculation of forecast dispersion at least three forecasts were required. The 
year and industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered and 
heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
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 Table 10. Forecasts Update 
 
Panel A: Probit Estimation  
 
   Multiple Forecasts 
Size decile  ‐0.03086*** 
(‐9.5)    
Maturity  ‐0.00881*** 
(‐64.1)    
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00439 
(1.9) 
Number of companies  0.00954*** 
(24.3) 
Expereince  ‐0.00214*   
(‐2.4)    
Firm Experience  0.00005*** 
(14.5) 
Coverage  0.04477*** 
(29.9) 
Difficulty  0.00001 
(0.0) 
Perecentage of Institutional Holdings  0.09023*** 
(3.7) 
Earnings variance decile  0.04341*** 
‐17.3 
Earnings correlation decile  ‐0.00691*** 
(‐3.4)    
ddum  0.16735*** 
(10.5) 
Constant  ‐0.76672*** 
(‐21.4)    
  
R‐squared  0.0756 
N  838000 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 Panel B: Marginal Effects 
dy/dx 
Size decile  ‐0.0104*** 
   (‐9.58) 
Maturity  ‐0.002977*** 
   (‐66.37) 
Book‐to‐market decile  0.0014 
   (1.86) 
Number of companies  0.0032*** 
   (23.97) 
Experience  ‐0.00072* 
   (‐2.38) 
Firm Experience  0.000018*** 
   (14.36) 
Coverage  0.0151*** 
   (28.51) 
Difficulty  0.00 
   (0.00) 
Perecentage of Institutional Holdings  0.0305*** 
   (3.70) 
Earnings variance decile  0.0147*** 
   (17.20) 
Earnings correlation decile  ‐0.0023*** 
   (‐3.43) 
ddum  0.057*** 
   (10.33) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 10: Panel A reports the coefficients from the probit regression at equation 11 for the 1990-
2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. The analysts data 
comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file.  Panel B presents the 
marginal effects. Analysts that cover less than three companies are dropped. Numbers in 
parentheses are clustered z-scores. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
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 Table 11. Summary statistics 
Panel A: Whole sample 
 
 
Accrual 
quality ln(assets) 
Sales Standard 
deviation 
CFO 
Standard 
deviation
ln(Operating 
Cycle) 
Percentage 
of 
negative 
earnings CFO 
total 
assets 
Property, 
plant and 
equipement
mean 0.04 5.31 0.17 0.09 4.81 0.19 0.04 2136.15 1586.47 
sd 0.03 2.14 0.72 0.18 0.71 0.29 0.43 9752.05 8638.24 
p10 0.01 2.65 0.04 0.02 3.99 0.00 -0.11 14.13 4.23 
p25 0.02 3.75 0.07 0.03 4.44 0.00 0.02 42.64 15.61 
p50 0.03 5.16 0.12 0.05 4.86 0.00 0.08 174.73 78.51 
p75 0.05 6.77 0.21 0.09 5.24 0.40 0.14 873.64 483.08 
p90 0.08 8.17 0.34 0.16 5.58 0.60 0.20 3550.50 2429.73 
 
Panel B: Dividend paying firms 
Accrual 
quality  ln(assets) 
Sales Standard 
deviation 
CFO 
Standard 
deviation
ln(Operating 
Cycle) 
Percentage 
of negative 
earnings  CFO 
total 
assets 
Property, 
plant and 
equipement
mean  0.03  6.14  0.14  0.05  4.77  0.05  0.11  2887.76  2147.55 
sd  0.02  1.87  0.17  0.04  0.60  0.12  0.08  10993.18 9769.26 
p10  0.01  3.77  0.04  0.02  4.01  0.00  0.03  43.31  19.34 
p25  0.01  4.78  0.06  0.03  4.47  0.00  0.07  118.87  59.25 
p50  0.02  6.05  0.10  0.04  4.83  0.00  0.11  424.63  244.85 
p75  0.03  7.43  0.17  0.06  5.15  0.00  0.15  1684.38  1070.30 
p90  0.05  8.60  0.27  0.09  5.45  0.20  0.20  5418.08  3831.20 
 
Table 11: The table reports summary statistics of the variables used to calculate the accruals quality (as described according to section IV) and the 
distribution of the results for the calculated for the accruals quality. The data comes from Compustat for the period 1960-2009. 
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 Table 12. Fama-Macbeth estimation of equation 13 
Panel A: Regression results 
   Accruals Quality 
ln(Total assets)  ‐0.002385*** 
   (‐5.31) 
CFO Standard deviation  0.1200826*** 
   (6.93) 
Sales Standard deviation  0.0209135*** 
   (4.5) 
ln(Operating Cycle)  0.0045434*** 
   (5.63) 
percentage of negative earnings  0.0236809*** 
   (16.88) 
ddum  ‐0.0017707** 
   (‐3.19) 
constant  0.0116994 
   (2.32) 
  
N  59657 
time periods   42 
avg. R‐squared      0.4369 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Panel B: Summary statistics of coefficients 
   Pos         Pos/Sig*  Neg         Neg/Sig* 
ln(Total assets)  0             0  42            42 
CFO Standard deviation  41            41  1             0 
Sales Standard deviation  38            32  4             4 
ln(Operating Cycle)  42            34  0             0 
percentage of negative earnings  42            41  0             0 
ddum  11             0  31            15 
constant  31            17  11             1 
 * p<0.05 
Table 12: The table reports the coefficients from Fama-Macbeth estimation of equations 13 for the 
1960-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. The t-
statistics are corrected for autocorrelation using the  Newey-West correction. 
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 Table 13. Forecasts clustering 
 
Panel A: Probit Regression 
   Clustered 
Size decile  ‐0.03435*** 
   (‐14.0)    
Maturity  0.01448*** 
   (71.8) 
Book‐to‐market decile  ‐0.00839*** 
   (‐4.2)    
Number of companies  ‐0.00274*** 
   (‐8.2)    
Expereince  0.02397*** 
   (27.9) 
Firm Experience  0.00001*** 
   (3.8) 
Coverage  0.06756*** 
   (45.01) 
Difficulty  ‐0.02732*** 
   (‐18.6)    
Perecentage of Institutional Holdings  0.34558*** 
   (14.2) 
Earnings variance decile  0.00453*   
   (2.3) 
Earnings correlation decile  ‐0.01010*** 
   (‐6.7)    
ddum  ‐0.06085*** 
   (‐5.0)    
Constant  ‐1.25329*** 
   (‐34.5)    
  
R‐squared  0.1427 
N  1063591 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 Panel B: Marginal Effects 
dy/dx 
Size decile  ‐0.0137*** 
   (‐13.97) 
Maturity  0.005771*** 
   (71.58) 
Book‐to‐market decile  ‐0.0033*** 
   (‐4.22) 
Number of companies  ‐0.0011*** 
   (‐8.18) 
Experience  0.01*** 
   (27.91) 
Firm Experience  4.78e‐06*** 
   (3.75) 
Coverage  0.027*** 
   (45.25) 
Difficulty  ‐0.011*** 
   (‐18.57) 
Perecentage of Institutional Holdings  0.1377*** 
   (14.15) 
Earnings variance decile  0.002* 
   (2.34) 
Earnings correlation decile  ‐0.0040*** 
   (‐6.71) 
ddum  ‐0.024*** 
   (‐4.97) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 13: Panel A reports the coefficients from the probit estimation of equation  14  for the 
clustering of forecasts for the 1990-2009 period. Panel B reports the marginal effects for each 
variable.  Only firms covered by three analysts or more were included. The dependent and 
independent variables are described at Table 6. The analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted 
Details file. Numbers in parentheses are clustered  z-scores. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
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 Table 14. Return and volume reactions to forecast updates 
  
Return Reaction, 
Positive Update 
Return Reaction, 
Negative Update
Volume Reaction, 
Positive Update 
Volume Reaction, 
Negative Update 
Update decile  0.00056***  0.00075***  0.00007***  ‐0.00013*** 
   (7.73)  (10.78)  (6.73)  (‐13.96)    
Size Decile  ‐0.00045***  0.00027**  ‐0.00008***  ‐0.00003*   
   (‐4.21)  (2.76)  (‐4.74)  (‐2.07)    
Earnings variance decile  ‐0.00037***  ‐0.00013  0.00004**  0.00002 
   (‐4.69)  (‐1.74)  (2.7)  (1.63) 
Earnings autocorrelation decile  0.00012  ‐0.00013  0.00008***  0.00003*** 
   (1.68)  (‐1.84)  (7.76)  (3.97) 
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   0.00021  0.00054  0.00191***  0.00165*** 
   (0.23)  (0.61)  (9.82)  (14.77) 
Mean turnover  0.00001  0.00025  0.00338***  0.00365*** 
   (0.04)  (1.14)  (23.1)  (75.53) 
Coverage  ‐0.00007  0.00004  0.00002  0.00001 
   (‐1.28)  (0.75)  (1.79)  (1.23) 
Momentum  0.00132  ‐0.00184*  0.00164***  0.00120*** 
   (1.85)  (‐2.38)  (14.35)  (11.05) 
Book‐to‐market decile  ‐0.00022*  0.00012  ‐0.00010***  ‐0.00011*** 
   (‐2.46)  (1.39)  (‐7.47)  (‐10.70)    
ddum  ‐0.00121*  0.00015  ‐0.00089***  ‐0.00049*** 
   (‐2.40)  (0.32)  (‐7.08)  (‐7.79)    
Constant  0.02811  0.00401  ‐0.00008  ‐0.00141*** 
   (1.59)  (1.67)  (‐0.10)  (‐4.41)    
           
R‐squared  0.006  0.006  0.554  0.535 
N  60349  73355  60348  73355 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 14: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 16 and 18  for the 
reactions to new forecasts for the 1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are 
described at Table 6. The analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Return and 
volume data comes from CRSP daily file.  Observations are the three day excess return around the 
forecasts(s) release. The year, day of week and industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in 
parentheses are clustered and heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based 
on the forecast(s) release date. 
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 Table 15. Recommendations Reactions 
  
Buys return 
reaction 
Sells return 
reaction 
Buys volume 
reaction 
Sells volume 
reaction 
Size Decile  ‐0.00160***  0.00104***  ‐0.00025***  ‐0.00033*** 
   (‐9.3)  5.3  (‐8.8)  (‐8.4)    
Earnings variance decile  0.00012  ‐0.00033*  0.00011***  0.00022*** 
   0.9  (‐2.3)  (4.4)  (7.2) 
Earnings autocorrelation decile  ‐0.00001  ‐0.00014  0.00008***  0.00008**  
   (‐0.1)  (‐1.0)  (3.7)  (3.2) 
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   ‐0.00424**  ‐0.00447*  0.00199***  0.00274*** 
   (‐2.7)  (‐2.5)  (6.4)  (7.4) 
Mean turnover  ‐0.00019  ‐0.00038  0.00423***  0.00397*** 
   (‐0.6)  (‐1.1)  (24.1)  (22.6) 
Coverage  0.00015  0.00003  0.00001  ‐0.00001 
   (1.8)  (0.3)  (0.5)  (‐0.3)    
Momentum  ‐0.00417***  ‐0.00142  0.00231***  0.00200*** 
   (‐3.8)  (‐1.0)  (12.0)  (8.1) 
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00071***  0.00104***  ‐0.00014***  ‐0.00025*** 
   (4.6)  (6.3)  (‐5.6)  (‐7.9)    
ddum  ‐0.0003  0.00416***  ‐0.00085***  ‐0.00120*** 
   (‐0.4)  (4.4)  (‐4.5)  (‐6.1)    
Constant  0.00097  ‐0.00158  0.00206  0.00709 
   (0.1)  (‐0.1)  (1.4)  (1.5) 
           
R‐squared  0.023  0.015  0.453  0.403 
N  37444  32368  37444  32368 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 15: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 19 and 20 for 
recommendations reactions for the 1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are 
described at Table 6. The recommendations data comes from the IBES Recommendations file. 
Return and volume data comes from CRSP daily file.  “Strong buy” and “Buy” recommendations 
are grouped together as buy recommendations. “Hold”, “Underperform” and “Sell” 
recommendations are grouped together as sell recommendations. The year, day of week and 
industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered and heteroscedasticity 
corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on the recommendation’s release date. 
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 Table 16. Earnings Announcements Reactions 
Return Reaction, 
Positive Update 
Return Reaction, 
Negative Update
Volume Reaction, 
Positive Update 
Volume Reaction, 
Negative Update 
Update decile  0.00428***  0.00296***  0.00029***  ‐0.00017*** 
   (23.84)  (12.94)  (12.97)  (‐6.60)    
Size Decile  ‐0.00054*  0.00118***  ‐0.00022***  ‐0.00004 
   (‐2.12)  (3.76)  (‐4.84)  (‐0.98)    
Earnings variance decile  ‐0.00135***  0.00025  ‐0.00001  ‐0.00005 
   (‐6.66)  (1.04)  (‐0.33)  (‐1.73)    
Earnings autocorrelation decile  0.00019  ‐0.00013  0.00016***  0.00002 
   (1.03)  (‐0.58)  (4.91)  (0.6) 
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   0.00684***  0.00249  0.00318***  0.00266*** 
   (‐3.33)  (1.05)  (4.89)  (9.03) 
Mean turnover  ‐0.00008  ‐0.0002  0.00505***  0.00516*** 
   (‐0.16)  (‐0.28)  (8.1)  (32.9) 
Coverage  ‐0.00005  ‐0.00053**  0.00019***  0.00018*** 
   (‐0.34)  (‐2.63)  (3.82)  (6.78) 
Momentum  ‐0.00526**  ‐0.00996***  0.00251***  0.00108*** 
   (‐2.82)  (‐4.91)  (10.61)  (3.31) 
Book‐to‐market decile  ‐0.00021  0.00064*  ‐0.00023***  ‐0.00019*** 
   (‐1.02)  (2.56)  (‐5.60)  (‐6.38)    
ddum  ‐0.00459***  0.0003  ‐0.00146***  ‐0.00099*** 
   (‐3.64)  (0.2)  (‐3.54)  (‐5.36)    
Constant  ‐0.06367***  ‐0.01199*  ‐0.00516***  ‐0.00114 
   (‐13.56)  (‐2.11)  (‐7.60)  (‐1.70)    
           
R‐squared  0.038  0.031  0.579  0.531 
N  20930  14088  20930  14088 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 16: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 22 and 23  for the 
reactions to earnings announcements for the 1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent 
variables are described at Table 6. The analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. 
Return and volume data comes from CRSP daily file.  Observations are the three day excess return 
around the forecasts(s) release. The year, day of week and industry dummies are not reported. 
Numbers in parentheses are clustered and heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters are 
formulated based on the forecast(s) release date. 
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 Table 17. Size and Book-to-Market Classification 
Panel A: Size Deciles 
Size 
decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE
ddum -0.0035 
-
0.00265 -0.0041 
-
0.00059
-
0.00256
-
0.00942
-
0.00849 
-
0.00308 
-
0.01667
-
0.00503
  (-0.9) (-1.0) (-1.7) (-0.3) (-1.1) (-4.1) (-3.7) (-1.4) (-6.7) (-2.4) 
R-squared 0.122 0.133 0.142 0.135 0.167 0.154 0.159 0.18 0.186 0.184 
N 12109 15481 13351 12782 11848 10975 10716 11002 10956 11326 
 
Panel B: Book-to-Market Deciles 
Book-to-
market 
decile 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE SAMFE
ddum 
-
0.00631 
-
0.00708 -0.0008 
-
0.00357
-
0.00172
-
0.00004
-
0.00465 
-
0.00283 
-
0.00177
-
0.00322
  (-5.6) (-4.5) (-0.4) (-1.9) (-0.7) (-0.0) (-1.5) (-0.8) (-0.4) (-0.5) 
R-
squared 0.101 0.097 0.093 0.094 0.145 0.137 0.134 0.126 0.158 0.206 
N 19847 16070 14055 12921 12172 10997 10359 9182 8616 6327 
 
Table 17: The table reports the coefficients of the dividend dummy ddum  from the estimation of 
equation 5 (SAMFE) for the different size (Panel A) and book-to-market (Panel B) deciles. The 
dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. The analysts data comes from IBES 
unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file.  The observations are the standardized 
mean forecast error calculated for each firm’s fiscal quarter. Only the last forecast of each analyst 
was used. Both AMFE and FD used forecasts with maturity of up to 60 days. For the calculation of 
forecast dispersion at least three forecasts were required. The year and industry dummies are not 
reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered and heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters 
are formulated based on firm. 
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 Table 18. SAMFE and SFD before and after the 2003 tax cut 
   SAMFE  SFD 
mean Maturity  0.0003  ‐0.00001 
   1.5  (‐0.0) 
mean Experience  ‐0.00119  ‐0.00331 
   (‐0.9)  (‐1.5) 
mean Firm Experience  0.00001  0.0 
   (1.6)  (1.0) 
mean Number of Companies  ‐0.00198  ‐0.00107 
   (‐1.8)  (‐1.3) 
Size decile  0.00820*  0.00583* 
   (2.5)  (2.1) 
Book‐to‐market decile  ‐0.00146  0.00337* 
   (‐0.8)  (2.4) 
Coverage  0.00071  0.00247* 
   (0.7)  (2.2) 
mean Difficulty  ‐0.00095  0.00091 
   (‐0.5)  (0.40) 
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   ‐0.06322*  ‐0.02491 
   (‐2.1)  (‐1.1) 
Earnings variance decile  ‐0.00181  0.00049 
   (‐0.7)  (0.4) 
Earnings correlations decile  0.00032  0.00437 
   (0.2)  (1.8) 
ddum  ‐0.01311  ‐0.03418* 
   (‐1.9)  (‐2.1) 
Constant  0.07197  ‐0.01161 
   (1.9)  (‐0.5) 
     
R‐squared  0.465  0.418 
N  60  48 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 18: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equation 5 (SAMFE) and 7 (SFD) 
for the 2003 tax cut  period. The dependent variables are the average SAMFE (first column) and 
SFD (second column) of the 4 four quarters (1 year) before and after the tax cut of all firms which 
were covered by analysts both before and after the cut. The  independent variables are described at 
Table 6. For the calculation of forecast dispersion at least three forecasts were required. The 
analysts data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file.  Only 
the last forecast of each analyst was used. Only forecasts with maturity of up to 60 days are used. 
The year and industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered and 
heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
 
CHAPTER 2
188
 Table 19. Probit estimation for the case of the dividend dummy ddum and estimation of Average 
effect of Treatment for the Treated (ATT) 
Panel A: Probit estimation for the case of the dividend dummy ddum 
   ddum 
Maturity  0.00295*** 
(9.3) 
Experience  ‐0.04967*** 
(‐26.5)    
Firm Experience  0.00039*** 
(50.8) 
Number of companies  ‐0.00945*** 
(‐5.8)    
Size decile  0.18216*** 
(95.9) 
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00066 
(0.4) 
Coverage  ‐0.02041*** 
(‐20.0)    
Difficulty  ‐0.01529*** 
(‐7.8)    
Perecentage of Institutional Holdings  0.20374*** 
(11.6) 
Earnings variance decile  0.00016 
(0.1) 
Earnings correlation decile  ‐0.04460*** 
(‐29.4)    
Constant  ‐1.11607*** 
(‐44.4)    
  
N  110854 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 Panel B: Estimation of Average effect of Treatment for the Treated (ATT) for the case of SAMFE 
Treatment 
obs.  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
40135  ‐0.016  0.005  ‐3.271 
 
Panel C: Estimation of Average effect of Treatment for the Treated (ATT) for the case of SFD 
Treatment 
obs.  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
28197  ‐0.106  0.057  ‐1.859 
 
 
Table 19: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equation 25  (Panel A) and the 
estimation of the average effect of the treatment for the treated (Panel B). The  independent 
variables are described at Table 6. The matching with respect to the propensity score is conducted 
using the control subject with the closest propensity. The analysts data comes from IBES 
unadjusted Details file. Price data from CRSP monthly file. Only the last forecast of each analyst 
was used. Only forecasts with maturity of up to 60 days are used. For the calculation of forecast 
dispersion at least three forecasts were required. 
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 Table 20. Robustness checks 
   AMFE  FD  PSAMFE  PSFD 
mean Maturity  0.00017***  ‐0.00001  0.00002***  0.00000**  
   (9.0)  (‐1.1)  (11.1)  (3.0) 
mean Experience  ‐0.00009  0.00013  ‐0.00002  0.0 
   (‐0.7)  (1.8)  (‐1.4)  (0.4) 
mean Firm Experience  0.0  ‐0.0  0.00000***  0.00000**  
   (1.2)  (‐0.5)  (5.9)  (3.1) 
mean Number of Companies  ‐0.00004  ‐0.00001  0.0  0.0 
   (‐0.5)  (‐0.1)  (0.5)  (1.1)    
Size decile  0.00075***  0.00036***  ‐0.00056***  0.00026*** 
   (4.1)  (3.3)  (‐34.7)  (‐31.3)    
Book‐to‐market decile  0.00342***  0.00213***  0.00051***  0.00022*** 
   (22.6)  (22.4)  30.8  (29.7) 
Coverage  ‐0.00044***  0.00055***  ‐0.00003***  0.00004*** 
   (‐4.9)  (11.8)  (‐4.3)  (11.8) 
mean Difficulty  ‐0.00017  ‐0.00052***  ‐0.00002*  ‐0.00004*** 
   (‐1.5)  (‐5.9)  (‐2.1)  (‐6.4)    
Percentage of Institutional Holdings   ‐0.00621***  ‐0.00349***  ‐0.00318***  ‐0.00138*** 
   (‐4.3)  (‐3.7)  (‐18.4)  (‐17.4)    
Earnings variance decile  0.01030***  0.00550***  0.00083***  0.00030*** 
   70.7  (64.3)  53.9  (47.6) 
Earnings correlations decile  ‐0.00005  ‐0.0001  0.00012***  0.00003*** 
   (‐0.3)  (‐1.3)  8.4  (4.7) 
ddum  ‐0.00376***  ‐0.00302***  ‐0.00155***  ‐0.00050*** 
   (‐4.5)  (‐5.9)  (‐20.6)  (‐14.4)    
Constant  0.38776***  ‐0.00785***  0.02469***  0.01482 
   (8.7)  (‐3.8)  (10.6)  (1.5) 
           
R‐squared  0.14  0.22  0.144  0.196 
N  121030  64264  121027  64263 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 20: The table reports the coefficients from the estimation of equations 5 with AMFE and 
PSAMFE as dependent variables and equation 7 with FD and PSFD as dependent variables for the 
1990-2009 period. The dependent and independent variables are described at Table 6. The analysts 
data comes from IBES unadjusted Details file. Price data comes from CRSP monthly file.  Only the 
last forecast of each analyst was used. Both AMFE, FD PSAMFE and PSFD used forecasts with 
maturity of up to 60 days.For the calculation of forecast dispersion at least three forecasts were 
required. The year and industry dummies are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are clustered 
and heteroscedasticity corrected t-statistics. Clusters are formulated based on firm. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
Examining the Extrapolation Hypothesis with the 
Use of Long-term Forecasts 
 
Abstract 
I use the long-term growth forecasts produced by financial analysts to examine the extrapolation 
hypothesis. The extrapolation hypothesis states that investors are too optimistic about growth and 
big firms and too pessimistic about value and small firms, extrapolating the firms’ recent 
performance. I find that the errors of the forecasts are higher for the growth firms and larger firms, 
providing thus support to the extrapolation hypothesis. I proceed to investigate some common 
factors that may influence the analysts’ long-term forecasts. I find that the most important factors 
are the current GDP growth and the firm age. 
 
I. Introduction 
It is a well-established fact that value strategies, buying cheap stocks using book-to-market and 
price to earnings ratios as measures, earn superior returns over adequately long periods. However, 
the reason why this is the case is controversial. There are two competing theories which try to come 
up with explanations which describe the phenomenon. The first theory due to Fama and French 
(JFE 1992) explains the higher returns of value stocks on the grounds of the higher risk they bear. 
On the other hand, Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (JF 1994) point to behavioral explanations. 
More specifically, LSV (JF  1994) propose the hypothesis that investors naively extrapolate the 
current performance of firms far into the future. But in reality the firms cannot keep up with their 
previous growth rates and eventually their performance mean reverts; the growth firms slow down 
and the value firms improve their performance. The stock market realizes the situation with some 
lag and the returns adjust accordingly. La Porta (JF 1996) finds evidence that buying the stocks with 
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 low forecasted growth and selling the ones with high forecasted growth earns superior returns. Also, 
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (JF 1997) find that the reactions to earnings 
announcements are more positive for value stocks than for glamour stocks for a period of 5 years 
after the portfolio formations. On the other hand, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (JF 2002) find that the 
beginning of the year earnings forecasts are actually more optimistic for value and small stocks, 
contrary to the predictions of the extrapolation hypothesis. 
In this study I present evidence that the long-term analysts’ forecasts are indeed more optimistic for 
the growth and large firms, providing thus support to the extrapolation hypothesis. In that sense, the 
study is close to La Porta (JF 1996) who also uses the analysts long-term growth forecasts. 
However, La Porta doesn’t test the extrapolation hypothesis directly by sorting the firms into book-
to-market and size portfolios and then testing their long-term performance, which is the procedure I 
follow in this study. More specifically, I find that the errors of the forecasted growth are greater for 
the low to book-to-market firms and large firms. Also, for most cases during the sample period, the 
forecasting errors are positive, for all categories of book-to-market and size firms. In other words, 
the analysts overestimate the growth prospects of all firms, but they are particularly more optimistic 
about the outlook of growth and large firms. 
Another property of the long-term forecasts is that the analysts’ expectations move together, i.e. 
they increase and decrease together for all categories of book-to-market and size firms. I postulate 
that there must be some factors that force the analysts to update the forecasts for all firm categories 
at the same time. I explore the phenomenon by investigating the correlations of the analysts’ 
expectations with a series of factors that might influence their expectations. I find that the analysts’ 
forecasts are mainly influenced by the concurrent GDP growth rates (especially after 1990) and the 
firm age. However, they are not particularly influenced (or they are influenced to the wrong 
direction) by the concurrent overall market returns, the firms’ specific returns, the GDP forecasts or 
by the firms’ quarterly earnings. Moreover, their forecasts are not in agreement and are overly 
optimistic with respect to the corporate profit forecasts produced by the Professional Forecasters of 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
Finally, I examine if there is any evidence of mean reversion in the firms’ performance. It is known 
that profitability is mean reverting (Fama and French, JB 2000, Stigler, 1963), that earnings are 
mean reverting and that a considerable part of the earnings mean reversion comes from the mean 
reversion of profitability. I examine a metric of the efficacy of firms with respect to their book-to-
market and size categories. As an efficacy metric I use the ratio of sales to the cost of goods sold. 
The intuition of the metric is clear. A firm uses inputs like labor and raw materials to produce 
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 output to sale to its clients. A firm has high efficacy and is more competitive if it can minimize its 
costs (dollar-wise) and maximize its sales (dollar-wise). So, successful firms will have high sales, 
low costs and thus high efficacy. The opposite for less competitive firms. The advantage of such a 
metric is that both its constituents are easily and precisely measured (unlike some productivity 
measures) and, more importantly, the growth of the ratio is a clear sign that the firm improved its 
performance compared to its performance last year. As expected, growth firms have higher efficacy 
at the year after their inclusion to the growth category. However, the value firms increase their 
efficacy the four years after they are included at the value portfolio, while the growth firms exhibit 
deteriorating efficacy, as predicted by the mean reversion argument. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section II describes the data. Section III examines the extrapolations hypothesis. Section 
IV examines the common movement of expectations and errors. Section V investigates some factors 
that contribute to the common movement. Section VI investigates what the analysts miss and 
Section VII concludes.   
 
II. Data 
The data comes from IBES, CRSP and Compustat. I use the IBES summary long-term forecasts file 
form 1981 to 2011, the CRSP monthly and daily file from 1981 to 2011, the CRSP events file from 
1955 to 2011 and the Compustat annual fundamentals file from 1981 to 2011. For the analysis 
related to the long-term forecasts I use the intersection of firms between CRSP monthly file, IBES 
summary long-term forecasts  file and Compustat. For the analysis of the firms’ accounting data I 
use the intersection between CRSP events file and Compustat annual and quarterly fundamentals 
file. Finally, for the investigation of market’s reaction, I use the intersection between IBES 
summary long-term file and CRSP monthly file. 
I create the intersection between the IBES long-term summary file and the CRSP monthly file using 
the connection table provided by WRDS. I also use the procedure proposed by WRDS to connect 
CRSP and Compustat. I use the CRSP identifier (permno) as a bridge to connect IBES and 
Compustat files. 
Descriptive statistics for the IBES summary long-term  forecasts file (intersection with CRSP) are 
presented at Figures [1] and [2]. Figure [1] reports the number of firms per year for the 1981-2011 
period. Figure [2] presents the number of estimates per year for the period 1981-2011.  
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 The CRSP monthly file includes 21120 firms, from three exchanges (NYSE, AmEx and 
NASDAQ).The CRSP stocks are assigned to five size quintiles. The quintile breakpoints 
correspond to NYSE quintiles, and each stock is assigned to each portfolio at the beginning of each 
year, based on its market equity at the end of the previous year. Each stock stays at the portfolio for 
a year. 
For calculating the book-to-market of each firm I use accounting data from Compustat annual 
fundamentals file. I calculate the book value as the sum of assets, deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit and convertible debt minus the preferred stock and total liabilities. I calculate the market 
value at the end of the current calendar year and then I calculate the book-to-market ratio. I use 
NYSE breakpoints to calculate the quintile of the book-to-market values each year. The quintile to 
which a firm belong is the same for the whole next year, e.g. the quintiles calculated at 12/2001 are 
used for the whole 2002.  
Figure [3] presents the number of firms per book-to-market quintile in the intersection between 
IBES summary long-term forecasts file and CRSP monthly file. Figure [4] presents the same 
information with respect to the size quintiles. 
 
III. Extrapolation Hypothesis 
The extrapolation hypothesis states that the investors’ expectations are too high for growth firms 
(low book-to-market firms) relative to value firms (high book-to-market firms) and also too high for 
large firms relative to small firms. Moreover, the investors extrapolate recent performance to the 
future.  
Doukas et al. (JF 2002) use analysts’ earnings  forecasts and find that the extrapolation hypothesis 
doesn’t hold. Specifically, they sort the stocks into book-to-market quintiles and they find that the 
stocks which belong to the highest book-to-market quintile, the value stocks, exhibit the largest 
forecast error, while the stocks of the first quintile, the growth (or glamour) stocks, exhibit the 
smallest forecast error. According to Doukas et al. (JF 2002), this finding provides evidence that the 
investors are more optimistic about the value stocks (assuming that analysts’ forecasts proxy for the 
investors’ expectations), and not the growth stocks, as prescribed by the extrapolation hypothesis. 
They repeat the sorting procedure with respect to the size of firms. They put the stocks in five size 
quintiles and they find that the smaller size firms have higher forecast errors than larger firms. 
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 Again, they interpret the finding as that the investors do not overestimate the earnings of larger 
firms, contrary to what the extrapolation hypothesis implies. 
I use analysts’ long-term growth forecasts to test the extrapolation hypothesis. An advantage of 
long-term growth forecasts is that they provide expected growth rates, so I can compare not only 
analysts’ errors but also the expected growth rates per se among firms. The long-term growth 
forecasts correspond to an average annual increase in operating earnings over the company’s next 
full business cycle. According to IBES, these forecasts refer to a period of between three to five 
years. I use a value of 4 years as an intermediate value. In order to define the forecast errors, I have 
to attribute the forecasts to an accounting quantity. I use the operating income before depreciation. 
In the IBES manual, IBES gives the following description for the long-term forecasts: 
“Long-term growth rate forecasts are received directly from contributing analysts; they are not 
calculated by Thomson Reuters. While different analysts apply different methodologies, the Long-
term Growth Forecast generally represents an expected annual increase in operating earnings over 
the company’s next full business cycle. In general, these forecasts refer to a period of between three 
to five years.” 
According to Compustat, the operating income before depreciation is calculated as Sales (Net) 
minus Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General, and Administrative expenses before deducting 
Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization. The definition takes into consideration both sales and 
cost of goods sold, so it is a measure close to “operating earnings” suggested by IBES. 
 
I define two types of errors, simple and relative. The simple forecast error is defined as: 
ܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ݁݀_ܱܫܤܦ ௜ܲ,௧ିସ െ ܱܫܤܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
and the relative as  
ܴܨܧ௜,௧ ൌ ൫ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ݁݀_ܱܫܤܦ ௜ܲ,௧ିସ െ ܱܫܤܦ ௜ܲ,௧൯ܱܫܤܦ ௜ܲ,௧  
with OIBDPi,t the operating income before depreciation for firm i at quarter t and 
Forecasted_OIBDPi,t-4 the operating income forecasted four year ago for the firm i. 
In other words, I check the current quarter’s and the quarter’s four years away operating income 
before depreciation. By doing so, I create a time series of forecast errors for every firm. 
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 The relative forecast error is superior since it is independent of the magnitude of the operating 
income. Since the numbers are not per share, the problem of a very small denominator is largely 
mitigated.  
The choice of operating income as the chosen accounting variable comes with two drawbacks. First, 
there are some missing values: 157119 out of the 683300 observations are missing in the Compustat 
Fundamentals file. Second, the measure is too volatile. The problem introduced by high volatility is 
that, for example, a spike in a given quarter will lead to the erroneous conclusion of better than 
expected performance. I try to mitigate the first problem by replacing missing values by the average 
of the quarter before and after the missing one. I increase the sample size by 7344 observations. 
About the second problem, I use a moving average of the current and the last 4 quarters of a firm’s 
operating income. Figure [5] presents the case of Microsoft’s operating income as an example. The 
employed procedure seems to reduce effectively the intertemporal volatility and also follows the 
trend of Microsoft’s operating income. 
 
III.A. Book-to-Market 
In order to test the extrapolation hypothesis for growth and value firms, I sort the stocks in book-to-
market quintiles and I examine the median forecast and median forecast error. I use median errors 
in order to avoid the influence of outliers. Use of medians for long-term growth forecasts is also 
advised by I/B/E/S. Table [1] presents the results for the simple error, the relative error and the 
expectations for each quintile for the whole sample. The errors, both absolute and relative are 
positive for all book-to-market quintiles, pointing to analysts’ optimism. However, there is 
significant dispersion among the different quintiles. At the first quintile, the growth firms, the 
relative error is 21%. This means that the operating income before depreciation after four years is 
overestimated by 21%. The overestimation for the high book-to-market firms is only 1.26%, which 
is negligible compared to the error of the growth stocks. The errors for the three middle quintiles are 
14.5%, 6.9% and 3.7%, i.e. the error decreases monotonically for higher book-to-market stocks. 
Notice also that the expectations for growth stocks are higher than the growth expectations for value 
firms:  20% is the median growth expectation for growth firms, versus 10.68% for the value firms. 
The growth expectations also decrease monotonically with the book-to-market quintile. 
I follow the procedure by Doukas et al. (JF 2002) and I examine the firms by exchange. The results 
are presented at Table [2]. For the NYSE firms, the results are the same as above, namely high 
errors and expectations for the growth firms and low errors and expectations for the value firms. 
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 Both errors and expectations decline monotonically. For the AmEx, the errors for the value firms 
are higher than the errors of the growth firms but only by 3%. For NASDAQ,  the errors are higher 
for the growth firms than the value firms, the decline in errors is monotonic, and also the errors of 
the NASDAQ value stocks are negative, meaning that the analysts underestimate the firms’ 
prospects. 
A valid criticism is that the forecasts are too far in the future so errors are inevitable. For this reason, 
even if the argument doesn’t address the issue of consistent optimism, I examine the performance of 
the firms two years after the release of the forecast, using the fact that the forecasts refer to average 
annual growth. The results are presented at Table [3]. The magnitude of errors is smaller as 
expected, however the ordering is the same: the errors for the growth firms are higher  than the 
errors of the value firms, 6% versus 0.4%. The errors also decline monotonically. The picture is the 
same even if I divide the stocks by exchange. The results are presented at Table [4]. For all the three 
exchanges, the growth firms’ forecasts exhibit higher errors than the value firms, and for the case of 
NYSE and NASDAQ the errors decline monotonically by the book-to-market quintile. 
The above results seem to confirm the extrapolation hypothesis. The forecasts for the low book-to-
marker firms are more optimistic than the forecasts of the value firms. If the forecasts are used as 
proxies for the investors’ beliefs, then the expectations for the growth firms are overly optimistic. 
 
III.B. Size 
I examine now the extrapolation hypothesis with respect to firm size. I sort the stocks in size 
quintiles and I examine the median forecast and median forecast error. Table [5] presents the results 
for the simple error, the relative error and the expectations for each quintile for the whole sample. 
As in the case of the book-to-market sorting, the errors, both simple and relative are positive for all 
size quintiles, pointing to analysts’ optimism. Again, there is significance dispersion among the 
different quintiles. For the small firms of the first quintile, the relative forecast error is negligible, 
while for the large firms of the fifth quintile the median relative error is 13%. The growth forecasts 
are higher for the smaller firms and decrease monotonically by size.  
The results remain the same if the firms are examined by exchange. The results are presented at 
Table [6]. For NYSE, the results mirror the results of the whole sample. For AmEx, qualitatively 
the results are the same, but the median error of the large firms is at 87%. The expectations for all 
AmEx firms are the same and around 15%. For NASDAQ, the relative error is marginally negative 
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 for smaller firms and positive at 18% for the largest firms. The forecasted growth rates is 17-18% 
for all NASDAQ firms. 
Table [7]  examines the firms’ performance two years after the release of the forecasts. The picture 
remains the same. Small and negative errors for smaller firms and larger error for the bigger ones. 
The conclusions are the same even if I divide the firms by exchange (Table [8]). The relative 
forecast error is 2% for the smaller NYSE firms and 5% for the largest. For the case of AmEx, it is 
1% for the smaller ones and 26% for the bigger ones. For NASDAQ, -1% for the smallest and 5% 
for the biggest. 
The results are again in agreement with the extrapolation hypothesis. The relative errors of the 
forecasts for the large firms are bigger than the relative errors for the smaller firms.  
 
III.C. Book-to-Market and Size 
Finally, I sort stocks by book-to-market and size. The results are presented at Table [9], and confirm 
the previous results. The small and high book-to-market firms have negative relative errors (-8%), 
meaning that their prospects are underestimated, while the big growth firms have relative errors of 
21%. For all book-to-market quintiles, the largest errors are observed at the fourth size quintile, 
while for all size quintiles the largest errors are observed at the first book-to-market quintile.  
As a conclusion, the results confirm one of the predictions of the extrapolation hypothesis: analysts 
are optimistic for growth firms and large firms, but the results are quite disappointing. Growth firms 
miss the forecasts by around 20% and large firms by 13%. On the other hand, value and small firms 
miss the forecasts by only 1% and 0.6% respectively.  
 
III.D. Comparison with the Results of Doukas et al. (JF 2002) 
The results of the previous three subsections regarding the extrapolation hypothesis are in contrast 
to the results presented by Doukas et al. (JF 2002). In this subsection I investigate the reasons 
behind this discrepancy.  
I turn to the behavioral aspects of the production of earnings forecasts in order to resolve the 
disagreement between my results and the results of Doukas et al. (JF 2002). Degeorge et al. (JB 
1999) provide evidence that management tries to exceed the median forecast by manipulating 
earnings. Lim (JF 2001) provides evidence that analysts tend to overestimate initially the prospects 
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 of the firms in order not to alienate themselves from the management. I try to investigate a 
combination of the above two ideas. If the analysts do not want to alienate themselves from the 
management, they may be willing to help the management by issuing forecasts favorable to the firm. 
The degree of optimism may be related to a threshold. In my case I will examine as a threshold the 
EPS of the previous FYE. If the conjecture is right and analysts issue forecasts that exceed the 
previous FYE EPS results, I should be able to produce figures like Figures 5 and 6 in Degeorge et al. 
(JB 1999). 
I define the initial expected earnings growth (IEEG) as the difference between the EPS forecasts  
issued eight months or earlier than the announcement of the results of the next FYE and the 
previous FYE’s earnings. I produce a histogram for each book-to-market (Figure [6]) and size 
quintile (Figure [7]). In all cases, it is evident that the number of positive IEEG are much higher 
than the number of negative IEEG, resembling the Figures 5 and 6 in Degeorge et al. (JB 1999). As 
a result, there is evidence that the analysts are reluctant to issue forecasts that lead to negative IEEG. 
It is also interesting to notice that the great majority of forecast produce an IEEG of 5 and 10 cents. 
It is safe to argue then that the first forecasts issued by analysts at the beginning of each FYE are in 
many cases produced mechanically: the analyst just adds some cents to the previous FYE’s results, 
usually up to 10.  
The above finding implies that the analysts do not try to estimate the prospects of the firms next 
year, they act mechanically based on the results of the previous FYE. So, the results of Doukas et al. 
(JF 2002) could be a manifestation of the above phenomenon. The disagreement between the 
findings by Doukas et al. (JF 2002) and the extrapolation hypothesis may then be the result of the 
fact that the value and small firms are not performing as well as the growth and big firms and not of 
the optimism of analysts about value and small firms. 
 
IV. Time Series of relative Errors and common Movement 
The tables in section III provided evidence that the extrapolation hypothesis is valid for the 1981-
2011 period, based on the financial analysts’ long-term growth forecasts. However, the results may 
apply only to specific years or periods, and not to the whole 1981-2011 period, and through 
averaging the results extend to the whole period. In this section I address the concern that the above 
results for book-to-market and size classifications are driven by specific years or periods. I examine 
first the case of book-to-market classification. In order to present a clear picture free from 
idiosyncratic spikes, I will use the Hondrick-Prescott filter to the filter the time series of the relative 
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 errors (for the four year horizon errors) of every book-to-market quintile. The Hondrick-Prescott 
filter removes the noise from a time series and what remains is considered to be the trend of the 
series. In the case under consideration, I have five time series, one for each book-to-market quintile 
with one data point for each quarter. The results are presented at Figure [8]. The results confirm the 
conclusions of Tables [1] through [4]. The relative errors for the case of the growth firms are always 
higher than the errors of the value firms. The errors across quintiles seem to covary and the 
difference in relative errors between quintile 1 and 5 seem to remain approximately the same at 
around 20% during the 30 years period. Also, with the exception of the beginning of the sample, the 
errors decline monotonically by the book-to-market quintile. Notice that the conclusions would be 
the same if I were to use the original time series without employing the Hondrick-Prescott filter, but 
the exposition wouldn’t be that clear.  
I examine also the possibility that the observed behavior of size quintiles simple and relative errors 
at Table [5] is the result of certain years. I use again the Hondrick-Prescott filter to isolate the trend 
from noise. The results are presented at Figure [9]. The results confirm the conclusions of Tables [5] 
through [8]: the relative errors of the bigger firms are always higher than the relative errors of the 
smallest firms for the whole period. The errors also seem to covary, as in the case of sorting the 
firms by book-to-market. In many periods, the errors of the firms of the fourth quintile are higher 
than the errors of the firms of the fifth quintile. The conclusions are the same even if I don’t use the 
Hondrick-Prescott filter. 
Next, I employ the above methodology to investigate if the common trends of errors have 
counterparts at the forecasted growth rates. If the same trends are found also at the expectations, it 
would mean that the errors of the forecasts are not driven only by unforecastable subsequent 
developments that influenced certain firms in certain ways, e.g. the NASDAQ crash and the 
recession that followed hit hard the fragile high tech firms with no clear record of earnings and not 
many tangible assets that could guarantee continuing financing. 
The results for the book-to-market quintiles are presented at Figure [10]. It is evident that there is 
strong covariance among the forecasts of various quintiles. They all start increasing at the beginning 
of 90s, they peak around 2000 and then drop. The correlation of the forecasts is reported at Table 
[10] Panel A. They all are above 0.8. The conclusions don’t change with the use of the original data. 
The correlations of relative errors among the book-to-market quintiles are reported at Table [10] 
Panel B. They are all positive and economically significant. The correlations of expectations and 
relative errors for each book-to-market quintile are presented at Table [10] Panel C. With the 
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 exception of the second quintile which is negative but insignificant, the other correlations are 
positive and highly significant. 
I repeat the above procedure for the case of the size quintiles. The results for the expectations (after 
the use of Hondrick-Prescott filter) are presented at Figure [11]. The correlations among the 
expectations (Table [11] Panel A) of the size quintiles are all above 0.9, implying that all rise and 
fall together. The correlations between relative errors and expectations are presented at Table [11] 
Panel B and are economically significant. The correlations between  the expectations and relative 
errors for the size quintiles are presented at Table [11] Panel C. With the exception of the second 
size quintile, the other correlations are significant at the 10% significance level.  
As a conclusion, Figures [8] and [9] suggest that the extrapolation hypothesis applies to the whole 
period 1981-2011. Moreover, they suggest that the relative errors for the different book-to-market 
and size quintiles covary, rising and falling together. Figures [10] and [11] provide evidence that the 
common movement of relative errors is because of the common movement in analysts’ forecasts. 
 
V. Possible Factors explaining the common Movement 
The previous two sections established that there is evidence that the extrapolation hypothesis is 
valid (with respect the long-term analysts’ forecasts) and also it is valid for the whole 1981-2011 
period. Moreover, the relative errors and expectations of the various book-to-market and size 
quintiles move together. In this section I examine some factors that might contribute to the common 
movement of the firms’ expectations, in order to shed light to the factors that influence analysts and 
lead them to overestimate the future performance of growth and big firms. 
 
V.A. Market-wide Returns 
The rationale behind examining market returns is that high or low (especially sustained) market 
returns may influence financial analysts’ forecasts. This may happen in two ways. First, by taking 
into consideration that markets are forward looking, high market returns may signal improved 
prospects for the economy, so improved prospects for firms. Second, high market returns may 
create euphoria among analysts who will believe that the market and the economy as a whole will 
continue having sustainable growth. This euphoria could translate into higher expectation for the 
growth of firms. This explanation could be seen as a macro extrapolation hypothesis. 
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 In order to check this hypothesis, I examine the change in growth forecasts and market returns in a 
quarterly level. As market returns I use the cumulative market return for the three months of each 
quarter. I check the relation between market returns and growth forecasts in two ways. First, 
examining the correlation between the cumulative market return during the given quarter and the 
change in median forecast of the current quarter and the median growth forecast of the previous 
quarter. Second, I examine the behavior of the growth forecast during periods of the most extreme 
market returns. 
Table [12] Panel A presents the results of the correlation between the change in growth estimates 
and quarterly market return for all firms. The correlation coefficient is statistically significant but its 
magnitude is very small, only 2%. Using a non-parametric setting, I examine the change in quarters 
the market had positive returns or negative returns. For negative returns, the mean difference is        
-0.39% and for positive quarter returns the change is -0.18%.  
Table [13] Panel A reports the correlations between the cumulative three months market returns and 
the corresponding change in the mean of expected growth for each book-to-market quintile. The 
correlations are small (even if some of them are significant), and provide evidence that the market 
performance is not an important factor in determining the high forecasted expected growth. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the regression of the change of the mean forecasted growth for all 
book-to-market quintile on the market return is around 0.005 (t=3.29). Given that market returns 
over a quarter have an average of around 3%, it means that the change in forecasted growth is 
miniscule and doesn’t seem able to explain the growth in expected returns. As a final step, I check 
the change of expected growth rates for each book-to-market quintile during periods of sustained 
positive or negative market performance. I define a market return as very positive if the cumulative 
market return during the quarter is more than 10% and as very negative if it is less than -10%. The 
results show that the change of expectations is again very small: -0.12% for the first quintile and -
0.326%  for the fifth for the case of  <-10% and 0.1694% and 0.127% for the case of  >10%.  
Table [14] repeats the same procedure for the case of size quintiles. The correlations between the 
change in expected growth for each size quintile and the market returns are also very weak, as in the 
case of book-to-market quintiles. The coefficient of the regression of the change in growth 
expectations on market returns has a coefficient of around 0.00806 (t=4.86), which again is 
relatively small. Also, as it is evident in Panel B and Panel C, during periods of particularly high or 
low returns of the overall market, the expected growth rates change very little. For the case of 
returns lower or equal to -10%, the change is -0.12% for the first quintile and -0.326% for the case 
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 of the fifth quintile. For the case of returns equal or higher than 10%, the change is -0.0756 for the 
first quintile and 0.1303 for the last one.  
The conclusion is that the hypothesis that analysts change their forecast of long-term growth based 
on the current market returns doesn’t seem plausible. The correlation between change in expected 
growth rates and market returns is very low, both in the level of individual firms and also based on 
portfolios formed on the basis of book-to-market and size. 
 
V.B Firm Returns 
Another possible explanation of the synchronized change in expected growth rates is that the 
analysts become optimistic for some firms, and then they carry this optimism to all other firms, 
creating in such a way the synchronized moves in the forecasted growth across all firms. 
I use firm market excess returns over a quarter. The correlation between the firm excess return and 
the change in the forecasted growth, using the data for all firms, is 5%. This correlation, even if it is 
statistically significant (p-value=0), economically doesn’t point to a firm’s market performance as a 
source of analysts’ forecasted growth rates. Moreover, running the regression of the increase or 
decrease of forecasted growth on the excess return during the quarter, has a coefficient of 0.007 
(t=31.07), which even if it is significant, is very small to generate any significant variation in the 
forecasted growth rates. Even if I run the regressions by book-to-market quintile or size quintile, the 
results remain qualitatively the same. 
I examine also the case of extreme firms returns. Again, I focus on cases of more or less of 10% 
return over the quarter. In cases of an excess firm return of -10% or less, the mean change in 
forecasted growth rates has an average of -0.63%, which is statistically significant but economically 
meager. In the case of a positive firm excess return of 10% or more, the change in expected growth 
rate is -0.027%, which is statistically indistinguishable from 0. In the case I require at least two 
extreme excess returns quarters in a row, the results change slightly. Table [15] Panel A presents the 
results for the case of more than one quarters of extreme negative returns. For two quarters in a row, 
the decline in expected growth rates is relatively small, only -1.11%. For 3 quarters in a row, it is -
2.39% which is more significant. The decline is more remarkable for more quarters in a row, for 
example -8.388% for the case of 7 quarters in a row. The opposite case with extreme positive 
returns is presented at Table [15] Panel B. The effects on expected growth  are more moderate for 
persistent positive performance. For two quarters of positive returns, the change in expected growth 
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 rates is -0.087%. In order to have an increase of more than 2%, it is required to have more than 5 
quarters of continuing excess returns of 10% or more. 
In general, the results are not supportive of the hypothesis that the analysts rise the expected growth 
forecasts taking into consideration the market performance of the firms. The correlation between 
market returns and forecasted long-term growth is small. Even the case of persistent positive or 
negative returns cannot adequately explain the phenomenon: the cases are very few and the changes 
in the persistent positive returns case are relatively small.  
 
V.C. GDP Growth 
 
Another factor that might contribute to common movement of forecasted growth rates is the GDP 
growth. The rationale is that the expected growth rates move together because of positive or 
negative GDP growth, which is a factor that influences the whole economy. 
 
First, I check the correlations between the GDP growth and the long-term expectations for each 
book-to-market quintile. I use the Hondrick-Prescott filter to smooth both the long-term 
expectations and the GDP and then I calculate the GDP growth based on this smoothed series. The 
results are reported at Table [16]. Figure [12] presents plots of every book-to-market quintile with 
the smoothed GDP growth. For the whole sample the correlations are positive, significant and 
economically important for the first two quintiles, at the range of 0.4, positive (0.039) but 
insignificant both statistically and economically for the third, and negative (around -0.2), 
statistically significant and economically relatively important for the fourth and the fifth quintile.  
However, if I constraint the correlations calculation after 1990, then the correlations for all book-to-
market quintiles turn positive, significant and economically important ranging from 0.88 for the 
first quintile to 0.36 for the fifth. For the sample before 1990, the correlations are positive, 
statistically significant and economically important for the three first quintiles, while they are 
negative, significant and economically important for the fourth and fifth quintiles. 
 
I repeat the above procedure also for the case of size quintiles. The results are presented at Table 
[17]. For the first and second quintile the correlation is positive, statically significant and 
economically important. The correlation is positive also for the third and fourth quintile, but not 
statistically significant, and negative and insignificant for the fifth quintile. As in the case of the 
book to market, if I restrict the sample to quarters after 1990, the correlations for all quintiles turn 
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 positive, statistically significant and economically important. For the sample before 1990, the first 
three quintiles exhibit negative correlations, which are significant and economically important, 
while the fourth and fifth quintiles are positive, significant and economically important. Figure [13] 
provides graphical representation of the above findings. 
 
The results for both book-to-market and size sorts show that the GDP growth seems to be an 
important factor to explain the expected growth rates. The correlations are statistically and 
economically significant for all cases of the sample. However, for small and value firms the 
correlations have different signs at the two parts. Another potential problem with GDP growth is the 
fact that it is relatively hard to explain the high expected growth rates. The GDP growth over the 30 
years of the sample is relatively low and stable (the Great Moderation period), so it is hard to argue 
that the analysts were not aware of it, even if behavioral arguments are employed; growing 25% per 
year for four years while the overall economy grows by around 3% the same period is a difficult 
task for most firms, even if they are considered to be growth firms. A possible explanation is that 
this is an ex post stability and the expectations of GDP growth were different, that there were 
forecasts predicting the end of this stable period, contrary to the perception of stability established 
by the consecutive years of stability. In any case, the influence of the concurrent GDP growth seems 
to be an important factor influencing the long-term growth forecasts after 1990. All correlations for 
both book-to-market and size classifications are highly significant both statistically and 
economically, so it is safe to assume that the current GDP growth is a factor that influences the 
financial estimates. Notice that financial analysts didn’t have access to the actual GDP growth of 
the quarter the announced their estimates; the results for each quarter are finalized one quarter later 
than any given quarter. So, the signal they used was noisy. 
 
VI. D. GDP Forecasts 
 
I turn now to the examination of the relation between the GDP forecasts and the long-term 
expectations. The aim is to investigate if the GDP forecasts may provide an explanation for the high 
expected growth rates forecasted by analysts. The hypothesis is that the high expected growth rates 
were based on high expected GDP growth. 
 
The GDP growth forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted every 
quarter by the  Philadelphia FED. I use the four quarters ahead and ten years ahead forecasts. The 
one year ahead forecasts are used to investigate the short term projections about GDP growth, while 
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 the ten years ahead forecasts to examine if there are any expected hindrances to long-term growth. I 
use the mean forecast of both series, and for every quarter I have a forecast of the average growth 
for the next 4 quarters and the average projected annual growth for 10 years ahead (the current one 
included), building in such a way a time-series of quarterly frequency. Again, I use the Hondrick-
Prescott filter to smooth the series. For the four quarters ahead forecast, the smoothed series of GDP 
growth mean forecasts has a mean of 1.6%. The standard deviation of the mean forecast is lower 
than the standard deviation of the actual GDP growth:. 0.005 versus 0.01. Figure [14] provides 
some graphical evidence about the relationship between the actual and the forecasted  GDP growth 
for the non-smoothed case. For the 10 years ahead forecast, the average yearly forecasted growth 
rate is 2.85%.  
 
I proceed with the examination of the correlations between the four quarters GDP growth forecasts 
and the long-term growth forecasts for the book-to-market quintiles. The results are presented at 
Table [18]. All correlations are negative, significant and economically important. However, if the 
sample is broken before and after 1990, the results change substantially. For the period after 1990, 
the correlation for the first book-to-market quintile is positive, even if not significant. The 
correlations for the second and fifth quintiles are still negative, but they are neither significant nor 
economically important. For the period before 1990, for the first three quintiles the correlations are 
positive, while they are negative for the last two. 
 
The results for the case of the size quintiles are reported at Table[19]. For the whole sample, the 
correlations are negative, significant and economically important as in the case of the book-to-
market quintiles. For the sub-sample after 1990, only the correlation with respect to the fifth 
quintile remains negative and significant. The situation is reversed for the period before 1990, 
where the fourth and fifth quintiles exhibit positive, significant and economically important, while 
for the first three quintiles the correlations are negative, significant and economically important. 
 
Table [20]  presents the correlations between the book-to-market quintiles and the 10 years ahead 
GDP growth forecasts. For the whole sample, the correlations of the first two quintiles are negative, 
insignificant and economically trivial, while for the last three are positive, significant and 
economically important. Since the 10 years ahead forecasts are available only after 1990, it is not 
possible to examine the periods before 1990. 
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 Table [21] presents the results for the case of size quintiles. All correlations are positive, but only 
the correlations for the fourth and fifth quintiles are significant and economically important. 
 
The above results seem to point to other factors than the expectations about the  macroeconomic 
conditions as the reason why the analysts’ long-term growth forecasts are too optimistic about firms’ 
prospects and the optimism about growth and large firms. The GDP growth forecasts are reasonably 
accurate and in any case they don’t draw an overly rosy prospect for the economy. Moreover, the 
correlations between the GDP forecasts and the firm forecasts are not always positively correlated, 
and in many cases the correlation is or weak or economically trivial to be accounted as a reason for 
the optimistic forecasts of financial analysts. More specifically, the negative or statistically zero 
correlations imply that the firms are projected to perform well, while the GDP will increase only 
sluggishly or even decrease.  It is not easy to try to reconcile the negative correlations (as in most 
cases of book-to-market and size quintiles) between GDP forecasts and operating income; it means 
that the majority of firms will do well in a tough macroeconomic environment. At least for the 
period after 1990, financial analysts seem more influenced by the current macroeconomic condition 
and not the forecasted GDP growth.  
 
V. E. Profit Forecasts 
 
The Survey of Professional Forecasters by Philadelphia FED includes also a questionnaire where 
the participants are asked to forecast the general profit level of the firm within the economy. The 
responses could be useful, because they offer another view on the performance of corporations. It is 
true that in the current study I use the operating income and not profits as performance measure, and 
also the SPR doesn’t include forecasts on individual firms, nor distinguishes the firms in low and 
high book-to-market or small and big. However, something can be said if  the focus of the analysis 
is the growth of profits from quarter to quarter, which can be compared to the growth in operating 
performance forecasted by financial analysts. 
 
For this dataset, the average quarter growth of profits is 1.9% (median 1.5%), with a standard 
deviation of 1.4%. Figure [15] presents the time series of profits growth of the original series and 
also the smoothed series from the Hondrick –Prescott filter.  
 
Table [22] presents the correlations between the book to markets quintiles and the smoothed profit 
forecasts. For the whole sample, all correlations are negative, significant and economically 
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 important at the range of -0.35. For the period after 1990, only the first three quintiles remain 
negative and significant. The fourth quintile has an insignificant correlation and the fifth becomes 
positive and insignificant. For the period before 1990, the picture is the opposite one, the first two 
quintiles exhibit positive, significant and economically  correlations, the third positive and non-
significant, while the last two negative, significant and economically important. 
 
Table [23] presents the correlations between the size  quintiles and the smoothed profit forecasts. 
For the whole sample, all correlations are negative and significant. The correlations of the first four 
quintiles are also economically important. For the period after 1990, all correlations remain 
negative, but the correlations for the first and the fifth quintile are not significant any more. For the 
period before 1990, the correlations for the first three quintiles are negative again, highly significant 
and economically important. For the fourth and fifth quintiles the correlations are positive, 
significant and economically important. 
 
The conclusions from using the profit forecasts are that the financial analysts seem to be 
excessively optimistic about the firms they cover, at least in comparison to the forecasters surveyed 
by the Philadelphia FED. For example, for the firms of the first book-to-market quintile (growth) 
firms the forecasted growth is consistently above 20% per year for the whole period since 1981. In 
quarterly terms this means an average growth of around 5% per quarter. This is 2.5 times the 
forecasted profits growth of all firms. For the value firms, the average is around 11% per year, 
which is around 2.75% quarterly growth, which in turn is 40% more than the average 1.9% at the 
SPF. The optimism is exemplified in the after 1990 period, where with the exception of the second 
book-to-market quintile, the vast majority of the analysts’ estimates is above the forecasts by the 
SPF. For the case of the size quintiles, the smallest firms (first quintile) have an time series average 
of 18.86% per year, which in quarterly terms is 4.72%, which is around 2.5 times the average 1.9% 
by the SPF. For the biggest firms, the average is a 3.125% quarter growth, which is 50% more than 
the average of SPF. What is more worth-mentioning however is the negative correlations during the 
90s, where the estimates by the financial analysts were increasing, while the ones of the SPF were 
in decline. This points to the fact that the two groups focus to different facts in order to come up 
with their estimates. It is true that the SPF has profits as focus and the financial analysts estimates 
the operating income, however the differences are still high enough and also it is difficult to 
reconcile the negative correlation during 90s, which implies that operating income will go up, while 
profits will go down for all firm categories. 
 
CHAPTER 3
209
 V. F. Firm Age 
 
Another factor that could contribute to the co-movement of the growth forecasts is the average firm 
age. It is possible that analysts are excited for the prospects of a new company, while at the same 
time they discount the prospects of old and established firms. Figure [16]  provides some evidence 
that this might be the case. The figure reports the median of the median of all firms of the given age 
that have a long-term growth estimate. The younger the firm, the higher the estimates, which then 
decline by age.  This is also the case for all book-to-market and size quintiles. Figure [17] presents 
the book-to-market quintiles and Figure [18] the size quintiles. The pattern is the same for all book-
to-market and size quintiles. The estimates are high when the firm is young, no matter its 
classification. For the book-to-market case, for the first quintile (growth firms), the average initial 
estimates are 32.5% annual increase, 26% annual increase for the next two quintiles and 22.5% for 
the last two. After 150 quarters, the average is around 12% for all quintiles. For the case of size 
quintiles, the first quintile (small firms) kicks in with 26% annual increase in operating income, for 
the next three the initial estimates are 26% and for the large firms of the fifth size quintile 18%. 
After 150 quarters the numbers are 12.5% for the first four quintiles and around 11% for the fifth 
quintile. The above plots point to the fact that the long-term analysts’ forecasts about the firm are 
strongly influenced by the firm’s age, independently of its classification. 
 
If firm age is a factor that could explain the behavior of long-term forecasts, then the median long-
term forecast of the firms of each book-to-market and size quintile should vary with age. In other 
words, when the average age of the firms in each book-to-market and size quintiles change, the 
long-term growth forecasts should change as well. Figure [19] plots the average age and the median 
long-term estimate for each book-to-market quintile for the whole sample period and Figure [20] 
plots the average age and median long-term estimate for each size quintile for the whole sample 
period. Both for book-to-market and size quintiles the growth estimates increase while the mean age 
decreases and vice versa for the case of increasing age. 
 
Table [24] examines the correlations between the forecasted long-term growth for each of the book-
to-market quintiles and the average age of the firms of each quintile. Both the average expectations 
and age are smoothed using the Hondrick-Prescott filter. For the whole sample, the correlations are 
negative, significant and economically important. The maximum (in absolute value) correlations 
appears at the fourth quintile with -0.967 and the minimum (in absolute terms) at the fifth with -
0.879. For the sample after 1990, all correlations are at the range of -0.92 and are significant. For 
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 the period before 1990, the correlation for the first quintile is negative but insignificant, positive and 
significant for the second quintile and negative and significant for the last three quintiles. 
 
Table [25] examines the correlations between the forecasted long-term growth for each of the size 
quintiles and the average age of the firms of each quintile. Both the average expectations and age 
are smoothed using the Hondrick-Prescott filter. For the whole sample, the correlations are negative, 
significant and economically important. The maximum (in absolute value) correlations appears at 
the fourth quintile with a correlation of -0.94 and the minimum at the fifth with a correlation of        
-0.65. The picture remain the same for the sample after 1990, with a maximum correlation at -0.92 
at the fourth quintile and minimum at the second with -0.68. For the period before 1990, the 
correlations for all quintiles are again negative, significant and economically important. 
 
The conclusion is that the when the mean age of the firms decreases, the forecasted long-term 
growth increases. This effect is independent of the book-to-market and size of the firms. This fact 
points to a behavioral explanation about the high forecasted growth rates and also the co-movement 
of these expectations for all quintiles: more young firms enter the market, the analysts get excited 
and bid up the forecasted growth rates. This explanation can also accommodate the timing of the 
spike in expectations in the late 90’s, where the last big IPO wave took place. 
 
V. G. Interactions with quarterly Results 
 
In this sub-section I examine the interaction between the quarterly results and the change in the 
long-term forecasts. The idea is that quarterly results that far exceed expectation, may have as result 
that analysts increase their long-term forecasts. The same applies also to results that fall short of 
expectations. As a measure of expectations I use the mean forecast of analysts for the given quarter 
as an expectations measure. The sample refers to the 1990-2010 period.  
 
I test the above hypothesis by examining the response of the long-term forecasts to extreme forecast 
errors, with forecast error defined as the actual value announced after the end of the quarter minus 
the mean forecast for the given quarter. I define the extreme as the 10% of highest and 10% of the 
lowest forecast errors. High forecast error means that the analysts were too pessimistic about the 
firm’s quarter results. Low forecast errors mean that the analysts were too optimistic about the 
firm’s quarter results. Because missing or exceeding the analysts’ mean forecast by a large amount 
may mean that the firm is taking a deep bath or some other transitory anomaly (i.e. because of 
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 management change), I also examine the inverse hypothesis, namely how good or bad  are the 
quarter results in cases of extreme changes of the long-term forecasts. 
 
Table [26] Panel A presents the summary statistics of the forecast error. The 10% and 90% are -
0.0667 and 0.09 respectively. I define the change in the long-term forecasts as the change in the 
next quarter’s mean long-term forecast minus the mean long-term forecast of the quarter of the 
large (in absolute value) forecast error. I also examine a more long-term perspective by calculating 
the difference in the mean long-term forecast between the same quarter next year minus the current 
quarter. For the case of the high forecast errors, the mean difference between the current and the 
next quarter is -0.11%(Panel C). For the case of low (negative) forecast errors, the mean difference 
is -0.2497% (Panel D). The differences are not economically important, and what is more, they are 
not significantly different. For the case of the one year difference, for the high forecast errors the 
mean difference is -0.6367%, while for the low forecast errors is -0.86%. Again, they are not 
significantly different from each other. 
 
I examine the inverse hypothesis, how big are the forecast errors in the case of an extreme change in 
the long-term forecasts. The summary statistics of the change in long-term forecasts are presented at 
Table [26] Panel B. For the case of an excessive (above 90%) increase in the long-term forecasts in 
the period of one quarter, the mean forecast error is -0.0008615. For the case of an excessive 
decline (below 10%), the mean forecast error is 0.0017785. The difference between the two isn’t 
statistically significant. 
 
As a result, it seems that the short term forecast error is not a crucial factor in determining the long-
term forecasts. In other words, the analysts don’t get optimistic or pessimistic because of 
extraordinary short term results. Also, when they increase (or decrease) their long-term forecasts, 
they are not influenced by short term results of the covered firm. 
 
V. H. Conclusion 
 
The conclusion from the above analysis is that the analyst long-term forecasts are mostly influenced 
by the current state of the economy and the age of the covered firms. They are not much influenced 
by the market returns or the returns of the covered firm, by the expectations about the GDP growth, 
they are not in agreement with profit forecasts issued by the forecasters of the SPF, and finally are 
not influenced by short term forecast errors. These facts, coupled with the non-zero forecast errors 
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 of the long-term forecasts, point to behavioral explanations for the behavior of the long-term 
forecasts: they analysts don’t take into consideration other forward looking data (market and firm 
specific returns, GDP forecasts, profit forecasts), while they take into account the current status of 
the economy (the GDP growth) and the age of the firm. 
 
VI. What do the Analysts miss? 
The previous sections have provided evidence that analysts systematically overestimate the 
prospects of all firms and especially the prospects of growth and big firms. The analysts are 
optimistic about their prospects, extrapolating their current performance to the future. However, the 
corporate profits tend to mean revert (Fama and French, JB 2000). Thus, it seems possible that 
analysts don’t take into consideration the mean reversion in firm performance. This section 
examines the performance of firms in different book-to-market and size quintiles. I examine two 
metrics of firm performance, the change in ratio of sales to cost of goods sold and the growth in 
assets. The first is considered to be a proxy for the effectiveness/efficacy of a firm: if it can increase 
its sales faster than its costs, it means that the firm becomes increasingly effective and competitive 
in using its inputs and it competitiveness increases. The second mirrors the history of the firm while 
it increases or decreases its assets. Using these two measures I investigate if there is any mean 
reversion in the corporate performance. 
 
Table [27] Panel A reports the median ratio of sales to cost of goods sold for the each book-to-
market and size quintile. For all size quintiles, the growth firms have a higher ratio, meaning they 
are more effective than the value firms of the same size quintiles. However, the small growth firms 
are less competent than the big growth firms. This is not true for the other book-to-market quintiles, 
where the smaller firms are more competent than the big firms of the same book-to-market quintile. 
Table [27] Panel B presents the change in efficacy during the next four years. With the exception of 
the big value firms, the growth in efficacy of the value firms is positive and larger than the growth 
of efficacy of the growth firms, which is negative. With respect to the book-to-market quintiles, the 
efficacy growth of the big firms of the first and second quintile is bigger than the growth of the 
small firms. On the other hand, for the last three quintiles the efficacy gains are larger for the small 
firms. 
 
Table [27] Panel C presents the four year growth in assets. The growth firms increase their assets 
very fast (increase of 70% for the small growth firms), while the value firms have the lowest growth 
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 rates. Also, the smaller firms of all book-to-market quintiles increase their assets faster than the 
large firms. 
 
Overall, the small growth firms seem to increase their assets and decrease their efficacy while they 
are growing. At the same time, the small and growth firms seem to be more competent. These two 
facts point to a mean reversion of efficacy of the growth firms and small firms, which is not picked 
up by the analysts. The firms that have good growth opportunities become less competent while 
they grow. This doesn’t mean that the value firms become more competent than the growth firms, 
but it means that the growth firms see their efficacy decrease, while the value firms improve their 
performance.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
I have examined the performance of the long-term analysts’ growth forecast. Analysts tend to 
overestimate the growth potential of most firms for most of the period from 1981 to 2011. The 
overestimation is prevalent among growth and large firms, while the overestimation for the case of 
value and small firms is much more moderate, allowing for periods of underestimation. The errors 
associated with growth firms are always higher for growth firms than value firms and also higher 
for large firms than for small firms, providing support for the extrapolation hypothesis. Another 
aspect of the analysts’ long-term forecasts is that they move together for all firm categories, even if 
they stay at different levels. I identify two  common factor behind this co-movement: the concurrent 
GDP growth and the age of the firms. On the other hand, the forecasts don’t seem to be influenced 
by more forward-looking factors like the GDP growth forecasts. Finally, even if the low book-to-
market firms are more efficient, they tend to decrease in efficiency after they are included in the low 
book-to-market portfolio, while the value firms that exhibit initially low efficiency tend to increase 
their efficiency in the following years. 
 
Overall, the results point to fact that analysts are overly optimistic and that they don’t take into 
consideration the mean reversion inherited in the performance of firms in competitive markets; they 
seem to extrapolate the recent results of the firms into the future. If the analysts’ forecasts are to be 
taken as a proxy for the investors’ expectations and forecasts, then also the investors are prone to 
naïve extrapolation. However, analysts are known for their optimism, stemming both from their 
need to keep in touch with a firm’s management and because of conflicts of interest.  
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Table 1. Expectations and expectation errors for the four years horizon for each book-to-market 
quintiles 
Book-to-market 
Quintile 
Simple 
Error 
Relative 
Error 
Long-Term 
Growth Forecast 
1 5.824758 0.215747 20 
2 3.920853 0.145143 15 
3 2.126846 0.069286 12.5 
4 1.434441 0.037311 11 
5 1.021879 0.012685 10.68 
 
Table 1: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each book-to-market quintile. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 
1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income 
for the next three to five years. I use four years as an average between three and five years. The 
simple error is defined as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual 
operating income four years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by 
the actual operating income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted 
annual growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from 
CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 2. Book-to-market quintiles expectations and expectation errors by exchange for the four 
years horizon 
 Exchange    
    
NYSE AmEx NASDAQ
Book-to-market 
Quintile   
1 Relative Error 0.23213 0.155448 0.201603 
  Growth forecast (%) 15 21.125 25 
    
2 Relative Error 0.181665 0.197138 0.086733 
  Growth forecast (%) 13 15 17.5 
    
3 Relative Error 0.099229 0.02513 0.026477 
  Growth forecast (%) 11 13 15 
    
4 Relative Error 0.051952 0.081121 -0.01567 
  Growth forecast (%) 9.5 15 14.5 
    
5 Relative Error 0.024055 0.183801 -0.08591 
  Growth forecast (%) 8.695 14.15 15 
 
Table 2: The table reports the median relative error and the median growth forecast for each book-
to-market quintile and each stock market. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-
2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the 
next three to five years. I use four years as an average between three and five years. The simple 
error is defined as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating 
income four years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the actual 
operating income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth 
rate in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The 
long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 3. Book-to-market quintiles expectations and expectation errors for the two years horizon 
Book-to-
market 
Quintile Simple Error 
Relative 
Error 
Long-Term 
Growth Forecast 
1 1.40394 0.06655 20 
2 1.188509 0.050976 15 
3 0.8018498 0.031007 12.5 
4 0.4819975 0.012345 11 
5 0.3237357 0.004301 10.68 
 
Table 3: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each book-to-market quintile. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 
1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income 
for the next three to five years. The simple error is defined as the two years ahead forecasted 
operating income minus the actual operating income four years  later. The relative error is defined 
as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating income two years later. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from 
Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 4. Book-to-market quintiles expectations and expectation errors by exchange for the two 
years horizon 
 
 Exchange    
    
NYSE AmEx NASDAQ
Book-to-market 
decile   
1 Relative Error 0.087617 0.067423 0.045952 
  Growth forecast (%) 15 21.125 25 
    
2 Relative Error 0.078291 0.088837 0.018012 
  Growth forecast (%) 13 15 17.5 
    
3 Relative Error 0.05663 0.037138 -0.00129 
  Growth forecast (%) 11 13 15 
    
4 Relative Error 0.020328 0.029178 -0.01227 
  Growth forecast (%) 9.5 15 14.5 
    
5 Relative Error 0.009566 0.017342 -0.01993 
  Growth forecast (%) 8.695 14.15 15 
 
Table 4: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each book-to-market quintile and by stock market. The forecasts were issued by 
analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth 
of operating income for the next three to five years. The simple error is defined as the two years 
ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating income four years  later. The relative 
error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating income two years later. 
The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. The accounting 
data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from 
IBES.  
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Table 5.  Size quintiles expectations and expectation errors for the four years horizon 
Size 
Quintile Simple Error Relative Error 
Long-Term 
Growth Forecast
1 0.394376 0.006722 16.5 
2 2.020374 0.075275 15 
3 4.683392 0.117076 14 
4 12.9744 0.154531 12 
5 45.19731 0.130472 11 
 
Table 5: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each size quintile. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and 
are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the next three 
to five years. I use four years as an average between three and five years. The simple error is 
defined as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating income four 
years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating 
income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in 
percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3
219
Table 6.   Size quintiles expectations and expectation errors by exchange for the four years horizon 
 Exchange    
    
NYSE AmEx NASDAQSize Quintile   
1 Relative Error 0.028861 0.047041 -0.00035 
  Growth forecast (%) 12.9 15 18 
    
2 Relative Error 0.041634 0.098232 0.103612 
  Growth forecast (%) 13 15 18 
    
3 Relative Error 0.113054 0.141435 0.12095 
  Growth forecast (%) 12 15 17 
    
4 Relative Error 0.148535 0.241926 0.161241 
  Growth forecast (%) 11 15 17.5 
    
5 Relative Error 0.121245 0.87553 0.187674 
  Growth forecast (%) 10 14.125 18 
 
Table 6: The table reports the median relative error and the median growth forecast for each size 
quintile and each stock market. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and 
are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the next three 
to five years. I use four years as an average between three and five years. The simple error is 
defined as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating income four 
years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating 
income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in 
percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 7. Size quintiles expectations and expectation errors for the two years horizon 
Size 
Quintile Simple Error Relative Error
Long-Term Growth 
Forecast 
1 0.082824 -0.008 16.5 
2 0.604317 0.019336 15 
3 1.781837 0.047455 14 
4 4.71273 0.05938 12 
5 17.17621 0.053816 11 
 
Table 7: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each size quintile. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and 
are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the next three 
to five years. The simple error is defined as the two years ahead forecasted operating income minus 
the actual operating income four years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is 
divided by the actual operating income two years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the 
forecasted annual growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data 
comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 8.   Size quintiles expectations and expectation errors by exchange for the two years horizon 
 Exchange   
    
NYSE AmEx NASDAQSize Quintile   
1 Relative Error 0.021354 0.013657 -0.01476
  Growth forecast 12.9 15 18
      
2 Relative Error 0.015252 0.048453 0.02219
  Growth forecast 13 15 18
      
3 Relative Error 0.051914 0.053795 0.038259
  Growth forecast 12 15 17
      
4 Relative Error 0.063393 0.110109 0.036387
  Growth forecast 11 15 17.5
      
5 Relative Error 0.053286 0.263204 0.052463
  Growth forecast 10 14.125 18
 
Table 8: The table reports the median simple error, the median relative error and the median growth 
forecast for each size quintile. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and 
are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the next three 
to five years. The simple error is defined as the two years ahead forecasted operating income minus 
the actual operating income four years  later. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is 
divided by the actual operating income two years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the 
forecasted annual growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data 
comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 9. Size and book-to-market quintiles relative errors  for the four years horizon 
Book-to-market quintile            
1 2 3 4 5 
size quintile 
1 0.1073413 0.0345812 0.0360601 -0.02088 -0.0808132 
2 0.2253785 0.1015829 0.0289075 0.0155379 0.0089975 
3 0.2334118 0.1870988 0.0349756 0.0470354 0.0493386 
4 0.2495524 0.1860047 0.1574714 0.0683645 0.0526462 
5 0.210604 0.165409 0.1174748 0.060166 0.0135154 
 
Table 9: The table reports the median relative error for each book-to-market and size quintile. The 
forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating 
an average annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. I use four years as an 
average between three and five years. The simple error is defined as the four years ahead forecasted 
operating income minus the actual operating income four years  later. The relative error is defined 
as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating income four years later. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from 
Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 10. Long term growth forecast and error correlations among book-to-market quintiles 
Panel A: Long term growth forecast correlations 
Book-to-market 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 
2 0.9269 1 
3 0.8687 0.9401 1 
4 0.8458 0.909 0.9899 1 
5 0.8491 0.8767 0.9612 0.9761 1 
 
Panel B: Relative error correlations 
Book-to-market 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 
2 0.7275 1 
3 0.7304 0.816 1 
4 0.7513 0.8075 0.8655 1 
5 0.8477 0.6686 0.4937 0.7562 1 
 
Panel C: Correlations between the relative error and the expectations for each book-to-market  
quintile (p-values in parentheses) 
Long-term growth forecast 
Book-to-market 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.40  (0.0)
2 -0.1346 (0.1773)
Relative Error 3 0.5784 (0.0)
4 0.4242(0.0) 
5 0.5735 (0.0)
 
Table 10: The table reports the correlations between each two book-to-market quintiles for the case 
of long-term forecasts (Panel A) and relative errors (Panel B) and between relative errors and long-
term forecasts (Panel C) for each book-to-market quintile for the period 1981-2011 . The forecasts 
were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. I use four years as an average 
between three and five years. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the 
actual operating income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual 
growth rate in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  
The long-term forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 11. Long term growth forecast and error correlations among size quintiles 
Panel A: Long term growth forecast correlations for size quintiles 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 
2 0.9285 1 
3 0.981 0.9239 1 
4 0.9577 0.9197 0.9675 1 
5 0.9845 0.9289 0.9819 0.9846 1 
 
Panel B: Relative error correlations 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 
2 0.6841 1 
3 0.5946 0.9043 1 
4 0.7297 0.9659 0.919 1 
5 0.4824 0.8963 0.9051 0.9212 1 
 
Panel C: Correlations between the relative error and the expectations for each size  quintile (p-
values in parentheses) 
 
Long term growth forecast 
Size 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 -0.176 (0.0765) 
2 -0.027 (0.7858) 
Relative Error 3 0.2455 (0.0129) 
4 0.187 (0.0596) 
5 0.556 (0.0) 
 
Table 11: The table reports the correlations between each two size quintiles for the case of long-
term forecasts (Panel A) and relative errors (Panel B) and between relative errors and long-term 
forecasts (Panel C) for each size quintile for the period 1981-2011 . The forecasts were issued by 
analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth 
of operating income for the next three to five years. I use four years as an average between three 
and five years. The relative error is defined as the simple error but is divided by the actual operating 
income four years later. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in 
percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES.  
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Table 12. Market returns and long-term growth forecasts 
Panel A: Correlation between cumulative quarterly market returns and the long term growth 
forecasts for all firms 
Correlation (p-value): 0.0209 (0.0)  
Panel B: Change in the long-term growth forecasts for the case of positive quarterly market returns 
Percentile 10 25 50 75 90 Mean St. Dev. 
-2 -0.4 0 0.12 1.34 -0.18 4.17 
 
Panel C: Change in the long-term growth forecasts for the case of negative quarterly market returns 
Percentile 10 25 50 75 90 Mean St. Dev. 
-2.5 -0.54 0 0.07 1.33 -0.39 4.74 
 
Table 12: The table reports the correlation between cumulative market return over each calendar 
quarter and the long-term forecasts (Panel A), summary statistics of the long-term growth forecasts 
for the case of positive cumulative market returns (Panel B) and summary statistics of the long-term 
growth forecasts for the case of negative cumulative market returns (Panel C). The forecasts were 
issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-
term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 13. Correlation between quarterly market returns and the book-to-market quintiles 
Panel A: Correlation between mean long term-growth forecast and the quarterly market return 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Correlation 
1 0.2406 (0.0087) 
2 0.096 (0.3013) 
3 0.164 (0.07519) 
4 0.1055 (0.255) 
5 0.1378 (0.1366) 
 
Panel B: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each book-to-market quintile for the case of 
quarterly market returns of equal or less than 10% 
Book-to-market 
Quintile 
Change in the mean 
forecast 
1 -0.12779 
2 -0.17492 
3 -0.1738 
4 -0.1884 
5 -0.326 
 
Panel C: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each book-to-market quintile for the case of 
quarterly market returns of equal or more than 10% 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Change in the mean forecast
1 0.1694 
2 -0.095 
3 0.2037 
4 0.054 
5 0.1267 
 
Table 13: The table reports the correlation between cumulative market return over each calendar 
quarter and the long-term forecasts (Panel A), the change in long-term growth forecasts for the case 
of market returns of less than -10%(Panel B) and the change in long-term growth forecasts for the 
case of market returns of more than 10% (Panel C) for each book-to-market quintile. The forecasts 
were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-
term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 14. Correlation between quarterly market returns and the size quintiles 
Panel A: Correlation between mean long term-growth forecast and the quarterly market return 
Size 
Quintile Correlation 
1 0.112 (0.2272) 
2 0.202 (0.0283) 
3 0.1621 (0.0795) 
4 0.0993 (0.2849) 
5 0.1880 (0.0415) 
 
Panel B: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each size quintile for the case of quarterly 
market returns of equal or less than 10% 
Size 
Quintile 
Change in the mean 
forecast 
1 -0.12779 
2 -0.17492 
3 -0.1738 
4 -0.1884 
5 -0.326 
 
Panel C: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each size quintile for the case of quarterly 
market returns of equal or more than 10% 
Size 
Quintile 
Change in the mean 
forecast 
1 -0.0756 
2 0.21499 
3 0.2228 
4 -0.0257 
5 0.1303 
 
Table 14: The table reports the correlation between cumulative market return over each calendar 
quarter and the long-term forecasts (Panel A), the change in long-term growth forecasts for the case 
of market returns of less than -10%(Panel B) and the change in long-term growth forecasts for the 
case of market returns of more than 10% (Panel C) for each size quintile. The forecasts were issued 
by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual 
growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the 
forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 15. Correlation between firm returns and long-term growth forecasts 
Panel A: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each book-to-market quintile for the case of 
quarterly market returns of equal or less than -10% 
Number of quarters in a 
row with return of equal 
or less than -10% 
Mean change 
(%) 
Median change 
(%) 
Number 
of cases
1 -0.37861 0 17,127 
2 -1.11005 -0.15 4,683 
3 -2.39732 -1.08 1,501 
4 -3.43498 -2 440 
5 -4.2232 -3.33 169 
6 -4.82069 -3.25 58 
7 -8.388 -3.42 20 
8 -10.771 -8.375 10 
9 -6.17 -6.17 2 
10 -11.125 -11.125 2 
 
Panel B: Change in the mean long-term forecast of each book-to-market quintile for the case of 
quarterly market returns of equal or greater than 10% 
Number of quarters in a 
row with return of equal or 
greater than 10% Mean change(%) Median change (%) 
Number of 
cases 
1 -0.10321 0 17,656 
2 -0.08758 0 4,400 
3 0.377031 0 1,209 
4 0.919756 0.25 369 
5 1.246471 1 119 
6 2.955102 2.5 49 
7 7.864286 2 7 
8 9.846666 8.83 3 
9 6.25 6.25 1 
 
Table 15: The table reports the mean and median change of long-term forecasts in the case of a 
series of quarters of negative firm returns of equal or less than -10% (Panel A) and in the case of a 
series of quarters of positive firm returns of equal or more than 10% (Panel B). The forecasts were 
issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-
term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 16. Correlations between GDP growth and long-term growth forecasts of book-to-market 
quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.4601 (0.0) 
2 0.4225 (0.0) 
3 0.039 (0.675) 
4 -0.2218 (0.0158) 
5 -0.2312 (0.0118) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2011 period 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.8854 (0.0) 
2 0.7582 (0.0) 
3 0.5347 (0.0) 
4 0.3109 (0.0) 
5 0.3638 (0.0) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 period 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.6614 (0.0) 
2 0.9449 (0.0) 
3 0.5069 (0.0) 
4 -0.8494 (0.0) 
5 -0.9852 (0.0) 
 
Table 16: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each book-
to-market quintile and the GDP growth  for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-2011 period 
(Panel B) and 1981-1989 (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly frequency. Both the 
GDP growth series and the series of the long-term forecasts of each book-to-market quintile are 
smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 
1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income 
for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth 
rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3
230
Table 17. Correlations between GDP growth and long-term growth forecasts of size quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Size Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.3537 (0.0) 
2 0.166 (0.0714) 
3 0.1322 (0.1356) 
4 0.1285 (0.1656) 
5 -0.0175 (0.8511) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2011 period 
Size Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.817 (0.0) 
2 0.7498 (0.0) 
3 0.6951 (0.0) 
4 0.5274 (0.0) 
5 0.3467 (0.011) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 period 
Size Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 -0.6070 (0.0002) 
2 -0.7466 (0.0) 
3 -0.9645 (0.0) 
4 0.9130 (0.0) 
5 0.7473 (0.0) 
 
 
Table 17: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile and the GDP growth for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-2011 period (Panel B) 
and 1981-1989 (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly frequency. Both GDP growth 
series and the series of the long-term forecasts of each size quintile are smoothed by using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are 
long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the next three to 
five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market 
returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 18. Correlations between four quarter ahead forecasted average GDP growth and long-term 
growth forecasts of book-to-market quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Book-to-market 
Quinitile Correlation (p-value) 
1 -0.2362 (0.0097) 
2 -0.2103 (0.0217) 
3 -0.5577 (0.0) 
4 -0.707 (0.0) 
5 -0.6955 (0.0) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2011 
Book-to-market 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.1502 (0.1676) 
2 -0.0474 (0.6648) 
3 -0.2108 (0.0514) 
4 -0.321 (0.0026) 
5 -0.1117 (0.3057) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Book-to-market 
Quintiles Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.4384 (0.0107) 
2 0.9907 (0.0) 
3 0.2857 (0.107) 
4 -0.7656 (0.0) 
5 -0.9331 (0.0) 
 
Table 18: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each book-
to-market quintile and the four quarters ahead average GDP forecasts for the 1981-2011 period 
(Panel A), the 1990-2011 period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data 
comes in quarterly frequency. Both the four quarters ahead average GDP forecasts series and the 
series of the long-term forecasts of each book-to-market quintile are smoothed by using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The GDP forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The 
forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating 
an average annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from 
CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 19. Correlations between four quarter ahead forecasted average GDP growth and long-term 
growth forecasts of size quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Size 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 -0.3164 (0.0005) 
2 -0.5067 (0.0) 
3 -0.5192 (0.0) 
4 -0.4151 (0.0) 
5 -0.4619 (0.0) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2011 
Size 
Quintile Correlation (p-value) 
1 0.2131 (0.0489) 
2 0.0568 (0.6035) 
3 -0.0208 (0.8493) 
4 -0.1550 (0.1542) 
5 -0.2388 (0.0268) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.7594 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.8566 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.9964 (0.0) 
4  0.9738 (0.0) 
5  0.8634 (0.0) 
 
Table 19: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile and the four quarters ahead average GDP forecasts for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 
1990-2011 period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in 
quarterly frequency. Both the four quarters ahead average GDP forecasts series and the series of the 
long-term forecasts of each size quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The 
GDP forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The forecasts were issued by 
analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth 
of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the 
forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 20. Correlations between ten years ahead forecasted average GDP growth and long-term 
growth forecasts of book-to-market quintiles 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.0829 (0.4705) 
2  ‐0.0425 (0.7118) 
3  0.2583 (0.0224) 
4  0.5044 (0.0) 
5  0.5598 (0.0) 
 
Table 20: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each book-
to-market quintile and the ten years ahead average GDP forecasts for the 1990-2011 period. The 
data comes in quarterly frequency. Both the ten years ahead average GDP forecasts series and the 
series of the long-term forecasts of each book-to-market quintile are smoothed by using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The GDP forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The 
forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating 
an average annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from 
CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
 
Table 21. Correlations between ten years ahead forecasted average GDP growth and long-term 
growth forecasts of size quintiles 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  0.1507 (0.1877) 
2  0.1012 (0.378) 
3  0.1107 (0.3348) 
4  0.3128 (0.0053) 
5  0.4623 (0.0) 
 
Table 21: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile and the ten years ahead average GDP forecasts for the 1990-2011 period. The data comes in 
quarterly frequency. Both the ten years ahead average GDP forecasts series and the series of the 
long-term forecasts of each size quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The 
GDP forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The forecasts were issued by 
analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth 
of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the 
forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 22. Correlations between four quarters ahead corporate profits growth forecasts and long-
term growth forecasts of book-to-market quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintiles  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.3101 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.152 (0.099) 
3  ‐0.3471 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.3801 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.3981 (0.0) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2010 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintiles  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.3372 (0.0015) 
2  ‐0.3972 (0.0002) 
3  ‐0.2878 (0.0072) 
4  ‐0.1545 (0.1556) 
5  0.0136 (0.9011) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintiles  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  0.3804 (0.029) 
2  0.9986 (0.0) 
3  0.1846 (0.304) 
4  ‐0.6892 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.8941 (0.0) 
 
Table 22: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each book-
to-market quintile and the corporate profits  forecasts for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-
2011 period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly 
frequency. Both the corporate profits forecasts series and the series of the long-term forecasts of 
each book-to-market quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The corporate 
profits forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The long-term forecasts were 
issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-
term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 23. Correlations between four quarters ahead corporate profits growth forecasts and long-
term growth forecasts of size quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2011 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.3468 (0.0001) 
2  ‐0.4573 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.4527 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.2039 (0.0261) 
5  ‐0.1802 (0.0499) 
 
 
Panel B: 1990-2011 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.1678 (0.1225) 
2  ‐0.2559 (0.0174) 
3  ‐0.3132 (0.0033) 
4  ‐0.2236 (0.0385) 
5  ‐0.1555 (0.1528) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.8025 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.8839 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.9963 (0.0) 
4  0.9881 (0.0) 
5  0.8970 (0.0) 
 
Table 23: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile and the corporate profits  forecasts for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-2011 
period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly 
frequency. Both the corporate profits forecasts series and the series of the long-term forecasts of 
each size quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The corporate profits forecasts 
come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The long-term forecasts were issued by analysts 
for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of 
operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted 
annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts 
come from IBES. 
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Table 24. Correlations between age and long-term growth forecasts for each book-to-market 
quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2010 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.7963 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.7836 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.7938 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.6991 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.7876 (0.0) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2010 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.8398 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.8171 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.7447 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.6028 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.5734 (0.0) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Book‐to‐market 
Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  0.0095 (0.9583) 
2  0.7730 (0.0) 
3  0.6014 (0.0002) 
4  ‐0.7981 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.9655 (0.0) 
 
Table 24: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each book-
to-market quintile and each quintile’s mean firm age for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-
2011 period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly 
frequency. Both each quintile’s mean firm age series and the series of the long-term forecasts of 
each book-to-market quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term 
forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating 
an average annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from 
CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 25. Correlations between age and long-term growth forecasts for each size quintiles 
Panel A: Whole sample 1981-2010 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.6848 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.7689 (0.0) 
3  ‐0.8932 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.9430 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.6599 (0.0) 
 
Panel B: 1990-2010 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.6860 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.6801(0.0) 
3  ‐0.8764 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.9249 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.8863 (0.0) 
 
Panel C: 1981-1989 
Size Quintile  Correlation (p‐value) 
1  ‐0.8020 (0.0) 
2  ‐0.6445 (0.0) 
3  0.8390 (0.0) 
4  ‐0.9939 (0.0) 
5  ‐0.8603 (0.0) 
 
Table 25: The table reports the correlations between the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile and each quintile’s mean firm age for the 1981-2011 period (Panel A), the 1990-2011 
period (Panel B) and 1981-1989 period (Panel C). In all Panels the data comes in quarterly 
frequency. Both each quintile’s mean firm age series and the series of the long-term forecasts of 
each size quintile are smoothed by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term forecasts were 
issued by analysts for the period 1981-2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average 
annual growth of operating income for the next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate in percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-
term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Table 26. Interaction between quarterly forecasts and long-term growth forecasts 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the quarterly forecast errors 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐0.066  ‐0.01  0.01  0.036  0.09  0.001  0.4012 
  
Panel B: Summary statistics of the long-term growth forecasts changes between two subsequent 
quarters 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐2.5  ‐0.5  0  0  1.5  ‐0.26  3.98 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics of long-term growth forecast changes between the current and the next  
quarter in the case of quarterly forecast error of less than -0.066 dollars 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐2.5  ‐0.5  0  0  1.5  ‐0.2497  5.31 
 
Panel D: Summary statistics of long-term growth forecast changes between the current and the next  
quarter in the case of quarterly forecast error of more than 0.09 dollars 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐2  ‐0.25  0  0  2  ‐0.1158  4.38 
 
Panel E: Summary statistics of long-term growth forecast changes between the current and the same 
quarter of next year in the case of quarterly forecast error of less than -0.066 dollars 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐5  ‐2  0  0.5  2.5  ‐0.864  5.66 
 
Panel F: Summary statistics of long-term growth forecast changes between the current and the same 
quarter of next year in the case of quarterly forecast error of more than 0.09 cents 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐5  ‐1.5  0  1  3  ‐0.6367  6.03 
 
Panel G: Summary statistics of quarterly forecast error in the case of a change in long-term growth 
forecast between subsequent quarters smaller than -2.5% 
 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐0.07  ‐0.012  0.01  0.035  0.09  0.00177  0.2234 
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Panel H: Summary statistics of quarterly forecast error in the case of a change in long-term growth 
forecast between subsequent quarters greater than 1.5% 
   10  25  50  75  90  Mean  St. Dev. 
Percentile  ‐0.07  ‐0.01  0.01  0.0333  0.0862  ‐0.00086 0.4987 
 
 
Table 26: The table reports summary statistics of the quarterly forecast error defined as the actual 
ESP minus the forecast (Panel A), summary statistics of long-term growth forecasts changes 
between two subsequent quarters (Panel B), summary statistics of the long-term growth forecast 
changes between the current and the next  quarter in the case the quarterly forecast error belongs to 
the lowest decile of quarterly forecast errors (Panel C), summary statistics of the long-term growth 
forecast changes between the current and the next  quarter in the case the quarterly forecast error 
belongs to the top decile of quarterly forecast errors (Panel D), summary statistics of long-term 
growth forecast changes between the current and the same quarter of next year in the case the 
quarterly forecast error belongs to the lowest decile of quarterly forecast error (Panel E), summary 
statistics of long-term growth forecast changes between the current and the same quarter of next 
year in the case the quarterly forecast error belongs to the top decile of quarterly forecast error 
(Panel F), summary statistics of quarterly forecast error in the case the change in long-term growth 
forecast between subsequent quarters belongs to the lowest decile of changes in long-term growth 
forecasts (Panel G) and summary statistics of quarterly forecast error in the case the change in long-
term growth forecast between subsequent quarters belongs to the top decile of changes in long-term 
growth forecasts (Panel H).The long-term forecasts were issued by analysts for the period 1981-
2011 and are long-term forecasts estimating an average annual growth of operating income for the 
next three to five years. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate in 
percent. Market returns data comes from CRSP.  The long-term and quarterly forecasts come from 
IBES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3
240
Table 27. Efficacy of book-to-market and size quintiles 
Panel A: Efficacy of book-to-market and size quintiles 
Size Quintile 
1  2  3  4  5 
1  1.587518 1.699177 1.736093 1.760395  1.836937 
2  1.520543 1.529182 1.540839 1.494808  1.502213 
Book‐to‐market quintile  3  1.468685 1.460724 1.420812 1.419075  1.402716 
4  1.423275 1.402302 1.375877 1.365854  1.364105 
5  1.357724 1.312062 1.300159 1.31074  1.302348 
 
Panel B: Growth in efficacyof book-to-market and size quintiles 
Size Quintile 
1  2  3  4  5 
1  ‐0.00375 ‐0.01123 ‐0.01111 ‐0.00469 0.001743 
2  ‐0.00412 ‐0.00521 ‐0.00248 ‐0.00058 0.001017 
Book‐to‐market quintile  3  ‐0.00411 ‐0.00258 9.77E‐05 0.00071  ‐0.00466 
4  ‐3.6E‐05  0.000661 0.000178 ‐0.00102 ‐0.00504 
5  0.007208 0.004169 0.004776 0.009404 ‐0.0062 
 
Panel C: Growth in assets of book-to-market and size quintiles 
Size Quintile 
1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.704284 0.674553 0.649736 0.635414  0.546363 
2  0.491381 0.501883 0.468922 0.403061  0.375754 
Book‐to‐market quintile  3  0.387256 0.357736 0.368105 0.315917  0.310617 
4  0.308277 0.287771 0.317596 0.303627  0.304279 
5  0.198513 0.163678 0.204313 0.213145  0.162445 
 
 
Table 27: The table reports the efficacy of the firms at each book-to-market and size quintile for the 
1981-2011 period (Panel A), the growth in efficacy in the next four years at each book-to-market 
and size quintile for the 1981-2011 period (Panel B) and the growth in assets in the next four years 
at each book-to-market and size quintile for the 1981-2011 period (Panel C) . In all Panels the data 
comes in quarterly frequency. Efficacy is defined as the ratio of sales to cost of goods sold. The 
accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.   
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Figure 1. Number of firms at the long-term growth forecasts IBES summary file 
 
Figure 1: The figure presents the number of firms present at IBES every year. 
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Figure 2. Number of long-term growth forecasts at the IBES Details file 
 
Figure 2:  The figure presents the number of long-term forecasts per year in the IBES Details file. 
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Figure 3. Number of firms in each book-to-market quintile 
 
Figure 3: The figure presents the number of firms in each book-to-market quintile for which long-
term forecasts are available at the IBES Details file. The accounting data comes from Compustat 
and the stock prices data comes from CRSP. 
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Figure 4. Number of firms in each size quintile 
 
Figure 4: The figure presents the number of firms in each size quintile for which long-term forecasts 
are available at the IBES Details file. The stock prices data comes from CRSP. 
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Figure 5.Operating income for Microsoft 
 
Figure 5: The figure presents the original and the smoothed series of operating income for the case 
of Microsoft. The original data was smoothed by using a moving average of the current and the last 
4 quarters of a firm’s operating income. The accounting data comes from Compustat. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of initial expected earnings growth  for book-to-market quintiles 
Panel A: 1st book-to-market quintile 
 
 
Panel B: 2nd book-to-market quintile 
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Panel C: 3rd book-to-market quintile 
 
 
Panel D: 4th book-to-market quintile 
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Panel E: 5th book-to-market quintile 
 
 
Figure 6: The figure presents the distribution of the initial expected earnings growth for each book-
to-market quintile for the 1981-2011 period. The initial expected earnings growth is the difference 
between the EPS forecasts  issued eight months or earlier than the announcement of the results of 
the next FYE and the previous FYE’s EPS. Each bin corresponds to five cents. Both forecasts and 
actual results come from IBES. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of initial expected earnings growth  for size quintiles 
Panel A: 1st size quintile 
 
 
Panel B: 2nd size quintile 
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Panel C: 3rd size quintile 
 
 
Panel D: 4th size quintile 
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Panel E: 5th size quintile 
 
Figure 7: The figure presents the distribution of the initial expected earnings growth for each size 
quintile for the 1981-2011 period. The initial expected earnings growth is the difference between 
the EPS forecasts  issued eight months or earlier than the announcement of the results of the next 
FYE and the previous FYE’s EPS. Each bon corresponds to five cents. Both forecasts and actual 
results come from IBES. 
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Figure 8. Relative errors for each book-to-market quintile  
 
Figure 8: The figure presents the relative errors for each book-to-market quintile. The relative error 
is defined as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating income 
four years  later divided by the actual operating income four years later. The original series are 
smoothed by the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted 
annual growth rate of operating income in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. 
Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 9. Relative errors for each size quintile 
 
Figure 9: The figure presents the relative errors for each size quintile. The relative error is defined 
as the four years ahead forecasted operating income minus the actual operating income four years  
later divided by the actual operating income four years later. The original series are smoothed by 
the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth 
rate of operating income in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes 
from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 10. Long-term growth forecasts for each book-to-market quintile 
 
Figure 10: The figure presents the long-term forecasts for each book-to-market quintile. The 
original series are smoothed by the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term growth forecasts 
are the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in percent. The accounting data comes 
from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 11. Long-term growth forecasts by size quintile 
 
Figure 11: The figure presents the long-term forecasts for each size quintile. The original series are 
smoothed by the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted 
annual growth rate of operating income in percent. The accounting data comes from Compustat. 
Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 12. GDP growth and long-term growth forecasts for book-to-market quintiles 
 
Figure 12: The figure presents the long-term forecasts for each book-to-market quintile and the 
GDP growth . The original series are smoothed by the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term 
growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in percent. The 
accounting data comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts 
come from IBES. 
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Figure 13. GDP growth and long-term growth forecasts for size quintiles 
 
Figure 13: The figure presents the long-term forecasts for each size quintile and the GDP growth . 
The original series are smoothed by the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-term growth 
forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in percent. The accounting data 
comes from Compustat. Stock data comes from CRSP.  The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 14. Forecasted and realized average quarterly GDP growth (one year ahead forecasts) 
 
Figure 14: The figure presents the one year ahead forecasted and realized average quarterly GDP 
growth. The GDP forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
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Figure 15. Original and smoothed series of the four quarters ahead corporate profits growth 
forecasts 
 
Figure 15: The figure presents the original and smoothed series of the four quarters ahead corporate 
profits growth forecasts. The original series was smoothed by the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
The corporate profits forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
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Figure 16. Relation between age and median long-term growth forecast 
 
Figure 16: The figure presents the relation between firm age and median long-term growth forecast. 
The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in 
percent. The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 17. Relation between the median long-term growth forecasts of each book-to-market 
quintile and the firm age 
 
Figure 17: The figure presents the relation between firm age and median long-term growth forecast 
for each book-to-market qunitile. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth 
rate of operating income in percent. Accounting data comes from Compustat. The long-term 
forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 18. Relation between the median long-term growth forecasts of each size quintile and the 
firm age 
 
Figure 18: The figure presents the relation between firm age and median long-term growth forecast 
for each size qunitile. The long-term growth forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate of 
operating income in percent. Accounting data comes from Compustat. The long-term forecasts 
come from IBES. 
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Figure 19. Average age and the long-term growth forecasts of each book-to-market quintile 
Panel A: 1st book-to-market quintile 
 
Panel B: 2nd book-to-market quintile 
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Panel C: 3rd book-to-market quintile 
 
Panel D: 4th book-to-market quintile 
 
 
 
40
50
60
70
80
A
ge
 (Q
ua
rte
rs
)
12
13
14
15
16
17
G
ro
w
th
 E
st
im
at
es
 (%
)
1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Quarter
Median Grwoth Estimate Age
40
50
60
70
A
ge
 (Q
ua
rte
rs
)
8
10
12
14
16
G
ro
w
th
 E
st
im
at
es
1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Quarter
Median Growth Estimates Age
CHAPTER 3
265
Panel E: 5th book-to-market quintile 
 
Figure 19: The figure presents the relation between the median firm age and median long-term 
growth forecast for each book-to-market quintile for the 1981-2011 period. The long-term growth 
forecasts are the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in percent. Accounting data 
comes from Compustat. The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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Figure 20. Correlations between the average age and the long-term growth forecasts of each size 
quintile 
Panel A: 1st size quintile 
 
Panel B: 2nd size quintile 
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Panel C: 3rd size quintile 
 
Panel D: 4th size quintile 
 
 
 
20
30
40
50
60
A
ge
 (Q
ua
rte
rs
)
12
14
16
18
20
22
G
ro
w
th
 E
st
im
at
es
 (%
)
1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Quarter
Median Growth Estimates Median Age
30
40
50
60
70
80
A
ge
 (Q
ua
rte
rs
)
12
14
16
18
20
G
ro
w
th
 E
st
im
at
es
 (%
)
1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Quarter
Median Growth Estimates Median Age
CHAPTER 3
268
Panel E: 5th size quintile 
 
Figure 20: The figure presents the relation between the median firm age and median long-term 
growth forecast for each size quintile for the 1981-2011 period. The long-term growth forecasts are 
the forecasted annual growth rate of operating income in percent. Accounting data comes from 
Compustat. The long-term forecasts come from IBES. 
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